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ART. I.—*The Church is founded on Peter—is an organism, living its own life from within, not an aggregation, or a simple organization deriving its life from its members.*

MR. GLADSTONE has added a new word to the English language, *Vaticanism*, but it may not, after all, prove a permanent addition, for it meets no Catholic want, and serves only a temporary want of Protestant polemics. Yet the Vatican, with all deference to his Eminence, the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, has introduced one very important innovation, not in doctrine indeed, but in the mode of presenting it. The Holy Council of the Vatican is, we believe, the first Œcumenical Council that has treated the Primacy of Peter as the first part of *De Ecclesia*, or the foundation before treating the body of the edifice. All previous councils, and all the theologians we are acquainted with, had treated the Primacy as the second part of the tract, *De Ecclesia*. Thomists, Augustinians, Jesuits, Gallicans, Ultramontanes, the highest-toned papists, as well as the lowest-toned, those who recognized the Primacy at all, had uniformly treated the body of the Church before treating its head. Even the theologians designated to prepare the "Schema de Ecclesia" for the consideration of the council, undoubted papists and infallibilists as they were, did the same.

This persistence in what has always struck us as an unscientific method, cannot easily be explained otherwise than by the reluctance of any theologian to assume, on his own

responsibility, to deviate from it, or the tenacity with which the Catholic mind adheres to established usage; and it is no slight proof of the presence and controlling influence of the Holy Ghost in the council, that the Fathers were able to change the method of treating this article of the faith against the uniform practice of councils and theologians, and to adopt what is really the scientific method of treatment. Undoubtedly, the need of defining the powers and prerogatives of the Primacy, before they would be compelled to suspend their sessions, or to separate, perhaps never to assemble again in this world, was the occasion used by the Holy Ghost to induce them to adopt the innovation, and treat the Head before proceeding to treat the body.

This seems at first sight a small matter, but it is in our judgment important; and the change is in some measure necessary to guard against the error that the Church can exist as the Church of Christ without the pope: which we hold to be impossible. The Church is founded on Peter, and without Peter it has no foundation. A church without a foundation is founded on nothing and is nothing—a castle in the air. Till you have Peter, you have no Church. We cannot understand, therefore, how we can treat scientifically the Church before treating the Primacy, without which there is no Church. We beg here to introduce a brief disquisition on the *Constitution of the Church*, written before we removed from Boston in 1855, though not published till January, 1856. We omit the portion of the essay written after our removal to this city, when the REVIEW in a measure changed its character, and sought to coöperate with those of our friends who made it their specialty to labor directly for the conversion of non-Catholic Americans. There was something generous and patriotic, and yet more of enthusiasm in the movement which the REVIEW sought to aid, but it came to nothing, and the REVIEW caused its own ruin. It went so far at last, that many of its early friends hardly recognized it as Catholic, and non-Catholics began to look for our return to their ranks, as if they had anything to offer us that we had not sufficiently tried before our conversion.

Yet, however we may have been misled by a mistaken policy, against which we inwardly revolted, we held fast, through the grace of God, to our faith, and held, as we still hold, the Church to be essentially papal in her constitution.

We do not view with indifference the conversion of our non-Catholic countrymen, in whose conversion and incorporation into the Catholic body is the only hope, not only of their salvation, but of our civil society, becoming most fearfully corrupt, indeed, rotten to the core. But to their conversion there are many obstacles which, in the ordinary course of Divine Providence, can be only slowly overcome, and with great labor and difficulty, prayer and self-sacrifice, which surpass the zeal and charity of the mass even of our Catholic population, who have hardly learned as yet that this is their country. We can, as laymen, only pray for their conversion, and, as far as we are permitted, present them Catholic truth in its integrity. The article from which we make our extracts was written *à propos* of a work on Church authority by the eminent convert, the late Rev. Robert I. Wilberforce.

“ART. I.—*An Inquiry into the Principles of Church Authority ; or, Reasons for recalling my Subscription to the Royal Supremacy.* By the Rev. R. I. WILBERFORCE, M.A. Baltimore: Hedian & O'Brien, 1855. 12mo, pp. 333.

“THE Church is not, as many suppose, a mere aggregation or association of individuals or congregations; she is an organism, living and operating from her own central life, derived from the indwelling Holy Ghost; and it is the failure of non-Catholics to recognize and appreciate this fact, that renders it so difficult for us to make them understand the importance of the unity of the Church, and the destructive nature of heresy and schism. The world outside the Church has lost, or never had, the true conception of unity in multiplicity, and seems unable to comprehend how that what is multiple can also be one, or how that what is one can also be multiple. All modern philosophy, if pushed to its last consequences, is either Atheistic or Pantheistic, and loses either unity on the one hand, or multiplicity on the other. In Germany, the tendency to Pantheism predominates, and multiplicity is sacrificed to unity. The universe is identified with its Maker, and the reality of second causes is denied. In Great Britain and our own country, the prevailing tendency is to Atheism. The British and American mind loses the conception of unity, or confounds it with the conception of totality, or the aggregate. The God it asserts, is

not the living God, but an induction from particulars, the last generalization of observable phenomena. With it, multiplicity precedes unity, and the universe is prior to its Creator. Its unity is the sum total, composite in its nature, therefore divisible, and therefore no true unity at all. Hence English and American non-Catholics fail to conceive the substantial unity of the Church, and regard her as formed or constituted by an aggregation or association of individuals and particular congregations. They place the members before the body, make the branches older than the trunk, and assume that the branches bear the vine, not the vine the branches. The individual believer, on their theory, precedes the Church, and imparts his life to her, so that she derives her life from Christ through believers, instead of believers deriving theirs from Christ through her.

“This is the common Protestant doctrine, and is the only doctrine on which they can protest against the Church, and yet claim to be in union with Christ. Protestants make no account of the unity of the Church, and really assign her no essential office in the salvation of souls. They see no grave evil in heresy and schism, and do not understand why it is that salvation is not attainable out of the communion of the Church as well as in it. Even some Catholics, more or less affected by the Atheistic philosophy of the age and country, and but imperfectly understanding the constitution of the Church, find themselves in some measure unable to perceive the reason or justice of the dogma of exclusive salvation. They accept the dogma, because it is a dogma of the Church, and they know that, to be Catholics, they must believe whatever she believes and teaches; but they do not well understand why it need be so; and they see no intrinsic reason why there should be any harm in admitting that a man who walks by such light as he has, and is sincere in his belief, can be saved out of the Catholic communion as well as in it. Indeed, we even find not a few Catholics who in reality feel that the dogma is harsh, and hardly reconcilable with the justice of God, and who do their best to soften and explain it away. Hence, the frequent admonitions of our Holy Father, Pius the Ninth, to the pastors of the Church, to insist, in their instructions to the faithful, on the absolute necessity of the Catholic faith to salvation, and on the dogma that there is no salvation out of the Church.

"This difficulty results from not well understanding that the Church is not simply an aggregation, deriving her being and life from the individuals aggregated, but an organism, living her own divine life from her own centre, and imparting life to her members. The life flows, not from the members to her, but from her to them. This is what our indifferentists and latitudinarians do not sufficiently consider. At the bottom of their thought there lies the error, that the Christian precedes and makes the Church, or imparts to her the Christian life. This is undeniably the case with nearly all Protestants in our day. It is with them not the Church that brings forth believers, but believers that bring forth the Church. Especially is this true of the so-called Evangelical sects, who deny baptismal regeneration, and yet assert the necessity of being born again. Individuals come to the Church, not to be regenerated and to enter upon the supernatural Christian life, but they come to her because they are, or fancy they are, regenerated. The Christian life, they hold, may, and indeed must, be begotten in us before approaching the Church, or else we are not fit to approach her. Hence very few Protestants hold union with the Church at all necessary to union with God, or to final salvation. Hence there is and can be nothing fatal in schism, or in separation from her communion. For, if the life may be begotten and lived independently of union with the Church, it is clear, since it is the life that saves, that to be in her communion cannot be essential to salvation. But, if our Protestant friends understood that the life flows from the Holy Ghost only through the Church, and that, as St. Cyprian says, he cannot have God for his father who has not the Church for his mother, they would see at once that schism, or disunion, must be fatal, because it separates the schismatic from the very source and conditions of spiritual life.

"The error is occasioned by overlooking or not considering the fact, that the Church is an organism that lives a life of her own, from her own centre, and assimilates to herself individuals and congregations by a law analogous to that by which the body assimilates the food which is eaten, and converts it into living flesh. The Church, in the spiritual order, is what humanity is in the natural order. She is in fact regenerated humanity, living the life of grace, as unregenerated humanity lives merely the life of nature. Or

we may say, she is the new creation, holding from God as author of grace, as the primitive creation, or natural order, holds from him as author of nature. The two creations are analogous, and each, so to speak, has its type in the other. Grace corresponds to nature, and nature corresponds to grace. The conditions of life in the order of grace must then be, to some extent at least, analogous to the conditions of life in the order of nature, for the earthly is made after the pattern of the heavenly, and mirrors, reflects, or imitates it. In the primitive creation, in the natural order, the individual can be born and live only by communion with God through natural humanity; so in the new creation he can be born, or regenerated, and live only by communion with God through regenerated humanity. The conditions of birth in the new creation, if birth at all, must be analogous, as far as spiritual things can be analogous to natural things, to the conditions of birth in the primitive creation: and hence St. Paul teaches that the relation of husband and wife, in the sacrament of marriage, is a figure of the relation of Christ and the Church. The Church is called the bride, the spouse of Christ, and is the mother of his children, the joyful mother of all the faithful. If there is any propriety or aptness in the figure, the Church performs the maternal office in the spiritual conception and birth of the believer. The believer is begotten by the Holy Ghost, and born of her, and nourished at her breast, and we always call her our mother, and love and honor her as such. The Church can, then, no more derive her life from the faithful, than in the natural order the mother can derive her natural life from her children. As the mother precedes the birth of her child, so must the Church precede the birth of the believer.

“If it be asked, since the Church in one sense is the congregation of the faithful, Where was the Church, or what was the Church organism prior to the gathering of believers? we might answer by asking, Where or what was natural humanity prior to individual men and women? If humanity is inconceivable without individuals, individuals are equally inconceivable without humanity. But we will not insist on this answer. The Church derives from Christ, through the Incarnation, typified in the fact that Eve was taken from the side of Adam, and formed from him, bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. Regarded as prior to the visible con-

gregation of believers, the Church was in the Blessed Virgin, from whom our Lord assumed his flesh. Hence the Blessed Virgin, a mother and yet a virgin, is termed the Mother of God, and the Spouse of the Holy Ghost. She is the second Eve, as Christ is the second Adam; the mother, as he is the father, of regenerated humanity. In a certain sense, we may even say that she is the Church, and hence the saints apply to her those texts and epithets which they apply to the Church herself. She is, in more than a figurative sense, our spiritual mother. She is the mother of grace, through whom flows the Christian life, and through whom we receive from God his gifts and graces. As the mother of our Redeemer, she is intimately connected with the work of our redemption, and participates in our regeneration. Hence the reasonableness and justice of that high honor and deep veneration which we Catholics render her, the filial love we bear her, and the prominent place she holds in our devotions, so scandalous to no-Church Protestants, and which they foolishly, not to say blasphemously, affect to brand as 'Mariolatry.' Poor men! How little do they understand of the mystery of the Incarnation, and of the part of Our Lady, through the grace and election of God, in the conception, birth, and progress of the Christian life!

"Now, if there be any truth in the view we take, and which is certainly scriptural, the Church is the maternal source of life to the believer, and as such must be herself a living unity, living her own central life from the indwelling Holy Ghost, supernaturally immanent in her as the new creation, as God is, so to speak, naturally immanent—as *causa efficiens*—in the primitive creation, and imparting life to the faithful instead of receiving it from them. Hence it follows that to break the unity of the Church would be to destroy her, and to be separated from her communion would be spiritual death, because separated from the source and current of spiritual life. Hence the fatal nature of schism, and the terrible consequences of excommunication. Each implies the spiritual death of the soul, and even its eternal death, as much as separation from humanity implies our natural death; not as a mere penalty arbitrarily annexed, but as a natural and necessary consequence, because it places its subject out of all communication with God in the new creation or supernatural order, and cuts him off from the very source and current of supernatural life.

"All life springs from unity, which is always logically prior to multiplicity. The universe originates in the creative act of unity, and returns to unity as its final cause. If we suppose the Church to have life at all, to be a living and not a dead Church, we must, if we have a grain of philosophy, regard her as an organism, and, therefore, regard her unity as essential to her very being and existence. All life not only proceeds from unity, but is love. Hatred is death, for it separates, disunites. Life is love, and love is life. We have our being in God; in him we live and move and are; and God, the Sacred Scriptures tell us, is love. The nature of all love in creatures is, as the saints maintain, to unify, to become one with its object. The essence of the Christian life, all agree, is love, charity; and its nature is to unite all who live it with one another and with God. It tends always to unity. But this it could not do if it did not spring from unity, for there cannot be unity in the effect without unity in the cause,—unity in the final cause, without unity in the first cause. There is, then, nothing arbitrary or contrary to the general law of Divine Providence in making union with the Church a necessary condition of spiritual life, or in making separation from her communion spiritual death. Having instituted his Church as the maternal source of Christian life, it would be repugnant to his own Divine Being, which is love, to save out of her communion, since this would be to treat hatred as if it were love, death as if it were life, or to repute life where no life is.

"The Church, though, like all living organisms, invisible as to the principle of her life, is an outward visible body. The doctors distinguish, indeed, between the soul of the Church and the body, as in man we distinguish between the body and soul; but the invisible and the visible do not constitute two distinct organisms, any more than the body and soul in man constitute two distinct persons. Man, though composed of soul and body, is one *man*, in whom there is a union of the spiritual and material natures in one person. The Church derives, as we have said, from the Incarnation, and includes both the divine and the human, and is, as it were, an extension of the Incarnation. Yet, it includes the human as it is, not as soul alone, but as soul and body; and as the soul is the *forma corporis*, she can be

no living Church without the union of body and soul. As we can commune with the soul in man only through the body, so in the Church we can commune with the soul, the *anima ecclesiæ*, only through her body,—with the invisible, only through the visible Church; for though the body may bear things which do not pertain to the soul, the soul and body constitute simply one Church and are inseparable: otherwise the Church would be subject to dissolution, and might fail, as we know she cannot.

“The unity of the Church as invisible demands her unity as visible, the unity of the soul requires the unity of the body; for we cannot conceive the soul as the *forma* of several distinct and separate bodies, or regard the Church as a monster. If the Church is indissolubly soul and body, visible and invisible, and if she be the maternal source of Christian life, which is love and springs from and tends to unity, she must represent in her visible organization the invisible unity, and be alike one in body and soul. All agree that the Church is catholic; but if catholic, she must be one, for what is not one cannot be catholic. Multiplicity is as repugnant to catholicity as to unity. There can be no composite catholicity. To attempt to get at the conception of catholicity by the indefinite aggregation of particulars, is as absurd as to attempt to reach the infinite by the indefinite aggregation of measurable quantities; or eternity, by the indefinite aggregation of moments. The larger the number aggregated, the further are we removed from catholicity, or the universal, for the more limited, relatively at least, is each particular. Hence the Church, if Catholic, as all who profess the Apostles’ Creed acknowledge, must be one. Her catholicity asserts necessarily her unity, and her visible catholicity her visible unity. She is then a visible as well as an invisible organism.

“This established, the reason becomes evident why the constitution of the Church is Papal, not simply Presbyterian or Episcopal, and why the Church of Rome must be regarded as the Mother and Mistress of all the Churches. The Church as visible must have a visible centre of unity, a central visible life from which everything in the visible order takes its rise. But without the pope and the Roman See, made one in spiritual marriage, this visible centre, this visible central life, is not conceivable. Without the Papal Constitution, there would be nothing in the visible order to represent the invisible

unity: which would be tantamount to saying that there is no visible Church at all. But this again would, on the principles we have established, be saying that there is for us no medium of access to the invisible Church, and therefore there is and can be no spiritual regeneration, or new birth. We should be as to the spiritual life, practically, as if Christ had not been incarnated, and there were no Church.

“It follows from this that the Papacy is *fundamental*, essential to the very conception of the Church in the visible order; and, without it, the visible Church could neither be nor be conceived. We think highly of Mr. Wilberforce, but we do not find this thought in his otherwise most admirable treatise. It may not have entered into his plan to recognize and develop it, but he seems not to have entertained it, at least in the full sense in which we wish it to be taken. He seems to start from the life of the believer, and speaks of the Church as a ‘confederacy of Churches.’ He recognizes the Papacy, but would seem to regard it rather as secondary than primary, as a product of the collective life of the Church, than as the original and central unity in which the whole ecclesiastical organization takes its rise. He may not have intended all this, and it may be that this is only a method he has adopted in addressing his Anglican readers, in order to render his views the more intelligible to them, and his arguments the more convincing to their understandings. Such, in fact, we suppose to be the case, for we are far from entertaining any distrust of the theological soundness of the illustrious convert, for whom we have the kindest feelings and the highest respect. But, taking this view absolutely, without reference to the author, we cannot accept it; because it makes the child precede the parent, and supposes unity may be evolved from multiplicity, which is metaphysically impossible. Unity is before multiplicity, creates it, and is never created by it. The parent precedes the child; the priest, as spiritual father, precedes the simple believer, and the pope precedes the bishop, and is not only the complement but the foundation of the hierarchy, the basis as well as the summit of the ecclesiastical organization. ‘Thou art Peter,’ said our Lord, ‘and upon this rock will I build my church,’ and therefore St. Ambrose may well say, *Ubi Petrus, ibi Ecclesia*: Where Peter is, there is the

Church. Prior to Peter is Christ incarnate and his blessed Mother, and nothing else, in our conception of the Church. As Christ is prior to Peter, so is Peter prior to the congregation of the faithful under the new law. The pope holds, as successor of Peter, immediately from Christ, in whom is the original priesthood, and all teaching and governing authority. He is not evolved from the internal operations of the Church, nor created or commissioned by the Episcopacy, but is the central unity whence the whole hierarchy takes its rise. He is the Vicar of Christ, and represents him in the visible order, and is, in regard to the visible, in the place of Christ himself. Christ may use bishops, priests, or the faithful in designating or electing the successor of Peter, as he may use the people as his instrument in constituting the state and carrying on the affairs of civil government; but the pope holds his commission immediately from the invisible head of the Church, not from them. It is not the see that makes the bishop, for the see is not strictly a see without the bishop. The see is the bride, the spouse of the bishop, and he wears a ring symbolical of his marriage with his see. But there is no bride without a bridegroom, no wife without a husband, and St. Paul tells us the woman was not first, but the man: which our Women's-Rights people, whose doctrine is a legitimate deduction from Protestant principles, are apt to forget. Rome did not make Peter pope, but Peter made Rome the Apostolic See, which, without him to create it, it never could have been; and without Peter in the Apostolic See, there could have been no other see. The pope is Peter, Peter still living; therefore without the pope there could have been no see, and if no see, then, again, no bishop. As in the invisible order all originates in Christ incarnate, so in the visible order all originates in the Pope married to the Holy See. We call the successor of Peter father. The very word pope, *papa*, means father, and we are not to suppose that this term has been applied to him without a reason, or a good and sufficient reason. The term must have some appropriateness, and imply that he is really, in the visible order, the spiritual father of the faithful. Then we must regard him as primary, as before all else in that order. Without so regarding him, we should have to change the language of all Christendom; we could discover no analogy or correspondence between the visible and the

invisible, no aptness in the figures and illustrations used by the Scriptures and spiritual writers, and could not even conceive the unity or the catholicity of the visible Church.

“The Anglican theory, which, under some points of view, Mr. Wilberforce so ably and philosophically refutes, stands directly opposed to this view of the constitution of the Church. The Anglican sometimes, when in good-humor, is not unwilling to cede the bishop of Rome a certain primacy which he calls a primacy of order, as distinguished from a primacy of jurisdiction; but he stoutly denies that the Papacy is integral in the constitution of the Church, or essential to her existence. He supposes the Church to be prior to the Papacy, that she can exist and perform all her essential functions as the Church of God, without the pope. Having got angry with the pope in the sixteenth century, he rejected him, and now finds himself unable to assert either the unity or the catholicity of the Church. The only Church he can now conceive is an aggregation of believers or of particular congregations. The faithful must precede the hierarchy, and the Episcopacy hold from the laity. Rejecting the Papacy, but still retaining the Episcopacy, he is obliged to fall back upon the absurd theory, openly avowed by some Anglicans, of diocesan Churches, and to maintain that each diocese is independent, a Church in all its integrity, complete in itself, and having need of nothing out of itself: substantially the theory maintained by the Independents. But who creates and circumscribes the diocese? who institutes or installs the diocesan? The lay authority, is the only answer the Anglican can give, and consequently he must maintain that the bishop holds his appointment, his mission, from the lay society; or that each bishop, in what happens to be his diocese, is a self-constituted pope, not called of God, as was Aaron, but taking his ministry upon himself, and running without being sent. He can have, on this theory, no legitimate ecclesiastical authority, no unity, no catholicity; for these diocesan Churches are not subordinated to one and the same ecclesiastical regimen, and have with one another, at best, only relations of comity and friendly correspondence.

“This diocesan theory has grown out of the erroneous notion, which obtained in England even prior to the so-called Reformation, that the Papacy is not essential to the being of the Church. The tendency of the secular courts, courtiers,

and jurisconsults, from Frederic the Second of Germany and Philip the Fair of France down to our times, has been to regard the Church as Episcopal rather than Papal, and the Papacy as accidental rather than essential in her constitution. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the secular authorities, emperors, kings, and princes, though nominally Catholic, forgetful of the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual, wielding the physical force, and having at their disposition the chief temporal advantages, gained an undue ascendancy in ecclesiastical matters, and, unhappily, over the minds of not a few churchmen. We need not be surprised, therefore, to find large numbers misapprehending the constitution of the Church, and imagining that she might exist, and be a true Church, without the Papal authority. It was the prevalence of this notion that prepared the way, and accounts for the sudden rise and rapid spread of Protestantism in the early part of the sixteenth century. No doubt, among the coadjutors of Luther there were men who rejected the Church herself, and did not even believe in Christ; but the larger part who joined or submitted to the Protestant movement, wished to retain the Church and the Christian faith, and never would have become Protestants, if they had believed it impossible to throw off the authority of the pope without throwing off that of Christ. Especially was this true in England; and we have no doubt that a very considerable number of the English people verily persuaded themselves, or were persuaded by the royalists and anti-papists, that the schism, commenced by Henry and completed by his daughter Elizabeth, was in reality no schism at all, but a simple reformation of abuses, which time and the ambition of the popes had accumulated, and the restoration of the Church to her primitive purity and simplicity. Even to-day we find Anglicans who apparently maintain this in good faith, and who really persuade themselves that they are members of the One Holy Catholic Church and in union with Christ.

“We see here the grave importance of having the people not only rightly, but thoroughly instructed as to the essential nature and constitution of the Church. We are not ignorant of the corruptions of the human heart, or of the rebellious nature of passion; but we cannot help thinking that if the people had better understood the great fact that the Church

is essentially Papal, the world would never have been afflicted with the Protestant Reformation. In the later Middle Ages, a strong antipapal spirit extensively obtained, and, owing to the ascendancy of the secular order, everywhere encroaching on the rights and prerogatives of the spiritual, the people or the laity were inadequately instructed as to the real position of the Papacy in the gracious economy of Divine Providence. They knew that they were required to obey the pope as visible head of the Church, but they did not fully understand the strict truth of the maxim: Where Peter is, there is the Church. Before Luther brought the discussion of theological questions before the public, and appealed from the schools, and even the Church herself, to the laity, the people had comparatively little understanding of them. They had ordinarily the simplicity of faith, which suffices for salvation, but very little knowledge of its reasons and relations. This answered every purpose when the civil authorities were submissive to the Holy Father, and performed their duty as protectors of the Church; but when these authorities made war on the pope himself, when they wished to revive the Cæsarism of pagan Rome, and make the chief of the state at once *Imperator* and *Summus Pontifex*, the laity were, save when animated by a lively faith and an ardent piety, ill prepared to stand by the pope, and to offer them a vigorous and manly resistance. Their defective understanding of the essential constitution of the Church laid them open to the arts and subtleties of the evil-minded, and rendered it comparatively easy to impose upon their simplicity, and to detach them from their fidelity. The difficulty did not lie altogether with the simple peasantry; it lay in the defective understanding of the constitution of the Church by the lay society generally. Dating from Frederic the Second of Germany, the lay society was, speaking in general terms, antipapal, and held the doctrine of which the Anglican theory is but a logical and historical development. We think this was in a great measure owing to the little real theological instruction imparted to this society. More full or more accurate theological instruction to the laity,—the state of society in those ages considered,—however desirable it might have been, was, most likely, impracticable; and we must not regard it as a fault of the Church, or of those churchmen who were animated

with her spirit, and conformed to her wishes, that it was not given.

“The Church is obliged to take the world as she finds it, and to do the best she can with it under the circumstances, and with the materials it furnishes to her hand. She herself always wishes her children not only to know the simple dogmas of faith, but to understand well all that pertains to sound doctrine. She has no great fondness for what our friends of *The Rambler* call ‘The system of safeguards.’ She does not count temptations and trials an evil, and never seeks to protect the faithful by keeping them in ignorance. She does not teach them that, in order to preserve their virtue, they must retire from the world, but labors always by her instructions and sacraments to prepare them to live in the world without being of it, or contaminated with its errors and vices:—‘I pray not that thou shouldst take them out of the world, but that thou shouldst keep them from evil.’ The system, which she is supposed to approve, of keeping people in the faith by excluding all knowledge of what is opposed to it, by repressing thought, and insisting on blind obedience, is not her system; and if, as is alleged, it is sometimes countenanced in Catholic countries, we must attribute it not to her, but to the secular order which obtains in them, in spite of all she is able to do. All absolute civil governments, all despotisms and despots, are jealous of freedom of thought, and especially freedom of education. Even in our own country, we find a large party wedded, without knowing it, to social despotism, that are doing their best to destroy freedom of education. They are laboring to place education under the exclusive control of the state, and to prohibit all instruction and all methods of instruction not sanctioned by the civil authorities. The Church has always had more or less of civil despotism to struggle with, for though she found it comparatively easy to convert individuals, she has never succeeded in any nation in fully converting society and the civil order. The safeguard system originates not in the Church, but in unconverted society; in a state which, while professing the Catholic faith, remains pagan as to its principles and modes of action; and it accords far better with the narrow jealousies and short-sighted views of the civil despot, than with the free, open, ingenuous, and trustful spirit of Catholicity. The Church

loves the light, for she is from above, not from below ; she fosters intelligence ; she promotes education, and provides it wherever the state leaves her free to do so ; she labors to have all her children well and thoroughly instructed in all that pertains to spiritual, moral, political, and social life, and wishes everywhere a free, manly, and enlightened laity. She demands in them, it is true, the docility of the child, but in understanding she demands that they be no longer children, but men,—strong, energetic men, in whom intelligence is not repressed or enfeebled, but rectified, elevated, and invigorated by the infused habits of grace.

“ Whatever may be said in regard to the ages immediately preceding the Protestant outbreak, this much is certain : the Church wishes her children to be thoroughly instructed, and the fullest and most exact theological instruction practicable is now a necessity, and the faithful must have it. Never, since the times of the persecuting pagan emperors, has the Church had less than now to hope from kings and queens, as nursing fathers and nursing mothers ; and never has she been more completely thrown back upon her own resources, as a spiritual kingdom set up by our Lord on the earth. Never, since she emerged from the catacombs and planted the Cross on the Capital of the world, have her children been more mixed up in the commerce of the world with the enemies of their religion, or more exposed to the fatal influences of error and indifference. Simplicity of faith is now nowhere enough ; we must have the knowledge of understanding. It is not enough to know the chief dogmas of our faith, and the ordinary practical duties of our state in life. It is necessary to know the dogmas, and their relation to the practical duties, to one another, and to natural reason. It is not enough now that this knowledge, formerly imparted in the schools to theological students, be possessed by the clergy alone. In these days of insubordination and self-will, when it is so difficult to secure proper respect to pastors and teachers, it must be possessed in as great a degree as practicable by the laity also. Not otherwise shall we be able to meet the wants of our times, bring back a docile and obedient spirit, and guard the faithful against the dangers to their faith and piety multiplied by common schools, journals, and popular literature. The laity, in all outside the sacraments, are now in great measure thrown upon themselves ; and their safety,

aside from the sacraments, depends to a great extent on their understanding of their faith and its reasons and relations, and in being able at all times to defend it intelligently and manfully.

“There may be those who regret the change that has taken place, and feel that we have fallen upon evil times. We confess that we are not of their number. We think the Church will gain more than she will lose by the change, for always does she lose more than she gains from the protection of princes. Princes, with a few exceptions, have always made her pay dear for their favor, and enslaved as much as they have protected her. We think, upon the whole, that she will derive great advantages from being thrown back upon her own resources, as the kingdom of God on earth. We must rely now on virtue, rather than on innocence; on the knowledge of what is true, rather than on ignorance of what is false. Innocence, regarded as a negative quality, is good, no doubt; but virtue, which is something positive, is better. Ignorance is favorable neither to simplicity of faith, nor to fervor of devotion. All faith and real devotion is an affection of the rational nature, and, therefore, intrinsically reasonable. Our religion presupposes man to be created with a rational nature, and always addresses him as a reasonable and reasoning being. The heart she demands is the enlightened heart,—the union of understanding and will. The Church can live, and move at her ease, only in an atmosphere of intelligence, and, as far as she has her freedom, she creates that atmosphere around her. She is obliged, as we have said, to take the world as she finds it, and do the best she can with it. She works with such materials as the world furnishes her. Where the political and social order,—what we call *civility*, or the civil order,—is adverse to her, she has to labor under a great disadvantage, for she cannot at once change that order, and conform it to her own mind. She addresses men as individuals, and does and must treat them as free agents. Where individuals are ignorant and enslaved, and the state will not suffer them to be enlightened and emancipated, she must take them as they are, and deal with them for what they are; although they are not what she wishes them, or what she would soon make them, if suffered to address their understandings, and to exert her silent but powerful influence on their hearts.”

ART. II.—*Origin, History, and Nature of Diocesan Synods.*

IN matters of importance bishops generally acted in concert with the clergy of their respective dioceses. They frequently consulted with them. Hence bishops and priests often met to discuss affairs of the diocese, and to lay down regulations for the spiritual well-being of the faithful.¹

Diocesan synods date back to the remotest antiquity of the Christian era. They were termed Concilium Episcopale,² Synodus Episcopalis, Capitulum, Concilium Synodale, Concilium Civile, by reason of being held in the episcopal city—*civitas*—*Conventus Presbyterorum*, etc.³

The first mention of diocesan synods occurs towards the end of the fourth century⁴ in the Can. Annis. of the Council of Hippo, held in 393. The Council of Orleans⁵ (511) and the Synod of Auxerre (585), the Fourth⁶ (633) and Sixteenth Council of Toledo⁷ (693) speak undoubtedly of diocesan synods. Benedict XIV points to a synod held by Pope Siricius, as being perhaps the first diocesan synod ever convened. It is delineated by Siricius in a letter to various bishops against Jovinian, in 389. The pope distinctly says that Jovinian was condemned by himself, and the entire clergy of Rome "*assembled before him.*"⁸

In connection with diocesan synods, in the sixth century, we find the office of archipresbyter frequently mentioned. The duty of these archipresbyteri was to act as deans over priests and people in determinate districts, and report to the bishop the state of the place or region assigned them. They had to visit the churches in their district, and call together the priests once a month, in order to advise with them as to the administration of the parishes. These meetings were styled Concilia decanorum Christianitatis, Synodi particulares, in contradistinction to diocesan synods; they were also named Syn. decanales.⁹ They were merely preparatives for diocesan synods. The latter were, at first, held as often as questions of valuable content or bearing were

¹ Cfr. Phillips Jus. Can. vol. vii, p. 133.

² Ibid., l. c. § 366, p. 140.

³ Cfr. Hinem. Rem. capit. presbyt. data ann. 852, cap. 1.

⁴ Phillips, l. c. p. 135.

⁵ Conc. Aurel. ann. 511. can. 19. apud Bruns.

Biblioth. Eccl. P. ii, p. 164.

⁶ Concil. Tolet. iv, can. 36.

⁷ Conc. Tolet xvi, can. 7.

⁸ Bened. XIV, De Syn. Dioc. Lib. i, c. i, n. 6.

⁹ Phillips, l. c. p. 143, vol. vii, § 366.

to be settled. Hence the clergy were called together at short intervals to weigh maturely affairs of consequence. Later on, these episcopal synods were celebrated but twice a year, and in the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) it was enjoined that they should be convened once a year.¹ The same discipline was reënacted by the Council of Trent.²

The “*Ordo Synodi*” of the ninth century will give an idea of the distinctive features of synods held in those times:—

1. The bishop cordially saluted all the clergy assembled in Synod.

2. Then followed a homily or brief instruction; after which a sermon was preached on the dignity and responsibilities of the priesthood. In fact, the synod was daily begun with a sermon or instruction.

3. It was not to last over fourteen days.

4. On the first day, examiners were appointed. The bishop then investigated charges against priests, and proceeded judicially in all cases coming before him.

5. Accusations against laics were also examined into and determined upon.

6. Pastors were finally bound to render an account of the administration of their parishes, of the condition of church vessels, vestments, etc.³

HISTORY OF DIOCESAN SYNODS FROM THE LATTER PART OF THE NINTH TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY (1215).

Among the chief and most zealous advocates and promoters of diocesan synods, Ulric, Bishop of Augsburg (✠ 973), and Ratherius, Bishop of Verona (✠ 974), were preëminently conspicuous.

St. Ulric held diocesan synods twice a year; one in Lent, the second on the 15th of October of each year.⁴

St. Ratherius convened his clergy in synod at Verona, in the Lent of 966. Some of his clergy were opposed to him. He therefore addressed a synodal letter to the priests of his diocese, speaking in tones of paternal kindness to them, reminding them of their duties and responsibilities.⁵ An *ordo synodalis*, which belongs to this period, will give us an idea of the nature of the synods of this epoch:—

¹ Ap. Bouvier, *Theol.* vol. v, tract. de Decal. p. 365.

² Sess. 24. ap. 2, de Ref.

³ Cfr. Phillips. *Jus Can.* vol. vii, p. 160 seq.

⁴ *Ibid.* vol. vii, § 369. p. 166.

⁵ *L. c.* p. 168.

1. The Synod should continue four days. It was daily opened by the sacrifice of the Mass, at which the laity could also assist. After divine service, the laity had to depart save those who were specially invited to attend.

2. After the reading of the Gospel, *cum esset sero die illo una Sabbatorum et fores essent clausæ*, etc., the bishop requested the clergy to bring forward any complaints they wished to make. The discussion of diocesan affairs then began.

3. Complaints on the part of laymen were also admitted and determined upon and adjudicated by the synod.

4. During this period, laymen were allowed to attend diocesan synods, nay, in some instances, they were obliged to do so.¹ This was owing to the fact, that bishops were not unfrequently possessed of vast temporal domains, and were princes of the realm. When we come to determine or consider the scope of synods at this time, we find:

1. That they aimed at fostering theological learning among the clergy, and preserving true faith among the laity.

2. Hence errors were refuted and condemned in them.²

3. Regulations were also made with regard to the proper and conscientious administration of ecclesiastical property, and the erection of monasteries.³

The synodal statutes of the Synod of Toulon, (Syn. Tullens., ann. 1192) and of Utrecht (Syn. Traject., ann. 1209) are the first collections of synodal statutes that have come down to us.⁴

The appellation of *synodus diocesana* does not occur before the end of the thirteenth century (1290). Generally, these synods were named from the diocese in which they were celebrated;⁵ e. g., *Sancta Synodus Tullensis*, *Syn. Coloniensis*, etc.

Before the celebration of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) *dioc. synodi* were termed *synodus generalis*, in contradistinction to particular meetings of the clergy, such as conferences, etc.; also *synodus plenaria*, *plena magna sollemnis*, *synodus universorum*.⁶

Diocesan synods from the year 1215 to the Council of Trent.

¹ Phillips, l. c. p. 170.

³ Phillips, l. c. p. 174.

⁶ Ibid.

² Syn. of Arras, ann. 1025.

⁴ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid. p. 176.

In the Fourth Lateran Council¹ bishops were commanded to annually hold diocesan synods under pain of suspension.²

This law was complied with for a considerable number of years. Synods were everywhere convened and salutary laws were enacted. The manner of celebrating synods was fixed; the purity of faith and morals was preserved; abuses were corrected; provisions and regulations were laid down for the observance of holydays, and the administration of the sacraments. Gradually, however, this fervor relaxed. Synods became less frequent, and were finally almost entirely discontinued. This contributed, in no small degree, to the widespread ignorance and immorality which was prevalent among priests and people at the outbreak of the Reformation.³ Infidelity and heresy follow in the wake of immorality. *Hæresis morum precedes the hæresis mysteriorum.*

The Council of Trent ordained that provincial councils should be held every third year. The Council says diocesan synods also shall be celebrated *every year*. But if any, whether metropolitans or bishops, shall be negligent in these matters, they shall incur the penalties enacted by the sacred canons.⁴

The penalty here alluded to is suspension from office, as decreed by the Fourth Lateran Council, cap. *sicut olim*.⁵

This suspension is *ferendæ*, not *latæ sententiæ*.⁶

Diocesan synods in consequence revived, flourished, and prospered after the close of the Council of Trent. St. Charles Borromeo set a most illustrious example in this respect, regularly convening his clergy in synod, and causing the same to be done in other parts of Italy. The statutes enacted in these synods of Milan are, to this day, patterns and models for imitation. In the eighteenth century this wholesome and salutary discipline again began to be discontinued, and is at present almost entirely done away with.⁷

This is to be regretted. It is strange that even the eloquence of Benedict XIV could not again bring these synods into popularity.

The synod of Pistoja, held by Ricci, Bishop of Pistoja, in

¹ Conc. Lateran. IV, ann. 1215, can. 6, cap. *sicut ol.*

² Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. i, c. vi, n. 3.

³ Phillips, Jus Can. vol. vii, p. 196.

⁴ Sess. xxiv, chap. ii, de Ref.

⁵ Cfr. Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. i.

⁶ Cfr. Fagnanus, n. 105. Thomassin, De vet. et nov. eccl. discipl. part. ii. l. 3, cap. 75, n. 10.

⁷ Cfr. Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. i, c. vi, n. 5. Phillips, Jus Can. vol. vii, p. 198.

1786, fell into several errors, and came to a sad end. It was condemned by Pope Pius VI in the bull, *Auctorem fidei*, 1794.

A similar synod was projected in Germany, and was to be held in Mayence in the year 1792. Its celebration was prevented by the outbreak of the French Revolution.

These facts contributed not a little to the decline and decay of diocesan synods. Add to this, that, in Catholic countries, the state laid claims to omnipotence even in religious matters, and intermeddled constantly with the affairs of the Church. Then, again, it was feared that the revolutionary spirit of 1848 might have infused itself even into the minds of some of the clergy, who might wish to consider diocesan synods in the light of merely parliamentary assemblies.¹ Synods therefore fell into desuetude.

In Germany they had already become extinct in 1792, save in some parts of the Austrian dominion. The same may be said of almost all Europe. The very notion and idea of diocesan synods is being lost and forgotten. Hence it may be said that these synods, prescinding from their revival in the United States, and some parts of Bohemia and Hungary, have passed into the realm, and become mere matter, of history: they are facts of the past.²

Synods seem to prosper and thrive in the United States.³ The first diocesan synod in the United States was held in Baltimore, 1791. Its decisions always remained in great veneration among the clergy. Rev. Mr. Bruté writes of it in 1831, while preparing the questions to be submitted to the Second Council of Baltimore: "We must read over the Synod of 1791 for the form, and its authority will be a good direction."⁴

The first session was held Nov. 7, 1791, at ten o'clock in the forenoon. The priests having vested in surplices, and the bishop in rochet, amice, alb, cincture, stole, cope, and precious mitre, with the crosier, proceeded in procession to the cathedral, where a sermon was delivered by the bishop. Then all the members of the synod made the profession of faith; after which two promoters and a secretary were appointed. The synod then adjourned to three in the afternoon.⁵

¹ Cfr. Phillips, l. c. p. 200.

² L. c. p. 202.

³ Notes on the Sec. Plen. Counc. Balt. n. 37, p. 30.

⁴ The Cath. Church in U. S., Courcsey & Shea, p. 121.

⁵ Conc. Prov. Balt. habita ab. ann. 1829, usque ad ann. 1840. Balt. 1842, p. 8.

At the second session, held the afternoon of the same day, statutes were passed as to the conditional baptism of converts, on baptismal registers, on not confirming children before the age of reason.¹

The third session, which took place on the 8th, took up the sacrament of the Eucharist. It treated of the first communion of children, and enacted that they should not be allowed to receive the Blessed Sacrament immediately on reaching the use of reason, but only when they attain to a more perfect use of reason.²

Statutes were also made with regard to decency of ceremonial ecclesiastical dress, collections, and trustees.

In the fourth session, on the 9th of November, the fathers considered the sacrament of Penance. All were reminded of the necessity of an approbation for priests.

The sacraments of Extreme Unction and Matrimony were also treated of, and mixed marriages subjected to proper guaranties.

In the last session, on the 10th of November, regulations were adopted as to holydays, manual labor being tolerated, in certain cases, on holydays not falling on a Sunday; and, finally, decrees were made upon the offices, the life of the clergy, their maintenance, and burial.³

The regulations laid down in this diocesan synod will serve as a fitting model for all future synods in this country. While diocesan synods seem to thrive on American soil, they have died out in Europe, as was seen. In fact, it was considered dangerous at one time to convene them. Thus, in 1848, many persons among the laity, and not an inconsiderable number of the clergy, leaned to the opinion that these synods were but constitutional assemblies; that the power of legislation in them lay in the hands of the pastors and clergymen, and even laymen; that the bishop was but the President directing the proceedings; that the decisive vote vested in the members of the synod, as in every other civil legislature, senate, or congress.⁴

It is superfluous to say that this position is entirely indefensible and wholly untenable.

A diocesan synod is not a parliamentary meeting, where

¹ Conc. Prov. Balt. l. c. p. 8.

² Conc. Prov. l. c. p. 11.

³ L. c. pp. 13, 20. Cfr. Cath. Church in U. S., p. 122.

⁴ Cfr. Phillips, *Jus Can.* vol. vii, p. 201.

the right of decisive vote is vested alike in all the members and their president. The bishop is the sole lawgiver and judge. The priests are his counsellors or advisers. Their vote is consultive, not decisive or final.

In this respect, diocesan synods differ no less from provincial councils than from civil legislative bodies. In provincial or national councils, all the bishops present exercise the same prerogative of judges and lawgivers as the presiding archbishop or primate. Hence a parallel may be drawn between these councils and constitutional assemblies.¹

Again the bishop alone can convoke a diocesan synod, or the vicar-general by special episcopal mandate or commission. The bishop may also appoint as his special procurator any clergyman he may choose, in order to convene the synod, *sede vacante*. The chapter or, rather, capitular vicar has the right to call a synod.²

Analogy would lead us to infer that, in the United States, *sede vacante*, synods may be assembled after the lapse of one year from the celebration of the last synod, by the administrators of the diocese, appointed by the Holy See.

All clergymen, whether secular or regular, who have charge of parishes, are obliged to attend the synod.³

Yet, as Benedict XIV well observes, pastors are not unfrequently exempt from the obligation to be present at synods when they have sick persons to look after, who are dangerously ill and who may die at any time. In case such pastors cannot find other priests to take their place, they must be excused by the bishop and the synodal judges.⁴

The first step in the holding of a synod is the decree of the bishop convoking the synod. This document should contain the place, time, and matter for discussion of the synod.⁵

These *litteræ convocatoriæ* are generally issued two months in advance of the celebration of the synod.⁶

Some time prior to the day fixed for the synod, preliminary meetings⁷—*congregationes præsynodales*—are held in presence of the bishop, and generally in the episcopal

¹ Phillips, 1. c. p. 203. § 374.

² *Ibid.* p. 204.

³ Cfr. Conc. Trid. sess. xxiv, de Ref. c. ii. Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. iii, c. 1, n. 3; Phillips, 1. c. p. 206.

⁴ Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. iii, c. 12, n. 3, 4.

⁵ Phillips, 1. c. p. 211.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Cfr. Prov. Conc. Balt. ab ann. 1829, 1840 edit. 1842, pp. 30, 31.

residence. A parallel may be drawn between these congregations *præsynodales* and political caucuses.

The object of these preliminary meetings is to point out, discuss, arrange, and shape the statutes that are to be determined upon and adopted by the synod. For these meetings, six or eight theologians and canonists are selected by the bishop. Each of these, in turn, gives his opinion on the matter under discussion. It is customary, also, to furnish each of these counsellors with some particular decrees or measures upon which he is to report.¹

A secretary is also appointed by the bishop, who ordinarily is also the secretary of the diocesan synod. It is his duty to note down the main points of the discussions.²

Again, the officials of the synod itself are designated and elected in these preliminary meetings.³

The *officiales cleri* are merely pointed out, not elected.⁴

There are two kinds of officials: *officiales synodi*, *officiales cleri*. The former are functionaries of the synod itself. Their duties end with the synod. The latter, *officiales cleri*, are elected in synod, in order to fulfil certain offices and duties during the year till the following synod. The functionaries of the synod are:—

1. Secretary, *secretarius synodi*, who is usually the one that acted as secretary in the preliminary or preparatory meetings.

2. Lector, who assists the secretary in the reading of roll, decrees, etc. These two officials keep the minutes of the proceedings, call the roll.⁵ They also prepare the schedules or lists for the committee of inquiry or investigation.⁶

3. *Promotores synodi*, whose duty is to take the initiative in the transactions before the synod. They bring before the synod matters for discussion, by addressing questions to the members assembled, asking their opinion on the various subjects on hand.⁷ One or two may be elected as the bishop sees fit.

4. Notarius, notary, who is generally the bishop's chancellor. His duty is to write out and attest the acts and decrees at the end of each session, etc.⁸

¹ Gavant. *Prax. exact. cap. iv, pars i.*

² L. c. cap. v, n. 4.

³ L. c. chap. xviii, n. 1.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Phillips. *Jus Can. vol. viii, § 375, p. 213.*

⁶ Bened. XIV, *De Syn. Diœc. lib. iv, c. i, n. 2.*

⁷ Gavant. l. c. cap. xix, pars i.

⁸ Phillips, l. c. p. 213. Bened. XIV, l. c.

This office is generally performed conjointly by the notary and secretary.

5. *Procurator cleri*. The task of this official consists in advancing the objections and arguments of the clergy against proposed measures which are deemed objectionable by the clergy.¹ A written copy of these exceptions should be given to the secretary.²

6. *Præfecti synodalis disciplinæ et scrutinium* have charge of the external decorum and arrangements.

7. *Judices querelarum et excusationum* formerly proceeded summarily and judicially in all causes of dispute between the clergy and the laity. At present, this function is no longer in vogue, and these officials merely decide upon the validity of excuses of absentees.³

8. Finally, confessors of the clergy (*confession. cleri*) preachers (*concionatores*) masters of ceremonies, door-keepers (*ostiarii*)⁴ are set apart. All these officials (*officiales synodi*) are elected in the preparatory meetings of the synod congregations *præsynodales*. The bishop, of course, has the chief voice in the choice of these functionaries, yet the election of them should be left to the preliminary committees, or also to the clergy.⁵

The names of these officials should not be divulged before the actual assembling of the synod; they are made known in the first session. Of course, it will be necessary to inform these persons privately of their appointment, so as to enable them to come prepared to fulfil their various offices.⁶

Besides the functionaries above-mentioned, whose office ends with the synod itself, a different set of officials is appointed or elected in synod, who are to act as officials till the next synod.⁷ They are named *officiales cleri*. These are:

1st, *Judices synodales*, or *judices in partibus*, synodal judges, or, also, *judices prosynodales*.⁸ The Council of Trent thus delineates the scope of this office: "Forasmuch as on account and by reason of the distances of places a knowledge of the persons to whom causes are committed cannot be

¹ Phillips.

² Bened. XIV, l. c. n. 4. Gava. ch. xxv.

³ Bened. XIV, De Syn. Dioc. lib. x, cap. ii, p. 89, Edit. Prati, 1844.

⁴ Ibid. Cfr. Gavant. l. c. cap. xxix, Phillips, l. c. p. 214.

⁵ Cfr. Gavant. l. c. cap. xviii, n. 12, cap. 4, n. 5, Benedict XIV, De Syn. Dioc. lib. x, cap. i.

⁶ Gav. l. c.

⁷ Gavant. Praxis, Pars i, cap. xxx, n. 7.

⁸ Phillips, Jus. Can. vol. vi, § 345, p. 769.

perfectly obtained, . . . the holy synod ordains that in each provincial or diocesan synod there shall be designated certain persons, . . . that to them also, besides the ordinaries of the places, may henceforth be committed these ecclesiastical and spiritual causes . . . which may have to be delegated to their districts; . . . in such sort that each diocese shall have, at least, four or even more persons approved and qualified as above, to whom causes of this nature may be committed by any legate or nuncio, and even by the Apostolic See."¹ From this we infer:

a) To these synodal judges are committed by the Holy See all cases of appeal from the sentence of the ordinary.² They are Papal delegates.³

b) They acquire no actual jurisdiction by their appointment in synod, but only when cases of appeal are actually referred to them for adjudication; and their jurisdiction ceases so soon as the cause committed to them is finished.⁴

c) If no synod is held, they are appointed by the bishop with the advice of his chapter or council.⁵

d) These judges hold from the pope and not from bishops. Their sentence, therefore, is reversible by the Holy See only.

e) An appeal from bishops does not lie directly to them; in other words, clergymen must appeal directly to the Holy See or papal legate or nuncio or other papal representative, who then are obliged to refer the case to the synodal judges. Whether it is desirable to have such judges as well as papal legates in the United States, is an open question.

f) It must not be overlooked that synodal judges are altogether distinct from the *judices causarum*,⁶ who should be associated with the bishop to try causes.⁷ The latter hold from the bishop, and form but one and the same tribunal with him. All causes are brought before them in the first instance, while the *judices synodales* can take cognizance of appeals only which are intrusted to them.

g) Again, "*judices causarum*" are only two in number, and are selected by the chapter or the bishop's council, while the

¹ Conc. Trid. Sess. xxv, ch. 10, on Ref.

² Cfr. Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. iv, cap. v, n. 12.

³ Phillips, l. c. vol. iv, § 345.

⁴ Ibid. p. 793.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Conc. Plen. Balt. ii, n. 77, p. 57.

⁷ Conc. Trid. Sess. xxv, ch. vi, on Ref.

judices synodales are designated in the synod,¹ and should be at least four in number.

h) The names of the synodal judges should be at once transmitted to the Holy See, in order to enable it without delay to delegate judges in cases of appeal.

Before passing to the office of synodal examiners, a word on the *Testes Synodales* may not be out of place. The *testes synodales* were, so to speak, the guardians of the decrees enacted in the synod. It was their duty to traverse the diocese, note abuses or violations of synodal decrees, and report them at the next synod.² By reason of the obligation of denouncing delinquents, this office soon became onerous, and fell into desuetude. It is at present almost entirely done away with save in name.³

The synodal examiners were introduced by the Council of Trent for parochial concursus; and, as regards the examiners, six at least shall be annually proposed by the bishop or by his vicar in the diocesan synod, who shall be such as shall satisfy, and shall be approved of by, the said synod. And upon any vacancy occurring in any church, the bishop shall select three out of that number to make the examination with him. . . . And they shall swear on the holy Gospels of God that they will lay aside every human affection and faithfully perform their duty.⁴

The office of synodal examiners, strictly speaking, extends to parochial concursus only.⁵ Yet these examiners may laudably be deputed by the bishop to conduct the examination for Holy Orders, and for the conferring of approbation to hear confession.⁶ Thus the Fathers of Baltimore say: "Although the office of examiners applies to and was directly instituted for parochial concursus only, which as yet do not obtain in these provinces or States, nevertheless this office may deservedly be extended also to examinations that should precede the conferring of Sacred Orders and the giving of faculties to hear confession, as also to the drawing up of letters testimonial, which should be presented to the bishop previous to ordination. Hence we advise that these examiners be nominated

¹ Cfr. Con. Trid. Sess. xxv, cap. vi, et cap. x, De Ref.

² Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. iv, cap. iv, n. 1.

³ Cfr. Conc. Plen. Balt. vi, n. 61, p. 49.

⁴ Conc. Trid. Sess. xxiv, ch. xviii, on Ref.

⁵ Gavant. Praxis Syn. cap. xxvi, n. 2, edit. Teul. 1668, p. 44.

⁶ Cfr. Bened XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. iv, cap. vii, n. 1, 2.

or proposed in diocesan synods, or meetings of the clergy."¹

The Fathers of Baltimore would appear also to counsel that the *judices causarum* for the trial of ecclesiastics should be nominated in synod in the same manner as synodal examiners.²

The Council of Baltimore,³ following out the intention of the Council of Trent as regards synodal examiners, directed that in the United States no priest should be placed over a congregation without having previously undergone an examination before the bishop and two priests to be designated by him.⁴

The chief difference between the synodal examiners as ordered by the Council of Trent, and those of the Council of Baltimore, are: 1. That the former are necessarily to be approved of by the synod though proposed by the bishop,⁵ while the latter are simply appointed by the bishop, who may consult the synod or his council on the appointments. 2. That the decree of Trent on this head causes all appointments or collations to parishes, made without the proper examination before, and approval of, the synodal examiners, to be null and void and of no effect whatever,⁶ while the enactment of Baltimore renders these promotions illicit indeed, but not invalid.⁷

No serious reasons appear to hinder us from having synodal examiners and parochial concursus in the United States,⁸ at least so far as promotions to the principal parishes are concerned. In most dioceses, if not in all, a sufficient number of priests may be found, who are possessed of the requisite theological knowledge to fulfil the office of synodal examiners.⁹

Yet it might be said that these examiners hold office for one year only, at the end of which the office lapses *ipso facto*;¹⁰ that diocesan synods cannot always be annually convened; that, therefore, collations to parishes would become impossible, as these officials must be approved of by the synod.

¹ Conc. Plen. Balt. ii, n. 76, p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, ii, n. 77, 57.

³ *Ibid.*, n. 126, pp. 79, 80.

⁴ Ap. Notes on the Second Pl. C. Balt. by Rev. Dr. Smith, § 26, p. 112.

⁵ *Gavantus, Praxis, etc. cap. xxxi, n. 2, p. 44.*

⁶ Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. xx, cap. vii, n. 1.

⁷ Cfr. Conc. Plen. Balt. n. 126.

⁸ Notes on the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, p. 112, § 26.

⁹ Cfr. Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. iv, cap. vii, n. 4.

¹⁰ Bened. XIV, l. c. n. 7, 8.

Benedict XIV replies to this difficulty that, in case no synod can be held at the expiration of one year from the last synod, the bishop need simply apply to the Holy See for permission to appoint these examiners. In this case, the choice or selection of examiners made by the bishop must be ratified by a majority of the chapter.¹

In the United States, the bishop might propose them to his council, which should have the power to approve or reject them upon reasonable grounds.²

But it might be urged that these pastors would become immovable. Be it so. There are many crimes and misdemeanors for which even immovable pastors become movable and liable to privation of parochial charge.³ No possible harm, therefore, can come from the immovableness of pastors in this country.

The Fathers of Baltimore, however, are of opinion that the office of synodal examiners would hardly be practicable with us even though we had parish priests in the canonical sense of the term.⁴

Again the synodal examiners proposed by the bishop do not obtain office save when approved of by the synod. Hence it is indispensable that a majority of members present at the synod should cast their suffrages for them; otherwise others, who will be endorsed by the synod, must be selected by the ordinary. The voting may be open or secret, *viva voce*, or by ballot.⁵

The Fathers of Baltimore would seem to favor the view, that the appointment of the above examiners should take place with the advice of the clergy in synod.⁶

A third difference intervenes between the decree of the Council of Trent on synodal examiners, and decree, No. 126, of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore. It is this: The Council enjoins that not less than three of the synodal examiners must conduct the competitive examination or concursus, otherwise the concursus would be illegal—contrary to the prescriptions of the Council of Trent; and the appointment or collation to a parish would in consequence be rendered null and void of effect.⁷

¹ Bened. XIV, l. c. n. 9, 10.

² Cfr. Bened. XIV, l. c. n. 10.

³ Cfr. Notes on the Second Pl. C. of Balt. § 27, p. 119.

⁴ Conc. Pl. Balt. ii, n. 126, p. 80.

⁵ Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. iv, cap. vii, 3.

⁶ Cfr. Conc. Plen. Balt. ii, n. 76, 126.

⁷ Bened. xiv, l. c. lib. ix, c. 8, n. 2.

The Fathers of Baltimore, however, require only *two* examiners.¹

Again, by virtue of the Tridentine decree, the right of suffrage is vested exclusively in the synodal examiners. Neither the bishop nor his vicar-general can cast a vote for candidates, save when the votes of the examiners themselves are equal or given to distinct individuals. Hence the bishop acquires a right to vote only when there is a tie among the examiners, or when their suffrages are scattered.²

Herein, also, the Fathers³ of Baltimore would appear to differ from the Council of Trent. In fact, they make no mention of any kind of voting. There being but *two* examiners, balloting would appear scarcely supposable. Perhaps, therefore, these two clergymen are to be considered simply as an advisory board of the bishop.

Yet neither is the casting of suffrages by the examiners excluded by the Fathers of Baltimore. Equity, as well as analogy, must lead us to conclude that priests who submit to the ordeal of examination, acquire a right to promotion, provided they prove themselves competent. Now their claims are to be determined, according to the Council of Trent, by the votes of the examiners. It would scarcely appear just or fair to make their claims dependent upon the individual judgment of the bishop or vicar-general, however well-meaning his intention may be.

Next come *Punctatores*. They note those who are absent. This duty may be discharged also by the secretary or notary. Here we may also observe that the *judices causarum*, that is, the priests whom the bishop associates with himself to try causes, may be proposed by the bishop in synod, to be approved of by that body or assembly.⁴

We may be allowed to call attention⁵ to the dissimilarity in this respect that exists between the Council of Trent and that of Baltimore in 1866. The latter ordains that the rule or method of ecclesiastical process or trial as laid down by the Provincial Council of St. Louis, held in 1855, shall have

¹ Conc. Plen. Balt. ii, n. 126.

² Cfr. Conc. Trid. sess. xxiv. ch. xviii, on Ref. Bened. XIV, l. c. lib. iv, cap. viii, n. 5.

³ L. c. n. 126.

⁴ Conc. Trid. Sess. xxv, ch. vi, on Ref.

⁵ Gavant. l. c. cap. xxxi, pars i.

the force of universal or canon-law throughout the United States.¹

Now, the decree of St. Louis enacts in substance that the bishop or vicar-general, when acting by episcopal commission, shall select or appoint two of his councillors, who shall assist him to conduct the trial.²

The Council of Trent, however, decrees that the chapter shall, at the beginning of each year, select two individuals belonging to the chapter, with whose counsel and consent the bishop or his vicar shall be bound to proceed, both in instituting the process, and in all the other acts thereof until the end of the cause inclusively; otherwise the proceedings, and what follows thereupon, shall be null and of no effect in law.³

Two striking features of distinction between the decree of Trent and that of Baltimore present themselves to our view. The Fathers of Trent enact that the chapter, not the bishop, shall select the two associate judges; the Fathers of Baltimore, on the contrary, decree that the bishop, and not the clergy, shall choose them.

Again, a violation of the presumptions of the decree entails the complete nullity of the entire proceeding. An infringement, however, of the law of Baltimore would not appear to be fraught with similar consequences. Nevertheless, it seems to us that reasons of analogy and equity, no less than the wording itself of decree, No. 77, of Baltimore would warrant the inference, that the clergy or the council of the bishop should be allowed to choose these associate judges; and that, therefore, the non-observance of this condition would render the sentence invalid and illegal.⁴

In conclusion, we point to the fact, that the Fathers of Baltimore make the decree of St. Louis obligatory throughout this country. They not merely *advise*, they enact that henceforth this shall be the common or universal law all over the United States, viz.: No priest accused of a crime shall be punished save on a regular trial, to be conducted by the bishop and two of his councillors.⁵

¹ Conc. Plen. Balt: ii, n. 77, p. 57.

² Notes on the Second Plen. C. Balt. § 87, n. 417, p. 375.

³ Conc. Trid. sess. xxv, chap. vi, on Reform.

⁴ Cfr. Conc. Plen. Balt. ii, n. 76, 77.

⁵ Cfr. Notes on Second Plen. C. Balt. § 92, p. 405, n. 452.

NATURE, SCOPE, AND UTILITY OF DIOCESAN SYNODS.

The diocesan synod is defined: "A legitimate meeting convened by the bishop, and made up of the priests and clerics of his diocese, and of others who are bound to come, in which those matters are to be deliberated and arranged, which have reference to the pastoral charge or the care of souls."¹

A synod, therefore, regulates those affairs that concern the care of souls. Its labors, therefore, are directed to parochial or missionary duties of priests; to the preaching of the Word of God, the administration of the sacraments, the settling of disputes, the disposing of complaints against priests.²

Great care, however, should be taken lest, under cover or pretence of reëstablishing the old and universal discipline of the Church, any law be made by the bishop in synod or otherwise, which is opposed to the more recent enactments relaxing the rigor of the universal or common law.³

Thus Benedict XIV writes: "It is but equitable and proper that the bishop should respect the peculiar and old usages of his diocese and country which were either tolerated for just reasons, or even approved, lest, arising imprudently against them in the synodal constitutions, he should deservedly incur the name of innovator."⁴

The mark or stamp of innovation attaches to bishops legislating against these customs, even when the latter run counter to the general discipline or common law of the Church.⁵

The Holy See, moreover, has protected such usages and customs, received in various countries, against adverse legislation.⁶ In like manner Gavantus writes that, to be valid, the law of the bishop must be just and in harmony with the condition and custom or usage of the country.⁷

In synod, therefore, nothing can ever be decreed opposite to or discordant with the pontifical law or the decrees of provincial and plenary councils.⁸

¹ Cfr. Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. i, cap. i, n. 4; Bouvier, Instit. Theol. tom. v, Tract de Decal. p. 364, edit. Paris, 1844.

² Bened. XIV, l. c. lib. i, c. ii, n. 2.

³ Ibid. l. c. lib. xi, cap. iv, n. 4.

⁴ Ibid. l. c. lib. xi, cap. v, n. i.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Praxis exact. Diœc. Syn. pars i, cap. vi. Annot. § ii, n. 2.

⁸ Praxis exact. Diœc., Syn. pars i, cap. vi, Annot. § ii, n. 2.

Let us illustrate these principles by a practical case. That books treating of religion should be submitted to the proper ecclesiastical authorities before publication, is a universal law of the Church.

Yet, in the United States, the contrary usage prevails. Nay, even the provincial¹ and plenary² councils, so far held, have restricted the canon-law to catechisms, bibles, and prayer-books only.³ Is it in the power of an individual bishop to derogate from this custom?⁴ Can he reinstate the old discipline in its full force? According to the rules above mentioned, the answer must be in the negative.⁵ On this head Kenrick fittingly remarks: "Hence there is a long list of books, the reading of which is prohibited under ecclesiastical censures; and although this discipline is overruled by contrary usage in most countries, it serves to give coloring to the charge that the popes are hostile to the liberty of the press."⁶

Now, the prohibition to read such books, and the forbidding to print them without previous approval by the ordinary, are correlatives: the one supposes the other. Are we bold, then, in saying the law of the Index, both as to the printing and the reading of books, is not in force in this and in some other countries?

MANNER OF CELEBRATING DIOCESAN SYNODS.

Clergymen assist at the synod, vested in cassock and surplice; pastors may also wear the stole over their surplice.⁷

In this country, it is customary that all clergymen should alike appear merely in surplice.⁸

The bishop is robed in stole and cope over his rochet.

The synod lasts three days, but may be ended on the second or even first day when all business is transacted.⁹

It begins by the "Missa de Spiritu Sancto," which ought to be solemnly celebrated by the bishop himself.¹⁰ On the second day solemn Requiem Mass is sung by one of the canons or chief clergymen, at which the bishop assists; after the

¹ Conc. Plen. Balt. i, n, 33, ann. 1829.

² Ibid. n. 2.

³ Cfr. Conc. Plen. Balt. ii, n. 502.

⁴ Notes on the Sec. Plen. Balt. p. 363.

⁵ Cfr. Kenrick, mor. vol. i, page 53, edit. 1861.

⁶ Primacy, chap. xxiii, § viii, p. 412 edit. 1845.

⁷ Gavant, Praxis, cap. xiii.

⁸ Conc. Prov. Balt. ab ann. 1829, 1840.

p. 8, edit. 1842.

⁹ Gavant. l. c. pars ii, p. 58, 59,

¹⁰ Bened. XIV, De Syn. Dioc. lib. v, cap. i, n. 3.

Requiem the absolution is performed by the ordinary. Then he puts on red vestments and opens the session. The solemn Mass on the third day is of the Most Holy Trinity. The bishop is present in stole and white cope: after Mass he vests in red, and presides over the last session.¹

Prayers are then recited as prescribed in the Roman Pontifical.² The bishop occupies a seat on the platform of the altar; on either side are ranged the clergy of the diocese, those highest in dignity standing nearest to the bishop.³ In this country no order of precedence, save in the case of the vicar-general, is observed. After the recital of the Litany of the Saints, and *Veni Sancte Spiritus*, all sit down. The bishop then delivers a short instruction, either as laid down in the Pontifical,⁴ or one of his own, after which a sermon is preached by a clergyman designated by the bishop.

Thereupon the secretary⁵ of the synod, or, as usage with us in the United States would appear to sanction, the archdeacon,⁶ who is generally the vicar-general, advances to the bishop's seat, and asking permission, proceeds to read decrees relative to the celebration of synods. They are:—

1. *Decretum de synodo incœpta.*
2. *De modo vivendi tempore synodi;*
3. *Decretum de præjudicio nemini inferendo*—This is omitted with us.
4. *Decretum de non decedendo*,—forbidding any member to depart before the end of the synod.
5. Decree on the Profession of Faith, which all are bound to make in the hands of the bishop. This was done already in the first diocesan synod ever held in the United States.⁷

It is not essential, however, that each clergyman should separately and individually recite the profession of faith of Pope Pius IV; it is sufficient that the secretary should read it aloud, all present repeating it after him simultaneously. After this recital of the formula, they go to the bishop, and in groups of two or four kneel before him, and touching the Holy Gospels, take this oath: "*Ego idem N.N. spondeo, voveo,*

¹ Bened. XIV, l. c. lib. v, cap. i, n. 4.

² Pontificale Rom. pars iii, ordo ad synod. p. 77, seq.

³ Phillips, vol. vii, § 375, p. 215.

⁴ Pontif. Rom. pars iii, p. 84.

⁵ Phillips, l. c. p. 215; Gavant. l. c. sect. i, annot. 32, p. 51, et pars iii, cap. ix, p. 74.

⁶ American Ceremonial, p. 481.

⁷ Conc. Prov. Balt. l. c. p. 8. Cfr. American Ceremonial, p. 482.

ac juro. Sic me Deus adjuvet et hæc sancta Dei Evangelia."¹ These matters generally occupy the entire forenoon.

The synod really begins in earnest in the afternoon with the call of roll and scrutiny. The latter consists in an investigation being made into the delinquencies of clergymen, and the mode of fulfilling their obligations.²

This inquiry is now universally done away with.³ In the United States, it has never obtained in synods. Complaints and accusations against priests are now adjudicated upon out of synods.

Next, the synodal judges are proposed by the bishop. The members of the synod vote for these officials with decisive—*voto decisivo*—not merely with consultive, vote—*voto consultivo*. Hence they may reject or approve them.⁴

In case the synod cannot be convened, the bishop is bound to select these judges with the advice of his chapter or council; otherwise the appointment would be null and void.⁵

The clergy, in like manner, elect the testes synodales and synodal examiners. *Judices causarum* may also be thus selected.⁶

Then comes the legislative task of the synod, which generally takes up the second day. First are published those decrees of general, provincial, and plenary councils, which the bishop insists on promulgating. Next come the statutes or laws which the Diocesan has himself made. It is not indispensable that any new laws should be enacted in synod. Sometimes it is better merely to reenact the laws already published.

The secretary reads the various decrees. The promoter asks the priests whether they assent to them by *Placent*, etc.?

After the reading of the decrees, and before the vote is taken, discussion or arguments pro and con are allowed. Respectful freedom of speech is very desirable. It will insure a more hearty and ready coöperation on the part of the clergy in the execution of the proposed enactments.⁷

Yet, of late, synods have sunk into mere publications of

¹ Phillips, l. c. n. 218, vol. vii.

² Bened. XIV, l. c. lib. v, cap. iv, n. 7.

³ Phillips, l. c. vol. vii, § 375, p. 218, n. 8.

⁴ Bened. XIV, De Syn. Diœc. lib. iv, cap. v, n. 5.

⁵ Cfr. Cæremon. Episcoporum, lib. i, cap. xxxi.

⁶ Bened. XIV, l. c. lib. v, cap. ii, n. 8.

⁷ Phillips, l. c. p. 219, vol. vii, § 375.

episcopal decrees or statutes. It became irksome to listen to the mere reading of laws. Synods themselves were in consequence quickly losing their hold on the clergy, and went out of use. Besides, other means were not wanting to publish episcopal enactments without convening synods.¹

Another reason of the disfavor into which synods have fallen in Europe is the tendency towards beurocratic centralization in the enactment of measures of Church discipline.² While the assent and suffrage of the clergy is promotive of harmony and good feeling between themselves and the bishop, yet this assent is not essential to the validity or binding force of the decrees. The bishop is the sole legislator in the synod.

It may be asked: Is the Tridentine decree, enjoining the annual celebration of diocesan synods, obligatory, *sub gravi*, at the present time and throughout the world?

Some canonists contend that the precept is no longer binding *sub gravi*, as synods have almost generally fallen into desuetude.

Bouix,³ however, maintains that the law of Trent still obtains in its full force, and binds, *sub gravi*, wherever the holding of synods is practicable. Thus he points out that, in France, councils of this sort may now be convened, owing to the fact that the government no longer places any obstacles in their way; that, therefore, the Tridentine canon should be reduced to practice.⁴

In the United States, no hindrances of a political nature would appear to stand in the way of holding synods. Hence the obligation following from the law of Trent may be said to extend to this country.

Again, we observe, with Bouix, that at the present day the only officials of the synods are the Notary, Secretary Promoter, and Master of Ceremonies. The rest may profitably be dispensed with.⁵

Thus it were imprudent, if not illicit, considering the present state of affairs, to appoint "*Disciplinæ et Scrutiniæ Præfecti*" to examine into the conduct of clergymen.⁶

For the forms to be used in the celebration of diocesan synods, see Bouix, l. c. p. 413.

S. S.

¹ Ibid., l. c. § 375, p. 218, 219, vol. vii.

² Ap. Bouix, de Episc. vol. ii, p. 352, edit. Paris 1873.

³ Ibid., de Episc. vol. ii, p. 372.

⁴ Bouix, de Episcop. vol. ii, p. 372.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

ART. III.—*The True and the False Infallibility of the Popes.*

A controversial Reply to Dr. Schulte. By DR. JOSEPH FESSLER, late Bishop of St. Polten in Austria, and Secretary-General of the Vatican Council. Translated by AMBROSE ST. JOHN, M. A., of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. Edgbaston: Birmingham. London: Burns & Oates. 1875. 8vo, pp. 143.

2. *The Vatican Decrees in their bearing on Civil Allegiance*: A political Expostulation. By the RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M. P. With the Replies of Archbishop Manning and Lord Acton. New York: Appleton & Co. 1874. 8vo, pp. 90.

3. *The Vatican Decrees in their bearing on Civil Allegiance*. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1875. 16mo, pp. 179.

4. *A Letter addressed to his Grace the Duke of Norfolk on occasion of Mr. Gladstone's recent Expostulation*. With a Postscript. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D. D., of the Oratory. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1875. 16mo, pp. 200.

5. *Mr. Gladstone's Expostulation unravelled*. By BISHOP ULLATHORNE. London: Burns & Oates. 1875. 8vo, pp. 80.

MR. KEHOE, of the Catholic Publication Society, has republished all these pamphlets in reply, together with the important Pastoral of Dr. Vaughn, Bishop of Salford, and bound them up in two very handsome and convenient volumes; which is well, for they are not mere ephemeral productions, but are solid discussions of great and important questions, and should be preserved as of permanent value.

One thing strikes us as a favorable sign in these replies to Mr. Gladstone's attack on Catholics: that is, that the refutation of the charges has followed almost instantaneously the attack. We have noticed, in the history of the Church, that often considerable intervals have elapsed between the attacks made and the Catholic answer, and that the answer, when made, lacked the elements of directness and popularity. These replies show that Catholics are alive, and are ready to meet charges against them as soon as made, and able to refute them in a language that everybody can understand. No

doubt, Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet has had a wide circulation, but it has by no means produced the effect he expected, or perhaps intended. This, in part, is probably owing to the change of public feeling towards Catholics, and to the disgust created in the more sensible part of the community by the persecuting policy of Bismarck, and the falsehoods by which he attempts to justify it; but still more to the promptness and thoroughness with which the most eminent Catholics of England have refuted him. This promptness to repel insidious attacks shows that our Catholic community is full of life and duly vigilant.

Dr. Newman has added a postscript to a new edition of his Letter, which removes most of the objections we indicated against it. He has not, indeed, entirely explained away his doctrine of development, but he has so far modified it as to make it mean very little. We have some doubts of the right of an individual to follow his private conscience, even though erroneous and false, against the pope, though Dr. Newman would seem to have the theologians on his side. We concede that conscience is the voice of God in the soul, commanding us to do right; but I have some difficulty in conceding that the voice of God, in or out of the soul, can command or oblige me to follow what is false or erroneous. I may be excused through invincible ignorance for doing so; but how can I be invincibly ignorant in face of an express command of the Vicar of Christ?

To return to the doctrine of Development. We find Alzog's Church History speaks of the growth of the papal power, as if it at first existed only in germ, which would seem to be Dr. Newman's doctrine. That the papal power, during the first and second centuries, was exercised to a less extent than subsequently, is possible; but that the papal power then existed only in germ, or that the Church was not as well understood to be founded on Peter, as it is now, is what it would be difficult to make us believe. Development of a certain sort we concede, indeed, maintain. That some things in the beginning were only implicitly revealed, not explicitly, we should be loath to deny; but implicitly and explicitly may, according to Suarez, be understood in two different senses. Implicit may mean what is not clear and distinct; or it may mean what is revealed only as the effect

in the cause, or the property in the essence. As opposed to the latter sense, we maintain that the whole revelation was explicitly revealed from the beginning; but, as opposed to the former sense, we do not maintain that the whole revelation was explicitly revealed in the beginning: and therefore we admit, with Vincent of Lerins, that faith, as time goes on, may acquire light, evidence, and distinctness.

But we have not introduced these publications for the purpose of criticizing or reviewing them. They are alike above our praise or our censure, and must be held by all Catholics as standard works on the main question: that of the relation of the Church to the civil power, or the spiritual to the temporal. We have thoroughly discussed this question more than once, but never more to our own satisfaction than in a review of the Chevalier Artaud de Montor's "*Histoire des Souverains Pontifes*," published in the *REVIEW* for January, 1853. As the article is out of print, we hope we shall be pardoned for republishing it in connection with the present controversy.

"M. Artaud evidently believes himself an Ultramontane, and is much more ultramontane than many Italians who declaim lustily against Gallicanism, but he is not precisely a Papist after our own heart. He denies, indeed, the last of the Four Articles,—the one which asserts that the doctrinal decisions of the pope are reformable, unless accepted by the Church; but we can find nowhere in his pages a distinct denial of the first, by far the most objectionable of them all,—the one which denies the Church all temporal authority, and asserts the independence of temporal sovereigns, and which, therefore, involves the political atheism now so rife throughout the civilized world. It is true, he defends St. Gregory the Seventh in his conflict with Henry of Germany, and Boniface the Eighth in his struggle for the rights of the Church against Philip the Fair of France; but he does it on principles which the lowest Gallican of the times of Louis the Fourteenth might have accepted, and by no means on the principles asserted by these holy pontiffs themselves. He professes to follow the popular theory of the excellent and learned M. Gosselin of St. Sulpice, and derives the power exercised by the popes over temporals in the Middle Ages from the concessions of sovereigns, the consent of the people,

the public law of the time, and the maxims then generally received; not from the express grant of power by our Lord to Peter, nor yet from the inherent universal supremacy of the spiritual order. He must, therefore, hold that power to be of human origin, and its possession a mere accident in the history of the Church. This, with many for whom we have a profound reverence, is at present a favorite method of defending the power exercised over sovereigns by popes and councils in the Middle Ages,—a power always odious to tyrants and demagogues, and which it is gravely asserted is no longer held or claimed by the successors of St. Peter.

“Of course we are far from denying the fact of the consent and concessions alleged, or that the claim of the power in question was in accordance with the public law and generally received maxims of the age; nor do we deny that this fact fully justifies, on the principles of modern politics, the use which was made of it by popes and councils; yet we confess that the complete and absolute justification of that power seems to us to demand the assumption of a higher ground, and a different line of argument.

“According to M. Gosselin, as cited by M. Artaud in his *Life of St. Gregory the Seventh*, ‘the power exercised over sovereigns by popes and councils in the Middle Ages was not a criminal usurpation of the rights of sovereigns by the ecclesiastical authority,’ because ‘the popes and councils who exercised this power only followed and applied the maxims then very generally received, not only by the people, but by men the most enlightened and virtuous.’ The fact here alleged is undeniable; but when we adduce it in defence of the exercise of that power, do we not defend the Church as a human rather than as a divine institution? This line of argument would, no doubt, answer our purpose most admirably, if we were defending a human government; but where what we have to defend is not a human government, but a divinely constituted and supernaturally assisted and protected Church, it, even if admissible at all, seems to us altogether unsatisfactory. It is certainly undeniable that the concessions of sovereigns and the consent of the people were obtained on the ground that the popes held the power by divine right; and that those maxims on which M. Gosselin relies for the justification of the popes and councils in exercising it were, that the spiritual order, and, therefore, the

Church as the representative of that order, is supreme, and temporal sovereigns are subjected to it, and to the pope as its supreme visible chief. Popes and councils, in exercising authority over sovereigns even in temporals, were, according to those maxims, only exercising the inherent rights of the Church as the spiritual authority, and, consequently, sovereigns were bound to obey them, not by human law only, but also by the law of God. Such, incontestably, is the doctrine of the magnificent bulls of St. Gregory and Boniface, and of the maxims according to which it is attempted to justify the power exercised over sovereigns by popes and councils.

“Now, these maxims either were true, or they were false. If they were false, how will you justify an infallible Church—expressly ordained of God to teach the truth in faith and morals, and to conduct individuals and nations in the way of holiness—in adopting and acting on them? If they were true, how can you deny that the power exercised is of divine origin, or pretend that it is derived from the consent of the people or the concession of sovereigns?

“Moreover, we confess that we are extremely averse to defending things in the history of the Church, which happen just now to be unpopular, on the ground that they were authorized by the maxims of the age, that is, the public opinion of the time. We have yet to learn that public opinion is infallible or obligatory. We are unwilling to receive it as law, and cannot understand how an infallible Church, deriving her knowledge and wisdom from above, can take it for her guide; far less how, in case she adopts and follows an erroneous opinion, she can plead in her justification or excuse that she ‘only followed and applied the maxims very generally received, not only by the people, but by men the most enlightened and virtuous.’ Have we in the Church nothing superior to human intelligence and virtue? Is the Church dependent upon, and responsible to, public opinion, and therefore in nothing superior to an ordinary Protestant sect? We own we had thought it the office of the Church, not to learn from public opinion, but to instruct and form it; not to be judged by it, but to judge it; not to conform to the maxims of the age, but to use all her power to make the age conform to her own maxims. Is this her office? Is she qualified to discharge it? How, then, undertake to justify her in the exercise of a power

which you deny to be properly hers, on the ground that she only followed the maxims of the age; or how dare you suppose, in case of a collision between her and public opinion, that she, not public opinion, is in the wrong, and must give way?

“The Church, placed in the world to teach and govern it, must undoubtedly apply her own principles and maxims according to the circumstances, conditions, and wants of particular times and places; but we cannot help believing that it is our duty either to renounce her, and no longer hold her to be God’s Church, supernaturally endowed and assisted, or else to maintain that the principles and maxims she adopts and applies are those which she receives from her heavenly Spouse, and not from the age which she is ordained to teach and govern. If she adopts and applies false principles and maxims, or a line of policy not at all times and places just and true in principle, she is, as far as we can see, inexcusable, and it is but a miserable defence to allege that she only ‘follows and applies the maxims very generally received, not only by the people, but by men the most enlightened and virtuous.’ Reestablish the ‘discipline of the secret,’ if you can; resort to the *œconomia* or prudent reserve practised by the Fathers, if you will, or if it is possible with the past history of the Church before the public, but do not take up a line of defence that reduces her to the level of human governments, philosophies, and sects. Least of all, attempt to justify her on the ground that she only conforms to the maxims of the age, especially in these times, when the tendency is to derive all authority from the multitude, and to declare popular opinion the supreme law.

“We have not read M. Gosselin’s highly esteemed and learned work on the power of the sovereign pontiffs in the Middle Ages, and consequently are unable to speak of his theory as he may himself hold it. What we oppose is, not his theory, at least as his, but a theory which we every day encounter, and which is almost everywhere alleged against us, whenever we venture to assert the supremacy of the spiritual order, save as a vague speculation, intended to have no practical application,—a theory apparently adopted as a sort of compromise between Gallicanism and Ultramontaniam, yet a compromise in which the concessions are all on the side of the anti-Gallican, and incompatible with the theory

of the Church that we have been taught, and with what seems to us to be the natural relation between the two powers, temporal and spiritual. Nothing we may say is intended to have any application to M. Gosselin himself.

“It strikes us that the advocates of this popular theory, which concedes the human, but denies the divine right of the Church over sovereigns, confound two things which are very distinguishable, namely: the origin and ground of the power in question, and the conditions of its practical, temporal, or civil consequences. As a matter of fact, this power was in accordance with the public law and the generally received maxims of Christendom in the Middle Ages; and, had it not been so, its exercise would not and could not have had direct practical effects in the civil order. To its practical efficacy in temporals, the consent of sovereigns and of the people was indispensable. The Church is herself a spiritual kingdom, and her powers are in their origin and nature spiritual, and to be exercised always for a spiritual end. Her exercise of these powers has not *per se* temporal consequences in the temporal order, because she is not herself the temporal power, and has not in herself the material force requisite to give it temporal effect, and cannot, as a fact, obtain it without the consent of the prince, royal, aristocratic, or popular. She might, without the maxims and public law of the Middle Ages, have performed all the acts she did in regard to temporal sovereigns, and they would have had their spiritual effect, but no temporal or civil effects. In a country like ours, for example, excommunication has only spiritual consequences, because the civil law does not recognize it. The excommunicated person loses none of his civil rights, and stands before the civil law or the state precisely as if no sentence of excommunication had been pronounced against him. Marriage, invalid by the canon law, yet not contrary to the civil law, is invalid here only in the eyes of the Church, and loses none of its civil rights or effects. The excommunication and deposition by the pope of a sovereign of England would, as the English law now stands, work no civil consequences, because the law of the realm does not recognize such excommunication and deposition, and makes none of the civil rights or prerogatives of the sovereign depend on his being in the communion of the Catholic Church. And this, too, whether the sovereign be a Catholic

or a Protestant. Yet, were her present gracious Majesty to become reconciled to the Church, she would forfeit her crown, because the civil law incapacitates all but Protestants, of some sort, from wearing it, as before Elizabeth it incapacitated all but Catholics. As a fact, then, the canons of the Church can have civil consequences only on condition that the prince recognizes them as the law of the land. Hence the Church can never secure to her decrees, sentences, or canons their proper civil effects against, or without the consent of, temporal sovereigns. Like consequences would not now generally follow acts like those of the popes and councils in the Middle Ages, because now in most states the civil law does not recognize them, and would treat them as *non-avenue*. The civil law in our times concedes to the acts of the spiritual authority no civil efficacy, and, therefore, their direct consequences are all confined to the spiritual order. We grant, then, that, as a matter of fact, the Church is dependent on the consent of the people for the civil consequences of her power over temporal princes; and in this sense, and thus far, we agree with the advocates of the theory in question.

“But not therefore does it follow that the power formerly exercised by popes and councils over sovereigns in temporals is derived from the concessions of princes and the consent of the people, from human law, and the generally received maxims of the age. It by no means follows from anything of this sort, that princes or people have the right before God to prevent the power from having its civil consequences, or that the power itself is not of divine origin, and inherent in the Church as the spiritual authority. A man may, if he chooses to incur eternal damnation, reject or blaspheme the Church; but that does not prove that he has the right to do so. Princes and people may refuse to recognize as law the canons of the Church, and proceed as if no such canons existed; but that does not prove that they can do so without wrong, or without incurring the wrath of Heaven. The Church may, in fact, depend on the will of sovereigns or civil enactments for the civil efficacy of her canons, and yet have a divine right over sovereigns in temporals as well as in spirituals. Because the public law and the maxims generally received by nations have, in this respect, been changed in modern times, we cannot say that

they have been rightfully changed; that civilization, freedom, and virtue have profited by the change; or that the popes have lost, far less abandoned, the power they formerly exercised over temporal affairs. They may not assert the power now, because now it cannot be exercised with its proper temporal consequences; but because they do not now assert it, we are not to conclude that they do not now possess it, or that they do not hold it by divine right.

"We regard this question, as to the relation of the two powers to each other, as of no little practical importance at the present time, and even in our own country; and though we have often discussed it, we must be allowed to discuss it again, and with some thoroughness. There have crept even into the Catholic camp not a few gross errors in regard to it, which are no less dangerous to civil liberty and social order, than hostile to the Church, and derogatory to the rights of her sovereign pontiff. It is quite the fashion even for Catholic politicians to assert that, though the Church is supreme in spirituals, the state in temporals is absolutely independent of her authority:—'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. As long as the Church keeps within her own province, and confines herself to spirituals, we respect her, and submit to her authority; in spirituals, we even recognize the authority of the pope, and allow that in them he may do what he pleases; but he has no authority in temporals, and in them we will do as we please.' Such is the popular doctrine of the day, and of not a few who would take it as a gross affront and as downright injustice were we to insinuate that they are but sorry Catholics. Scarcely a Catholic amongst us engaged in politics can open his mouth without uttering this doctrine, and uttering it as if it were an incontestable truth and a maxim of divine wisdom. It has become the commonplace of the whole political world, and is rung out upon us from thrones and the cabinets of ministers, from the halls of justice and legislation, and from the hustings and the caucus. Whoso ventures to question it, is stared at as the ghost of some old dreamy monk of the Dark Ages. Let us, then, be allowed to examine it.

"The Church is supreme in spirituals, the state in temporals; the two powers are distinct, each independent in its own order. This is the popular doctrine in its least offensive form. It was the doctrine of the Gallican bishops—or, rather,

of Colbert, the minister of Louis the Fourteenth—assembled by order of the king in 1682. According to this doctrine, in all that belongs to the temporal order, the temporal authority is supreme, and therefore absolutely independent of the spiritual authority. This is a bold doctrine, and it requires some nerve in a man who believes in God to defend it. If it is conceded, it must be maintained that, let the sovereign reign as he will, tyrannize and oppress his subjects in temporals as he may, the spiritual authority has no right to rebuke him, and the pope, as visible head of the Church, has no power to admonish him, or to subject him to discipline. However his subjects may be ground down to the dust, however they may groan under the weight of his iniquitous exactions, the Church must look on in silence, and never dare open her mouth in their behalf, or in the most modest and timid tones possible remind the tyrant ‘that the king is not in reigning, but in reigning justly.’

“Nor is this the worst. The doctrine means, if anything, that the temporal order is independent of the law of God, and, therefore, of God himself. It must, if independent of the spiritual authority, be virtually independent of God, even though you should pretend that it is bound to obey his law; for it can in such case be bound to obey that law only as it interprets it for itself: and a law which it is free to interpret for itself is no law at all—is but its own will, passion, or caprice. To declare the temporal independent of the spiritual, is only, in other words, to declare that God has no dominion over it, no right to legislate for it, or to sit in judgment on it; and, therefore, that sovereigns in temporals are under no law, accountable to no power above themselves, and free to do whatever they please. Their sovereign will and pleasure is the only rule of right or wrong in temporals. What the prince wills is right, what he forbids is wrong. Here is absolute political atheism. God is voted out of the constitution of the state, and in politics there is no God, unless it be the temporal sovereign himself. Do you not see that, if you hold this, you must take Cæsar for God, as under pagan Rome, and hold right and godlike whatever he does, and that it is permitted you to have no will but his? How, if Cæsar is god, or subject to the divine law only as he interprets it for himself, can you accuse him of tyranny or oppression? What law can you

adduce that he is bound to obey? What right have you to denounce the temporal tyranny of a Nero, a Decius, a Maximian, a Diocletian, a Henry the Second, a Louis of Bavaria, a Don Pedro the Cruel, or a Charles le Mauvais? Let the crowned monsters, whom all history holds up to our execration, ride roughshod as they will over the hearts of their unoffending subjects, what right have you to blame them? They do but exercise the independence you claim for them, and denounce us for denying to them.

"But it may be you are democrats, and fancy that you obviate this objection by asserting the sovereignty of the people, and making all power emanate from them, and all rulers and magistrates responsible to them. But you only crown the people instead of one man, put the people in the place of the king. You assert their independence of the Church, and maintain the absolute independence of their will in temporals. Are the people as sovereign bound to conform to the law of God as interpreted by the Church? To say that, would be to abandon your favorite doctrine, and to agree with us. Are they bound to conform to that law only as they interpret it for themselves? Then are they virtually not bound by it at all. Are the people a god? You cannot say it, if you are Christians. Are they infallible? You dare not pretend it, if you respect common-sense. Are they impeccable? You know better, if you know anything. What assurance, then, have you that they will not construe the law of God, even if they acknowledge it, so as to authorize whatever iniquity they, for the time being, imagine it for their interest to practise? Or that they will not tyrannize in temporals as well and as fatally as kings and Cæsars?

"'Oh, but you blaspheme the people! You are no democrat; you are an absolutist, an aristocrat, a monarchist, and would have kings and nobles, born booted and spurred, to ride us by the grace of God. *A bas les rois! A bas les aristocrates! Vive le peuple!*' Peace, good friends! Do not suppose, because you have lost your senses, that everybody else should be sent to the lunatic asylum. Do not fancy that, because your understandings have become darkened, you are enlightened, or that all light is extinguished. If you retain the least glimmering of common-sense, you must see that it is precisely against absolutism, that

is, the independence of the temporal sovereign, whether king or people, that we are contending. Blaspheme the people! And whom do you blaspheme when you put the people in the place of God, and declare their will the law of God, as you do in your application of the maxim, 'The voice of the people is the voice of God'? We love freedom, perhaps, as much, to say the least, as you do; but do not require us to be stupid enough to suppose that the best way to secure it is to destroy its indispensable conditions. Have you no knowledge of history? Know ye not that the very doctrine which we oppose, and you defend, was originally invented by graceless courtiers to please tyrannical masters, and that it has been by substituting it for what you call the monkish doctrine of the Dark Ages, that kings have emancipated themselves from all law, destroyed the old free constitutions of Europe, and established very nearly throughout all Christendom that Byzantine system of government, or that centralized despotism, against which you direct in vain your Jacobinical and Red-Republican revolutions? You, with all your democratic froth and foam, only reproduce in another form the very doctrine that permits kings to play the tyrant at will. Because you make the people God, or at least claim for them the prerogatives of the Church of God, you must not suppose that we make kings and Cæsars the object of our idolatry. We are republican, republican born and republican bred, and we have never yet raised our voice but in behalf of freedom and against tyranny: and against tyranny and the principles of tyranny we will raise it, whether royal or popular. We wish the people free,—free from their own passions, and from yours and mine, alike free from despots and from demagogues; and we know there is and can be no freedom for them, either in spirituals or temporals, except in so far as they are subjected to the law of God, as interpreted and applied by his Church.

"Democracy, understood as the ancients understood it, may be a good government, nay, the best government, when and where it is legitimate, as with us. But even legitimate democracy has a natural tendency, as old Aristotle tells us, to 'degenerate into demagoguery,' and does so degenerate, 'when the lowest of the people, those who have no fortune and less virtue, become the majority, suffer themselves to be seduced

by flatterers to despoil and oppress the rest. For the people also are a monarch, not an individual, but a collective monarch. Hence they seek to be themselves a monarchy, and to reign alone, without law, as a despot. They assume the air and manner of tyrants; and like them have their flatterers, who grow rich and powerful, because the people dispose of all, and they dispose of the people.¹ We are no advocates of monarchy, we are firmly attached to the institutions of our country, and we should have something to say against kingly, and much in favor of republican, government, if the prevalence of jacobinism, socialism, and communism, so many degrees worse than the worst monarchy possible in a Christian country, did not make it our duty to be silent in both respects. The madness and infidelity of European radicals have made it impossible to say aught against monarchical government, without making war on the Church and on society itself. But whoever knows anything of democracies knows perfectly well that the people count for much less in them than is commonly pretended. The great body of the people in all countries are honest and well-disposed, they sincerely desire just and stable government; but they are necessarily engrossed with their private affairs, and ignorant and inefficient in what regards the public. They must at best rely on the few for information, even where newspapers abound; and they easily fall a prey to demagogues and party leaders, who flatter and deceive them for their own selfish purposes. The will that rules in a democracy is the will of these demagogues and party leaders, who have no honest principle to restrain them, and who can be deterred by no considerations of shame; for they affect always to rule in the name of the people, and are able to shift upon them the responsibility of their acts. It is easy to understand, then, without any disrespect to the great body of the people, that democracies can tyrannize and oppress as effectually, and to as great an extent, as monarchies themselves, and therefore that the assertion of the absolute independence of the temporal power in temporals is no less dangerous to civil liberty where the form of the government is popular, than where it is monarchical. Demagogues and party leaders, to say the least, are no more infallible or impeccable than kings

¹ Aristotle apud Rohrbacher, *Hist. Univ. de l'Eglise Cath.*, tom. i, p. 12.

and emperors, and no more safe depositaries of absolute power.

“No man, unless a downright atheist, dares, in just so many words, to assert the monstrous proposition, that the temporal order is not subjected to the law of God. God is the Universal Lord, the Sovereign King, and his dominion extends to all, from the highest to the lowest; for he is the sole Creator of all, and from him, and by him, and in him, and for him, are all things, and in whom we also live, and move, and have our being. His providence extends over all the works of his hands, and he takes cognizance of all our thoughts, words, and deeds—our eating and our drinking, our downsitteing and our uprising, our sleeping and our watching, our speaking and our silence; he gives us seedtime and harvest, the early and the latter rains, the heat of summer and the snows of winter; he makes the corn to grow in our valleys, and crowns our hills with flocks and herds; he gives victory or defeat to our armies, setteth up and putteth down kings, rears the infant colony into a mighty people, and overwhelms the empire and makes the populous city desolate; he is the sovereign arbiter of nations as of individuals, in temporals as in spirituals. His law is as universal as his providence, and is the sovereign law in all things for all in heaven, on the earth, and under the earth.

“This universal dominion, extending to temporals no less than to spirituals, which none dare deny to God, or can deny to him, unless they deny his existence, and therefore their own, belongs also to our Lord Jesus Christ, not only as he is the Son of God, but also as he is the Son of man. ‘All things,’ he says, ‘are delivered to me by my Father.’ (St. Luke, x, 22.) ‘All power is given to me in heaven and in earth.’ (St. Matt., xxviii, 18.) Here his universal dominion is unequivocally asserted, and asserted of him as Son of man, because it is said to be *delivered* and *given* to him: which could not be said of him as Son of God, for as Son of God he is God, and always possessed it. That he possesses this dominion as Son of man, was well argued in 1329 by Roger Archbishop-elect of Sens, before Philippe de Valois, in behalf of the French bishops and clergy, against Pierre, Lord of Cugnières, who had spoken in the name of the French nobility in defence of the doctrine we are opposing:—

“‘For,’ he says, addressing the king, ‘Jesus Christ had both powers [temporal and spiritual], not only according to his divine nature, but also according to his human nature. He is a priest after the order of Melchisedech, and hath written upon his garment, and on his thigh, KING OF KINGS AND LORD OF LORDS. (Rev., xiv, 16.) By his *thigh* and *garment* is understood his humanity united to his Divinity, as is garment to him who is clothed therewith. He says of himself: “All power is given to me in heaven and in earth.” The Epistle to the Hebrews says that God, his Father, hath “constituted him heir of all things,” and the apostle applies to him the words of the eighth Psalm: “Thou hast made him a little less than the angels; thou hast crowned him with glory and honor; and hast set him over all the works of thy hands. Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet; all sheep and oxen, and beasts of the field.” Now, in subjecting all things to him, the apostle concludes, “God has left nothing not subjected to him.” (Heb., i, 1; ii, 7-9.) Hence it is evident that, in that same nature in which Christ is inferior to the angels, he has dominion over all things. The same conclusion follows from this other text (Phil., ii, 8-10): “He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God hath exalted him and given him a name which is above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and in hell.” Hence, according to that nature in which he humbled himself, hath God exalted him above all things, since in the name of Jesus every knee must bow. St. Peter asserts the same in the Acts of the Apostles (x, 40-42), where he says that God has appointed him to be the judge of the living and the dead; for he speaks of him according to that nature in which God raised him up again the third day. All Scripture proclaims the same thing.”

“Kings and temporal lords, as such, are confessedly null, and, therefore, unknown, in the spiritual order, and are in it only private individuals, indistinguishable as to state or dignity from the meanest of their servants. With no propriety, then, could our Lord have on his garment and on his thigh ‘King of kings and Lord of lords,’ if he had not dominion over them in temporals, in that order in which they are kings and lords. St. Paul declares (Col., ii, 10) that he is the ‘head of all principality and power.’ And we may conclude with absolute certainty that he has, even in his human nature, universal dominion; and that only he, as the apostle says (1 Cor., xv, 27), who put all under him, is not subject to him. It follows, therefore, necessarily, if the dominion of our Lord in the flesh, or as the Messiah, is thus universal, that the *Christian* law, the law of Christ, extends not only to spirituals, but also to temporals, and is the supreme law of both orders. Kings and lords, magistrates

¹ Rohrbacher, *Hist. Univ. de l'Eglise Cath.*, tom. xx, pp. 302, 303.

and rulers, sovereigns and subjects, are under it in all things, alike in things temporal and in things spiritual. Whoso denies this denies not merely the sounder opinion, but the Christian religion itself.

“This established, we demand to whom, under God, it belongs to keep, interpret, and declare the law of Christ? Whom hath our Lord constituted the depository, the guardian, and the judge of his law? Certainly the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, and the successor of Peter as visible head or supreme chief of that Church. ‘All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.’ (St. Matt., xxviii, 18–20.) Here, plainly, our Lord commits his law to his Church, and gives her pastors authority to teach it to all nations, and to teach them to observe whatsoever it commands. Certain, then, is it that the Church has received his law, and is the guardian and judge for all men, of whatever rank, state, or dignity, in all things to which it extends; and, therefore, that all are bound to receive it from her, and to observe it in all things as she teaches and declares it. It will not do to say here that she is its guardian and judge in spirituals, and that sovereigns are its guardians and judges in temporals. The commission is to the Church, not to the state; and nowhere can it be found that our Lord has made princes, as such, guardians and judges of his law, even in the temporal order. He only gives them authority to execute it when declared to them. Besides, to keep, teach, and declare the law of Christ, whether in spirituals or temporals, is manifestly a spiritual function; and temporal sovereigns, it is confessed in the very doctrine we oppose, have no spiritual functions.

“Here we must be permitted to avail ourselves again of the reasoning of Roger Archbishop-elect of Sens, in the conferences held on the subject before Philippe de Valois, in reply, as we have said, to Pierre de Cugnières. After having, in the passage already quoted, established the dominion of our Lord according to his human nature over both orders, temporal and spiritual, he proceeds:—

“St. Peter, whom our Lord constituted his vicar, had the same power. He condemns judicially Ananias and Sapphira for the crimes of larceny and lying. Paul also pronounces sentence against the convicted fornicator. That Christ has willed to give this judgment to the Church, is manifest from his words (St. Matt., xviii, 15-18): “If thy brother sin against thee, go and rebuke him between him and thee alone. If he hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand. And if he will not hear them, tell it to the Church. And if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and the publican. Amen, I say to you, Whatsoever ye shall bind upon earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose upon earth shall be loosed in heaven.” Behold how expressly he wills that, wherever there is sin of one against another, if the delinquent corrects not himself, the matter shall be referred to the judgment of the Church, so that the offender, if he will not hear her, may be excommunicated. And the reason he gives is, that “whatsoever ye bind or loose upon earth shall be bound or loosed in heaven.” *Whatsoever, all*, without excepting anything, any more than the apostle does, when he says all is subjected to Christ. I prove it, also, from St. Luke (xxii, 38), cited by the Lord of Cugnieres in his own favor. I will beat him with his own staff. He says, and says truly, that by the two swords are to be understood the two powers, the temporal and the spiritual. But in whose power does Christ will the two swords to be? Certainly in that of Peter and the apostles, of the pope and bishops, that is, of the Church. Do you say that Christ blamed Peter for striking with the temporal sword? That is nothing. For, mark, he did not tell him to throw it away, but told him to return it to its scabbard, to keep it in his possession, signifying that, although this power is in the Church, he wills that under the New Law it should be exercised by the hand of the layman at the order of the priest.

“I prove it also, in the third place, by St. Paul (1 Cor., vi, 1-6), who orders that whoever has a lawsuit should bring it to be judged before the saints. His reasoning is, “Know you not that the saints shall judge this world? If then the world shall be judged by you, are you unworthy to judge the smallest matters? If therefore you shall have judgments about the things of this world, set them to judge who are the most despised in the Church.” It is evident from these testimonies, without mentioning others which I omit, that both powers may be in an ecclesiastical person. If St. Peter and the apostles made little use of the temporal power, it was in virtue of the principles, “All things are lawful to me, but all are not expedient,” and, “Everything in its time.” Now that all Gaul is subject to the Christian faith, the Church rightly insists on the punishment of crimes and the execution of justice, that men may amend their lives. Our conclusion is therefore founded in divine right.

“I prove it again by natural reason. . . . He appears best fitted to judge who is nearest to God, the rule of all judgments. Ecclesiastics are nearest to God. Therefore it is fitting that the Church should judge in these matters. Besides, nobody denies that ecclesiastics may take cognizance of the sin in these [temporal] affairs. Moreover, who has the right to judge of the end, has the right to

judge of that which is ordained to the end which is the reason of its existence. The body being ordained to the soul and the temporal to the spiritual, the Church therefore has the right to judge of both, according to the axiom, The accessory follows the nature of the principal."¹

"Such was the Gallicanism of France in 1329; for Roger spoke before the king in council, after consultation with the assembled bishops, by their order, and in their name. Between this and the Gallicanism of the Four Articles there is a difference. In 1329 the French clergy thought more of asserting the rights of the Church than of pleasing the king, and opposed instead of following the maxims of the French lawyers and courtiers. Hence the difference between the Gallicanism of 1329 and the Gallicanism of 1682.

"There are two points made by Roger against the nobles, that of themselves alone decide the whole controversy. Nobody, he says, doubts that ecclesiastics may take cognizance of the sin which is found in temporal matters. Nobody can doubt it. Every Catholic who knows his Catechism, or who has ever been to confession, knows that the priest can interrogate him on his temporal conduct, and judge him for sins committed in his temporal no less than in his spiritual relations. It would be a startling novelty for a Catholic to be told by his ghostly father that he need not confess any sins he may have committed in temporal matters: such as lying and cheating in his business transactions, refusing to pay his honest debts, stealing, fornication, adultery, murder, sedition, treason; for these pertain to the temporal order, and the Church has no jurisdiction in temporals. Does not the law of Christ extend to all these matters? Are they not all forbidden by the law of God? Are they not all matters which touch conscience? How, then, withdraw them from the jurisdiction of the Church, and say that she has no authority in temporals? If the Church can take cognizance of the sins of private individuals in the temporal order, she can also take cognizance of the sins of public persons, of kings and magistrates, in the same order. If she may subject private persons to her discipline for the sins of fornication and adultery, why not sovereigns? Do these sins cease to be sins when committed by kings and Cæsars? If she can impose on

¹ Ibid *ubi supra*, pp. 303, 304.

private persons the law of having only one wife, can she not do the same for sovereigns, and judge the sovereign as well as the private person who violates it? If she can judge of sedition and treason in the subject, wherefore not also of tyranny and oppression in the prince? Are tyranny and oppression in temporal matters, on the part of princes, less sins against the law of Christ, than sedition and treason on the part of subjects? Is it for the Church to bind the subject to the prince, and not the prince to the subject? Were that just? What king ever protested against the Church's condemning sedition and treason? By what right does the Church condemn these, and not the prince who fails in his duties as prince? Theodosius the Great was a pious and orthodox emperor, but he was liable to fits of anger, in which he committed acts of injustice. In one of these fits he ordered a most cruel massacre of some seven thousand of his subjects in the city of Thessalonica. This was an act in the temporal order of temporal sovereignty, and therefore an act for which the Church, according to the doctrine we oppose, could not judge him; nay, for which even God himself could not judge him, if the temporal sovereign is independent of the spiritual power in temporals. Yet St. Ambrose, one of the four Latin Doctors of the Church, Archbishop of Milan, thought otherwise, rebuked him severely for his tyranny to his subjects, and made him do public penance for it. Some Christians, provoked by the malignity of the Jews, destroyed a Jewish synagogue. Theodosius commanded them to rebuild it. Here, again, was an act of temporal sovereignty in the temporal order. But St. Ambrose interposed, forbade the Christians to obey the order of the emperor, and informed him that it was not lawful for Christians to build the temples of a false religion, or in which their own religion would be blasphemed.

"The other point made by Roger of Sens is equally conclusive, namely: that whoever has the right to judge the end has the right to judge the means. The body is for the soul, the temporal is for the spiritual, and therefore the Church. Since, therefore, she has the right to judge the soul, she has the right to judge the body; and since she has the right to judge the spiritual, she has the right to judge the temporal. We cannot too often repeat that the temporal does not exist for its own sake, and that the end for which it does exist is not in its own order—is not temporal, but spiritual. It has

no end, no purpose, no legitimacy, but as it is subordinated to the law of Christ, and made subservient to the spiritual end of man. The state is inaugurated, the king is crowned and invested with the insignia of command, only for society, and society itself is only for man's spiritual destiny,—his ultimate union with God as his supreme good; for man has been created solely that he might 'know, love, and serve God in this world, and be happy with him forever in the next.' This is his end and only end. The earthly is for the heavenly, the seen for the unseen, the temporal for the eternal, man for God. This is the order of things. The Christian religion is the law according to which, from the beginning of the human race, in all times and places, man fulfils his destiny, or attains to the end for which he has been created and redeemed. No other law has ever been given to man. The Christian religion is, in substance, one and the same religion from the beginning. It is not a new religion, and is a new law only as to its state, for St. Paul argues to the Galatians that it was before Moses, and, therefore, that it was madness for them to think of being perfected by the Mosaic law without Christ. They who were saved before the coming of Christ were saved by the same faith, the same religion, the same law, by which we are saved: only they believed in a Messiah to come, and we in a Messiah who has come. Always was the law of Christ in the world, always was it the one law for all men, of whatever state, rank, or dignity,—the only law by which man could render himself acceptable to his Maker and fulfil his destiny. There never has been any other religion properly so called than that of Christ, and that is of all times and places.

"The Catholic Church, also, is from the beginning—not an institution of yesterday. It is catholic in time as well as in space. The Church is catholic, we are taught in the Catechism, because 'she subsists in all ages, teaches all nations, and maintains all truth.' She has subsisted under different modes, indeed; but whether as the patriarchal religion, as the Synagogue, or as the Roman Catholic communion, she is always one and the same Catholic Church, the immaculate Spouse of the Lamb slain from the foundations of the world, and the joyful Mother of all the faithful. All things are ordered in reference to her. Her Maker is her Husband, and he will own none as his children who

have not been carried in her womb and nursed at her breasts. Such is his will, eternal as his own being, and which is without variableness or shadow of turning, immutable and immovable as his own nature. She has been instituted expressly to guide, assist, and conduct us to God. For this end she has been made the depositary of the law of Christ, authorized to keep, to teach, to interpret, and apply it; to teach, feed, rule, and defend all men and nations, in reference to their final and only end. How, then, say she has no authority over temporals? How can she have authority to judge the only end for which temporals exist, or have any right to exist, if she have not the right to judge them, and to approve or condemn them as they do or do not subserve this end? How can she have charge of the end without also having charge of the means, since the means are necessarily subordinated to the end, and controlled by it? As she has charge of the end, that is, of gaining the end, she must have charge of the means; and as the temporal exists only as a means to man's final end, she must, by virtue of the very spiritual authority which she confessedly is, have supreme power over the temporal, and plenary authority to govern it according to the demands or the utility of the end, and therefore in all respects whatever.

"But let us not be supposed to insist on a doctrine, which we do not. We contend not here for the doctrine, that the state holds from God only through the Church, although we should be loath to deny even that doctrine, since it has high authority in its favor: we stop with the doctrine of Bellarmine and Suarez, that the temporal prince holds his authority from God through the people or the community, and therefore concede, as we have always conceded, that the people, where there is no existing legitimate government, are the medial origin of government. But the people, even on this ground, are not the ultimate source of power, and do not give to civil government its right to govern, for *non est potestas, nisi a Deo*: they are only the medium of its constitution, not the fountain of its rights. The government when constituted has immediately from God its authority or right to govern, and consequently holds immediately under his law, and for the end that law prescribes. That end, as we have seen, is the Christian end, the ultimate end of man. The government, then, whether regal or popular, holds its

authority on condition that it exercises all its powers in obedience to the law of Christ for that end, and, of course, forfeits its rights whenever it neglects or violates this condition. The powers of government are a sacred trust, and must be exercised according to the conditions of the trust: to violate these conditions is, then, to forfeit the trust, and to lose the powers it confers. We must say this, unless we accept Oriental despotism, and contend for the inamissibility of power; that is, that the prince, let him do what he pleases, tyrannize and oppress as he may, never loses his right to reign: a doctrine which cannot be consistently maintained by any Englishman who boasts of his glorious Revolution of 1688; or by any American who, on each succeeding Fourth of July, reads with patriotic pride the Declaration of Independence by the Congress of 1776.

“Now, although we do not say that the Church commissions the state, or imposes the conditions on which it holds its right to govern, yet, as it holds under the law of Christ, and on conditions imposed by that law, we do say that she, as the guardian and judge of that law, must have the power to take cognizance of the state, and to judge whether it does or does not conform to the conditions of its trust, and to pronounce sentence accordingly: which sentence ought to have immediate practical execution in the temporal order; and the temporal power that resists it is not only faithless to its trust, but guilty of direct rebellion against God, the only real Sovereign, Fountain of all law, and Source of all rights, in the temporal order as in the spiritual. She must have the right to take cognizance of the fidelity of subjects, since they are bound to obey the legitimate prince for conscience’ sake, and, therefore, of the manner in which princes discharge their duties to their subjects; and to judge and to declare whether they have or have not forfeited their trusts, and lost their right to reign, or to command the obedience of their subjects. The deposing power, then, is inherent in her as the spiritual authority, as the guardian and judge of the law under which kings and emperors hold their crowns and have the right to reign; for in deposing a sovereign, absolving his subjects from their allegiance, and authorizing them to proceed to the choice of a new sovereign, she does but apply the law of Christ to a particular case, and judicially declare what is already true by that law. She

only declares that the forfeiture has occurred, and that subjects are released from their oath of fidelity, who are already released by the law of God.

“This power, which we claim here for the Church over temporals, is not itself precisely temporal power. We are, indeed, not at liberty to assert that the Church has no temporal authority; for that she has no temporal authority, direct or indirect, is a condemned proposition,—condemned, if we are not mistaken, by our present Holy Father, in his condemnation of the work on Canon Law by Professor Nuytz of Turin; and we have seen that she has even direct temporal authority by divine right; but the power we are now asserting, though a power over temporals, is itself, strictly speaking, a spiritual power, held by a spiritual person, and exerted for a spiritual end. The temporal order by its own nature, or by the fact that it exists in the present decree of God only for an end not in its own order, is subjected to the spiritual; and consequently every question that does or can arise in the temporal order is indirectly a spiritual question, and within the jurisdiction of the Church as the spiritual authority, and therefore of the pope, who, as supreme chief of the Church, possesses that authority in all its plenitude. The pope, then, even by virtue of his spiritual authority, has the power to judge all temporal questions, if not precisely as temporal, yet as spiritual—for all temporal questions are to be decided by their relation to the spiritual—and therefore has the right to pronounce sentence of deposition against any sovereign when required by the good of the spiritual order.

“No Christian can or will deny that whatever we do,—whether we sing or pray, eat or drink, wake or sleep, assist at public worship or pursue our own domestic avocations, whether we act in a private or in a public capacity,—we are bound to do it from conscience, and for the glory of God, for whom we are created, and who is our supreme good, as well as the Supreme Good in itself. The Church, as the spiritual power, has jurisdiction in all matters that touch our consciences, the law, the glory, of God, on our supreme good. Then she has jurisdiction over all our lives and all our acts. Does the law of God prescribe our duty to temporal sovereigns? Does it prescribe the duty of sovereigns to their subjects? We have

seen that it does. Can we neglect our duty to sovereigns, or they their duty to us, with a good conscience, or without sin? Of course not. If sovereigns play the tyrant, if they become cruel, oppressive, governing their subjects iniquitously, for selfish ends, do they or do they not violate the laws of God, and forfeit their rights? If you are not a base despot or a vile slave, you must say they do. If the Church is the spiritual power, with the right to declare the law of Christ for all men and nations, can any act of the state in contravention of her canons be regarded as a law? The most vulgar common-sense answers that it cannot. Tell us, then, even supposing the Church to have only spiritual power, what question can come up between man and man, between sovereign and sovereign, between subject and sovereign, or sovereign and subject, that does not come within the legitimate jurisdiction of the Church, and on which she has not by divine right the power to pronounce a judicial sentence? None? Then the power she exercised over sovereigns in the Middle Ages was not a usurpation, was not derived from the concession of princes or the consent of the people, but was and is hers by divine right; and whoso resists it rebels against the King of kings and Lord of lords. This is the ground on which we defend the power exercised over sovereigns by popes and councils in the Middle Ages.

"We know this ground is not acceptable to sovereigns, to courtiers, or to demagogues. But is that our fault? Who has made it our duty to please them? Are we not bound to please God, and to adhere to the truth, let it offend whom it may? On this subject permit us to translate some remarks from the Abbé Rohrbacher's "*Universal History of the Catholic Church*," which we find very much to our purpose.

"'In the seventh book of this History,' says the abbé, 'we have seen the three representatives of ancient wisdom, Confucius, Plato, and Cicero, professing with one voice that God alone is the true sovereign of men; that there is no power that comes not from him; that his reason is the supreme and normal law of all others; that what princes, judges, and peoples decree that is contrary to this supreme rule, is in no sense law; that there was to come a time in which the Holy, the Saint of saints, the Word, the Reason itself of God, would be manifested in a sensible manner, give to all nations the same law, and make of the whole human race one only empire, of which God shall be the sole common Master and the Sovereign Monarch. We have seen, in the nineteenth book, that this ancient doctrine of human

wisdom is, as it were, a distant echo of the divine wisdom; and, joining one to the other, we may establish the following articles of the divine government of mankind.

“ARTICLE I. God only is properly sovereign. ART. II. The Son of God made man, Christ, or the Messiah, has been invested by his Father with this sovereign power. ART. III. Among men there is no power or right to command, unless from God, and by his Word. ART. IV. The power is from God, but not always the man who exercises it, or the use which is made of it. ART. V. Both the sovereignty and the sovereign, and both the use which is made of it and those on whom it is exercised, are equally subordinated to the law of God. ART. VI. The infallible interpreter of the divine law is the Catholic Church.

“Hence these consequences:—

“Therefore all that which regards the law of God, conscience, eternal salvation, the whole world, nations and individuals, sovereigns and subjects, are subordinated to the power of the Church and of her chief. Hence, also, in all that which interests conscience, civil legislation is subordinated to the legislation of the Catholic Church. Hence the first axiom laid down by a French prelate, M. de Marca, in his book, *De la Concorde du Sacerdote et de l'Empire*, is, that the constitutions of princes and temporal laws contrary to the canons are absolutely null and void.

“To escape this conclusion, it is necessary either to deny to the Catholic Church the right in the last resort to decide doubts concerning the divine law, conscience, salvation; or else to say that the temporal power and laws are not a matter which concerns the law of God, salvation, conscience. Say either, and you will arrive at anarchy, that state in which there is no longer either law or human duty; for if it belongs not to the Catholic Church, undeniably the highest authority on earth, to interpret definitively the divine law, this right belongs to nobody. He, in fact, who refuses it to the highest authority can accord it to none—to the prince or the nation no more than to the meanest individual. If in this case the prince and the nation are permitted to deride the Church and her chief, the meanest individual must be permitted to deride the nation and the prince. The divine law, the only source of duty, will be for man as if it were not. Moreover, if submission to the temporal power and law be not a matter which interests conscience, salvation, it ceases to be a duty to submit to them; then there is no longer any right, no longer any society. There is no medium. Either society is absolutely null, or else it is subordinated to the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church.

“But, as we have seen, this is a hard truth. What king will hear it? It revolted the idolatrous emperors of pagan Rome, they who pretended themselves to be not only emperors, but also sovereign pontiffs and gods. During three centuries they made war on the Eternal and his Christ, in order to repulse the yoke of Christ and his Church. But the Eternal laughed at them, his Christ has broken them and their empire as a potter's vessel beneath his feet.

“This subordination to the kingdom of God on the earth generally displeased the Greek Emperors of Constantinople. A few submitted to it with sincerity; the greater part either did it only in an astute manner, or openly refused to do it, pretending themselves to be, if

not gods, at least sovereign pontiffs. We have seen the Emperor Nicephorus, in order to justify his adulterous marriage, cause to be declared by a conciliabulum of courtier prelates, that the emperor is above the divine laws. The Greeks of Constantinople were in name and in fact the *Low Empire*, till it disappeared beneath the cimeter of the Mahometans.

“In Germany, Frederic Barbarossa and the emperors of his race and character pretended to be the living and sovereign law, from which emanate all the particular rights of nations and of kings. Consequently they would not have the divine law interpreted by the Church of God. By their force, their address, and their activity, they counted on prevailing against the Church, and against the Rock on which she is built. They ended by being broken against it, they and all their race. Such are the judgments of God, of which we have been the witnesses.

“In France, we have seen a grandson of St. Louis forgetting the lessons and example of his grandfather—above all, the lessons and example of Charlemagne, who called and proved himself a devout defender of the Holy Church and humble coadjutor of the Apostolic See in all things; we have seen Philip the Fair walking in the footsteps of the Germans, and the Greeks of the Low Empire insult the Church in her chief; and we have seen in a few years Philip the Fair disappear, and all his posterity. And France, who, instead of expiating the iniquity of her king, augmented its fatal consequences, we have seen delivered over to the English, and on the point of becoming an English province, when God in his mercy sent a Lorraine virgin [Joan of Arc] who restored France to the French.

“Frederic Barbarossa and Philip the Fair were misled and ruined, among other things, by what are called lawyers, men who study laws, but purely human laws, above all, the laws of pagan Rome, when her Cæsars were at once emperors, sovereign pontiffs, and gods, consequently the supreme and only law. More or less imbued with this political idolatry, the lawyers made each prince understand that, instead of being subject to the law of God interpreted by the Church, he was himself the living law and sovereign of all laws. Regarding, therefore, as *non-avenues* both the authority of the Catholic Church and the sovereignty of Christ on earth, they revived and justified in principle at once both the most odious tyranny and the most frightful anarchy. For, if the law of God, and the Church of Christ that interprets it, are nothing for kings, they are nothing for the people, —are nothing for anybody; and no one has any law but himself.

“Hence, from the times of these sovereigns we may remark among lawyers and their like a certain *low empire* of intelligences, low both as to ideas and sentiments, seeing only matter, only the individual, only the king, at best only a particular nation, never mankind in their integrity, humanity regenerated in God by Christianity, and advancing in the Church towards a perfect and triumphant humanity in heaven. They see nothing, wish to see nothing, and will not allow others to see anything of all this. To prevent it, they alter and disguise facts, or falsify them by malicious interpretations. They dissemble the good, they bring up and exaggerate the evil. It might be said that the Low Empire of the Greeks, with its baseness of ideas and sentiments, its chicanery, duplicity, and, above all, its hatred

of the Church of Rome, has passed from Constantinople to the West, and become naturalized among the writers of the last three centuries. It is, as it were, an invasion of learned barbarism, which suffers to appear in history only quarrels, wars, and ruins, without anything that consoles or edifies the heart of the Christian reader. In the assemblage of human ideas, all is confusion, inconsequence, contradiction, incertitude—a confusion worse than that of Babel. In the confusion of languages one no longer understood his neighbor, but in the confusion of ideas which has perplexed literary Europe for three centuries, men no longer understand themselves. They will not allow that politics are subordinated to the law of God, interpreted by the Church of God; they insist that politics shall be the law to themselves; and after having thus indoctrinated kings, queens, and princes, they complain that kings, queens, and princes follow their lessons, and acknowledge, politically, no moral law but their own interest. And what is most strange is, that they even blame the Church for their being no better,—the Church whom kings and princes would not suffer in the Council of Trent to proceed to their reform, as she did to that of the popes and bishops. They declaim against the theory of Machiavelli, and yet they have themselves no other, and differ from him only in the fact that he knew what he said and what he thought. The sight of this general baseness of the French mind and the incoherence of its ideas moves in us an immense pity for the men and the writers of that epoch [the sixteenth century?]. When we see a Francis the First and a Henry the Second . . . league with Mahometans against Christians, and with Protestants against Catholics, while they punish heretics in their own dominions, we are tempted to exclaim, O God! forgive them! for they know not what they do any more than they who counsel them.”¹

“The doctrine that the political order is subordinated to the law of God interpreted by the Catholic Church, is of course deeply offensive to sovereigns, courtiers, and demagogues; but that, if we rightly consider it, is no argument against its truth, or against its being fearlessly asserted. It is only by bringing both sovereigns and subjects back to it that we can save society from being the prey, on the one hand,

¹ Rohrbacher, 2d edition, tom. xxiv, pp. 611–614. We have introduced this extract, not only for its intrinsic merit, but also for the purpose of giving our readers a specimen of the author's Ultramontaniam. The Abbé Rohrbacher's work wants method, is sometimes a little crude and indigested, and is not always consistent with itself; but it is a work of extensive erudition, written from a truly Catholic point of view, with great sincerity, earnestness, and vigor; and may be consulted with full confidence and great advantage on all those points on which our popular histories are the most defective or the least trustworthy. The abbé is no mean philosopher, a sound theologian, and a hearty Papist. His work cannot be too extensively circulated, or too diligently studied. It is well adapted to the wants of the Catholic world in our own times, and even in our own country, where the laity are to a fearful extent infected with the lowest form of political Gallicanism, and seem to imagine that religion has nothing to do with politics.

of the most odious tyranny, and, on the other, of the most fearful anarchy. It is no new doctrine invented by us. The supremacy of the spiritual order is a dictate of the most vulgar common-sense—a universal conviction of mankind. It is in the nature of things, and was recognized by all Gentile antiquity, however it may have been disregarded in practice. It runs through all the Old Testament, and no one can deny that under the old law, in the Synagogue, the kingly power was subordinated to the sacerdotal. The Church, as containing in herself the whole priesthood, and all the spiritual authority instituted under the primitive law, and as succeeding to the Synagogue and continuing it in all not of a local and temporary nature, necessarily inherits and possesses this supremacy in its plenitude. The very end for which she is instituted and placed in the world, the very nature of her office and mission, presuppose it, and authorize us to assert it for her, even in case no express grant of power over the temporal order by our Lord to Peter could be alleged. For every Catholic, at least, the Church is the supreme judge of the limits and extent of her own powers. She can be judged by no one, and this of itself implies her absolute supremacy, and that the temporal order must receive its law, at least its interpretation, from her. So she herself has always asserted, by the mouth of all her holy doctors, her councils, and her sovereign pontiffs. Through all the long years of what is termed the Martyr Age, during her long and bloody struggle with pagan and idolatrous Rome, she asserted it and wrote it out in the blood of her dearest children, whom she commanded to submit to all manner of tortures, and to death in its most frightful and excruciating forms, sooner than obey Cæsar against Christ. She has no sooner emerged from the Catacombs, and gained a *status* in the world, than she reasserts it, and proclaims in the face of Arian emperors and infidel kings the eternal supremacy of the law of Christ, and her right, as its guardian and judge, to judge all men of every state, rank, or dignity, and to subject them to her discipline. Whenever the occasion occurred, she asserted her power, not in empty words only, but in deeds, to judge sovereigns, kings, and Cæsars, to bestow or to take away crowns, to depose ungodly rulers, and to absolve their subjects from their oath of allegiance. Under this claimed and generally-admitted supremacy of the Church, pagan Rome

was conquered, barbarians were subdued, the empires, kingdoms, and states of modern Europe were founded, civil liberty was reëstablished and protected, nations were converted, wholesome laws were enacted, and civilization was advanced. The human mind awoke from its sleep, rejoiced in new freedom, and felt itself endowed with an unwonted vigor. Men gloried in a sublime ideal, cherished lofty principles, and glowed with noble and generous sentiments. They adopted in their political conduct the Christian law for their guide, saints for their model, and performed deeds and attained to an heroic virtue, before which the greatest and best of our times seem mean and paltry. Shall we fear to do honor to our noble Catholic ancestors, or to assert the doctrine to which, under God, was due their greatness, lest we offend the fastidious ears of unbelieving sovereigns, or disturb the tranquillity of graceless courtiers and demagogues, who, to gain political advancement, would not hesitate to sell Jesus Christ to be crucified? Out upon such servility! We have not so learned Christ; we are not so lost to all true manliness. If God be for us, nothing can be against us; and he whose soul is knit in the bonds of love to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, may well defy all the wrath of man and all the rage of hell. Dare be freemen in Christ, or wear not his livery.

“The Church was doing her work, and civilization was advancing, when one day the German lawyers, courting the favor of a German Kaiser, who would be pope as well as Kaiser, recalled the old doctrine of the idolatrous emperors of pagan Rome, and assured him that he was the living law, the fountain of all rights and of all honor; that is, that he was emperor, sovereign pontiff, nay, a god, from whom emanated all authority, civil and ecclesiastical, which was therefore held at his sovereign will and pleasure. The Kaiser, inflated with his newly-discovered godhood, undertook the management of all affairs in Church and in state, and to make and unmake bishops and sovereign pontiffs at will. What the German lawyers claimed for the German Kaiser, or emperor, the French lawyers, not to be outdone as accomplished courtiers, claimed for their king, the Spanish lawyers for theirs, and the English for theirs. Thus the sovereigns were freed from their subjection to the Church, the supremacy of the temporal order was proclaimed, the Church was declared a civil institution, to be protected and

preserved only to preach the submission of the people to the civil tyrant, and to threaten them with eternal damnation if they dared resist his tyranny. And religion grew faint in men's hearts, the light of truth became dim, faith expired, civilization was arrested, and the world seemed abandoned to the violence and misrule of crowned monsters. Faith, piety, liberty, science, intelligence, morality, all that makes life worth possessing, were extinct in the secular world, and the courtiers applauded, and their dupes called it progress, the emancipation of the human mind from spiritual bondage, the glorious instauration of science and virtue! Would you have us reinstate these dupes, and follow the lead of those old German lawyers, who would make kings and emperors believe themselves at once emperors, sovereign pontiffs, and gods, as claimed to be the old pagan emperors of idolatrous Rome?

"This doctrine of the German lawyers, since called Gallicanism, and contained in principle in the first of the Four Gallican Articles of 1682, introduced into Western Europe the politics of the Low Empire, or of the Greeks of Constantinople, and destroyed the free constitutions of Mediæval Europe, and established on their ruins the absolutism of the last three centuries, expressed in the famous *L'Etat, c'est moi* of Louis the Fourteenth. All the world has revolted against this absolutism, and kings, and especially the Church, are held responsible for it, although the Church always opposed it, and her sovereign pontiffs exerted all their power to prevent its introduction and establishment, and it was introduced and established only in defiance of spiritual censures and anathemas. But everybody feels, that to make kings absolute, to give them all power, and free them from all law but their own will, is not precisely to found and secure civil freedom, or to provide for the well-being of the temporal order. Hence is renewed the doctrine of the responsibility of kings and rulers, but not now their responsibility to God through the Church. It is now responsibility to the people. The modern demagogue does for the people what the German lawyer did for the German Kaiser. He does not say the people are sovereign under the law of God interpreted by the Church; but he says the people are the living law, the fountain of all rights, and from them emanates all just authority, both civil and ecclesiastical. Therefore he makes

the people emperor, sovereign pontiff, god. Hence he actually uses the strange terms, people-king, people-pontiff, people-god. Read Pierre Leroux, read Giuseppe Mazzini, and you will find these barbarous epithets, or their equivalents, used in sober earnestness; and the last-mentioned of these worthies is the recognized chief of the whole European democracy, and commands the sympathy of constitutional England and democratic America. The people are crowned and deified in opposition to kings and emperors, but it is still the assertion of the independence, nay, the supremacy, of the temporal order, and the denial of its subordination to the law of God. The people are king, pope, god, and may do what they will; and hence for the despotism of kings we have the despotism of the mass, social despotism, or, rather, the despotism of the demagogues who control the people.

"But some revolt, again, at this, and will no more submit to king-people than to any other king. They see in the people only a collection of individuals, and will not admit of the whole collectively any more than is true of each individual taken separately. Hence we actually hear individuals, not in a madhouse, not looked upon as out of their senses, but honored and held up as the great lights of their age, claim for each individual what the lawyers claimed for the Kaiser, what the demagogue claims for the people *en masse*, and assert, each for himself, I am emperor, sovereign pontiff, and god. It is only the logical consequence of the Protestant doctrine of private judgment, only Protestantism consistently developed. But, with this monstrous claim of the individual, no law, no government, no society, nothing but anarchy is possible. Here is where the movement against the absolutism of kings does and must end. Asserting the independence of the temporal order, it passed on to the absolutism of the mass, and from that it passes on to the absolutism of the individual, the Free Trade of the late William Leggett, and would pass further, only there is no further; sink to a lower deep, only a lower deep there is not.

"Would you have us follow in this track, assert people-king, people-pontiff, people-god, or declare each individual emperor, supreme pontiff, god? Would you have us, in order not to incur the censure of our age, or offend the god of our demagogues, so belie our common-sense, so stultify ourselves, as to accept such arrant nonsense, or rather such

horrid blasphemy, which the fools of the day boast as a proof of the light and progress of this nineteenth century? But we must do it, or reassert the Catholic doctrine of the supremacy of the spiritual order, and maintain that the whole temporal order in all things is subordinated to the law of God as interpreted by the Roman Catholic Church. We cannot assert the premises of the idolaters of kings, the idolaters of the people, or the idolaters of the individual, and deny their conclusions; for their conclusions follow necessarily from their premises. We must deny their premises, and that we cannot do without asserting the supremacy of the Church as guardian and judge of the law of God over both sovereigns and subjects, in temporals no less than in spirituals. There is no medium, save at the expense of common-sense or common honesty.

“We are aware of the arguments usually adduced in defence of the antichristian and antisocial doctrine of the independence of the political order, but not one of them has the least conceivable force. Our Lord said, we are told, ‘My kingdom is not of this world.’ We should grieve to think it otherwise; but how, from the fact that his kingdom is not of this world, infer that it has no jurisdiction in or over this world? The kingdom of Christ does not derive its authority from this world, and is not founded on the principles or maxims of this world; yet it is set up in this world expressly for the purpose of governing it, of reducing the kingdoms of this world to subjection to the law of God, and making them the kingdoms of God and of his Christ. ‘Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s.’ Most assuredly; but what things *are* Cæsar’s? Who has the authority to answer this question for us as Catholics? Not Cæsar himself, for he is neither infallible nor impeccable, and may claim somewhat more than his own, nay, the things that are God’s, which he has very often done, and is in general inclined to do. We will give him exactly what the Church bids us give him, not a groat more, though he burn us at the stake, behead and disembowel, or hang and draw and quarter us, for the Church is the highest authority. But may not the Church usurp the rights of Cæsar, and refuse to authorize me to give him his dues? And if she can do such a naughty thing, who is to decide for us whether she does do it or not? Suppose she does, what she usurps may be as safe in her possession

as in his. The Church any day is as sovereign as Cæsar, and as safe a depositary of power, and the insolence and encroachments of churchmen, suppose them to be as great as the most shameless courtier or politician ever pretended, are less intolerable than the insolence and encroachments of Cæsar and his satellites. Any day the mitre is above the crown, and the priest above the demagogue. But, after all, we have a tolerable pledge of the good behavior, of the justice and discretion, of the Church, in the fact that she is the Holy Catholic Church, the Church of God, the Kingdom of Christ, the immaculate Spouse of the Lamb, divinely commissioned and supernaturally assisted by the Holy Ghost to teach and judge the law of God, and to conduct individuals and nations in the way of truth and holiness. We trust her in all that concerns the soul, and it would be a hard case if we could not trust her also in all that concerns the body. At any rate, she is less likely to go astray than Cæsar, and we may safely trust her in preference to him.

“But it is a mistake to suppose that our Lord in the text cited is giving a positive command. He gave no decision, but merely answered a captious question put to him by the Jews. Some Jews, seeking to entangle him and get something whereof to accuse him either before the Roman emperor or before the people, asked him, ‘Master, is it lawful for us to pay tribute to Cæsar, or not? But he, considering their deceit, said to them, Why tempt ye me? Show me a penny. Whose image and inscription hath it? They, answering, said to him, Cæsar’s. And he said to them, Render, therefore, to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s.’ (St. Luke, xx, 22–25.) Here is no decision: It is not our Lord who says the penny is Cæsar’s; it is the Jews who say so. He merely says: If, as you say, it is Cæsar’s, then render it unto him; for it is the principle of justice to render unto every one his own. But he decides nothing as to this further question, whether anything really is Cæsar’s or not. The text, therefore, cannot avail those who would adduce it in defence of the political independence of the temporal order. But, even if this interpretation be rejected, the text says nothing against the right of the Church to decide what things are Cæsar’s, and what things are God’s.

“We are also told that our Lord paid tribute for himself

and Peter to Cæsar, and thence is inferred the supremacy of Cæsar in temporals, or the subjection of the Church in temporal matters to the temporal lord. But, unhappily for our anti-Papists, or idolaters of the temporal order, the very text relied on condemns them:—‘They that received the didrachma [tribute money] came to Peter, and said to him, Doth not your master pay the didrachma? He said, Yes; and when he was come into the house Jesus prevented him, saying, What is thy opinion, Simon? Of whom do the kings of the earth take tribute or custom? Of their own children or of strangers? And he said, Of strangers. Jesus said to him, Then the children are free. But *that we may not scandalize them*, go thou to the sea and cast in a hook; and that fish which shall first come up, take; and when thou hast opened its mouth, thou shalt find a stater; take that and give it to them for me and thee.’ (St. Matt., xvii, 23–26.) Our Lord here plainly teaches that he and Peter, and therefore the Church, are not subject to tribute, and he paid it only to avoid scandal. The text asserts the absolute freedom of the Church even in temporals, or that even in temporalities she owes nothing to the political authority.

“All the arguments that can be adduced amount to nothing, for, if anything is certain, it is, that Christ has instituted his Church to govern all men and nations according to his law, which she alone is competent to interpret and apply. We only ask our readers to bear in mind that the Church is not herself the civil authority, and that, though she possesses the temporal authority *in radice*, she ordinarily governs the temporal order only through the temporal sovereign. She bears by divine right both swords, but she exercises the temporal sword by the hand of the prince or magistrate. The temporal sovereign holds it subject to her order, to be exercised in her service, under her direction. This is the normal order; and it is only an unmanly fear of offending, or an undue desire to please, secular governments, that has ever led any intelligent Christian to concede the contrary. That the Church has always been able to exercise her rightful supremacy, or that secular governments have in general shown themselves to be her obedient children, we are far from pretending; but we owe it to her and to them to assert her rights and their duties, and, perhaps, in doing so we may aid in preparing a better future, and do something to enable

her to check the reign of political atheism, and to save society, now threatened at once by both despotism and anarchy, from utter dissolution.

“We have dwelt at length on this subject, because we wish to show that those noble popes who withstood the secular tyrants and deposed them for their crimes against the Church and against their subjects, only exercised their rights, and discharged the duties of their office. We meet not a few calling themselves Catholics, who regard the conduct of these popes towards the secular power as something to be apologized for, or as something to be excused only by a reference to the false maxims and strange ignorance and barbarism of the times. Even though flaming democrats, if not because flaming democrats, they side with such cruel and debauched tyrants as Henry the Fourth of Germany and Henry the Second of England; and by an unaccountable blindness or perversity insist that the cause of truth, justice, and civil freedom was defended by these crowned monsters against the arrogance, ambition, and rapacity of the sovereign pontiffs. It was no such thing. The cause of truth, justice, civil freedom, is and always has been the cause of the Church, and these much-calumniated pontiffs have often stood alone in its defence, as at one time St. Thomas of Canterbury stood alone in England against the king in defence of the rights of the Church of God. The first interest of mankind in every age and country is the maintenance of the freedom and independence of the Catholic Church, for it is only through her and in her that mankind are redeemed, and able to form and maintain real society. The sovereign that makes war on the Church, that denies her her freedom and authority, by that act alone forfeits his rights, and deserves to be deposed, alike in the name of God, and in the name of mankind; for the true good of man is inseparable from the honor and glory of God in his Church. When, then, we find a sovereign pontiff judging, condemning, and deposing a secular prince, releasing his subjects from their obligation to obey him, and authorizing them to choose them another king, we may regret the necessity for such extreme measures on the part of the pontiff, but we see in them only the bold and decided exercise of the legitimate authority of the spiritual power over the temporal; and instead of blushing for the chief of our religion, or joining our voice to swell the clamor

against him, we thank him with our whole heart for his fidelity to Christ, and we give him the highest honor that we can give to a true servant of God and benefactor of mankind. It is not the sainted Hildebrand, nor the much-wronged Boniface, that we feel deserves our apology or our indignation, but Henry of Germany and Philip the Fair of France.

“The popes have been wronged by timid or time-serving Catholics, and it is time that we learn to do them justice, and free their memories from the foul calumnies with which party spirit and sectarian malice have loaded them. The pope is our father; and shall we not love him as our father? He is dearer to us than natural father or mother, for he is the Vicar on earth of our God and Saviour in heaven; and shall we not feel every arrow winged at him speed deep in our own hearts? Shall we not glory in his power, which after all is only the power of the cross? Shall we not sorrow when he is driven into exile by the wicked, and applaud when he strikes down the oppressor, defends suffering innocence, and makes himself the friend of the friendless, the father of the fatherless? O Sovereign Pontiff, Successor of the Prince of the Apostles, Vicar of God on earth! if ever through love of the world, or through fear of the secular power, whether royal or popular in its constitution, I forget to assert thy rights as supreme chief under Christ, my Saviour, of the whole spiritual order, and as such supreme alike in spirituals and in temporals, let my right hand forget her cunning, and my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth!

“We yield to none in our loyalty to civil government, and we are loyal to it because we are loyal to the successor of Peter. Religion with us governs politics, and the pope is lord of Cæsar. Without the pope, the Church would break into fragments, and dwindle into puny and contemptible Protestant sects; without the Church, religion would become an idle speculation, a maudlin sentiment, or a loathsome superstition, like that which is revived among us by our modern necromancers, or ‘spirit-rappers;’ without religion, the spiritual order disappears, morality no longer exists even in name, and man sinks into a mere animal, wallowing in the mire of sensuality. All history proves it; all reasoning demonstrates it; all study of our own hearts confirms it. Shall we then be so mad as to attempt to

circumscribe the power of the sovereign pontiff, or not to spurn with loathing and disgust that paltry spirit that would rob him of his glorious prerogatives, and make him a base slave of the mob, or of a Byzantine, a German, or a French Kaiser? There is no liberty without the supremacy of the spiritual order; that supremacy cannot be maintained without the Papacy; and therefore, while others pay their homage to graceless demagogues, or to a Frederic Barbarossa or a Louis the Fourteenth, we will reserve ours for the Roman Pontiff."

ART. IV.—1. *Grapes and Thorns*. By M. A. T., author of "The House of York," "A Winged Word," etc. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1874. 8vo, pp. 286.

2. *Brockley Moore: A Novel*. New York: Appleton & Co. 1874. 12mo, pp. 307.

3. *Hearts and Hands*. By CHRISTIAN REID. New York: Appleton & Co. 1875. 8vo.

IN noticing the first of these two works, "*Grapes and Thorns*," we feel that we must summon up all that remains of our youthful gallantry, and not forget for a moment that the work is written by a sensitive lady. We forgot it when reviewing her "*House of York*," and spoke of it in our natural voice, without softening its tones, according to our honest judgment of its merits, as if the author had been a hard-headed man; and the lady's friends set us down as a bear, and duly berated us. We shall take good care not to get another such a berating, as not she, but her male friends, gave us. Besides, we still remember the lesson read us both publicly and privately by the irrepressible Nun of Kenmare. In the very first number of our revived series, we committed three mortal offences: we criticized the "*House of York*," we failed to praise the Nun of Kenmare, and we doubted the infallibility of Louis Veuillot; and it shows an extraordinary charity on the part of the Catholic public that we are still enabled to make our quarterly appearance. But, though we frankly confess our literary sins, and promise not to repeat

them—unless occasion offers—we are afraid that we do not very sincerely repent them.

But, seriously, while we hold womanhood, as every true man does, in profound reverence, we consider it a sad thing, that women produce so large a share of modern popular literature. It is to this fact, combined with that of journalism, that we attribute the light and superficial, the sensational and sentimental, character of the popular literature of the day, its lack of deep and vigorous thought, its weakness, its enervating tendency on the mind of the reader, and its unhealthy influence on society. The authoress herself shows, in the character of *Lawrence Gerald* in "*Grapes and Thorns*," the injury it is to a man to be the pet of the other sex, and to be formed by feminine rather than by masculine influences. He is "a spoiled child," weak in will, feeble in resolution, conceited, overbearing, cruel, unfeeling, incapable of robust thought, manly action, or sustained effort. Let any one, after reading either of the novels before us, leave it and attempt to read a page of St. Thomas, or to make a meditation on any one of the great mysteries of faith, and he will at once understand the damaging effect on the mind and the heart of novel-reading or the effeminate literature of the day. It unfits one for serious and solid study, enervates the mind, wastes the freshness of the heart, and creates a morbid craving for excitement.

We may be very wrong, but we have not yet been able to accept—which appears to be almost universally accepted at present—the doctrine that ascribes all the noble qualities and virtues of the son to the mother. In our opinion, the paternal influence counts for something as well as the maternal in the formation of character; and though we admit that, as a rule, it is a far greater misfortune for very young children to be deprived of their mother, than it is to be deprived of their father, yet we do not believe it is desirable, at least for boys, that they should be brought up exclusively by their mothers. The faults of what we call Young America are in a great measure due to maternal weakness on the one hand, and the absence of paternal authority on the other. Mothers, for the most part, alternate between over-indulgence and over-severity. When they act from their maternal instinct, they put up with and pet their children whatever they do; when they attempt to act from their reason, they pass over

nothing. Most American mothers fail to govern their children, because they fail to govern themselves. But, aside from all this, while we hold the mother's influence very essential, as well as her tenderness during all the early life, we do not believe mothers are fitted to form strong and manly characters in their sons. The mother's influence softens, weakens, and enervates, when not tempered and hardened by the influence of the father. *Lawrence Gerald*, in "Grapes and Thorns," shows that mothers, excellent Catholic mothers, too, are not always qualified to train up their sons to be strong, energetic, self-reliant men, able to meet the rough-and-tumble of life, and to distinguish themselves in society as bold, honest, upright characters. He was idolized by his mother, who saw no fault in him as he grew up; but he was really a lazy, worthless scamp, and, as he himself confessed, a "gambler, a house-breaker, a thief, a sacrilegious liar, a murderer, and a matricide."

We acknowledge that our Puritan ancestors were too stern and rigid, they knew little or nothing of the gentleness and sweetness of the Gospel; but they maintained family government, and trained up their children to honor and obey their parents, to be honest and upright. The sons grew up with strong and manly characters, patterned after their fathers, and filled worthily their places when they were gone, in the family, in society, in the church—such as they had—and in the state. There is no use in denying it, private and public virtue was the rule: men and women, with rarely an exception, were loyal to their trusts, and could be relied on. But in their time there was no woman-worship. The man was the head of the woman, and the father was the head of the family, and was the principal in maintaining family discipline. We have changed all that. The husband and father, save as providing for the family expenses, counts in the respectable classes for nothing. The mother and daughters hold him in subjection, ruin him by their extravagance, while the sons hasten rapidly to the devil. The deification of woman in the natural order, or the institution of woman-worship, the characteristic of American, if not of all modern, society, and to which every novelist brings an offering, is only the worship of lust. Lust 'is the god of the modern world. For him men toil and moil, seek to be rich, traverse sea and land, rob, steal, forge, swindle, peculate,

betray their trusts, commit all sorts of crime, and make earth an image of hell. Men do not worship the almighty dollar: it is not the dollar they worship, but that which the dollar is needed to obtain.

We yield to no one in our reverence for true womanhood, or in our high appreciation of woman's influence in her place; but we protest against woman-worship, or making the wife the head of the family. We worship the Blessed Virgin, indeed, but we worship in her, not the woman, but the Mother of God; and in the Mother of God we honor virginity and chaste maternity, spotless purity, and the most exalted virtue. We do not deify her, regard her as a goddess, or call her divine. Between the *hyperdulia* we render to her and the worship of woman which we condemn, there is no analogy, and all the difference there is between heaven and hell. We honor woman as the helpmate of man, we reverence the meek and chaste wife, the tender and loving mother, who lives in her children, and forgets herself in them and for them; but we do not reverence or honor woman when she forgets her womanhood, and usurps the prerogatives of the other sex, claims to be the superior of man, and to subordinate all in society to her tastes, inclinations, and unchastened ambition, or love of power and display. We object to the influence of women as creators of popular literature, because the popular literature they create tends to emasculate thought, to enervate the mind, and to foster a weak and watery sentimentalism or a corrupting sensationalism. They who feed on it lose their virility, become incapable of serious and severe study, have no relish for what is grave and profound, and must have excitement, exciting reading, something that saves them the labor of thinking, inflames their imaginations, or moves their senses. This is the effect of modern literature. It is feminine, and feeding on it renders the community effeminate; and, therefore, a community in which passion predominates over reason, and which, consequently, is at once weak and tyrannical. This sort of literature has a direct tendency to barbarism; for the essence of barbarism, as distinguished from civilization, is that in it passion, sentiment, or emotion, uncontrolled by reason, reigns.

We have read too many novels in our day not to have experienced their evil effects; and we are strongly opposed to all novels, but especially to women's novels, for the feminine

mind is constitutionally sentimental, and fond of excitement. It should be so, to fit woman for her sphere of duty as a wife and a mother. She needs a quick sensibility, a ready sympathy, deep tenderness, and generous sentiments. These she needs, coupled with strong maternal instincts, to be able to supply what is in some degree wanting in the husband and father, who is usually of a sterner mould. The two combined make an admirable harmony; but either moving alone is defective. The two together are necessary to form a complete whole. "And God made man to his own image and likeness; male and female made he them:" plainly showing that the woman complements the man. The woman is not the complete man. She represents only the feminine element of human nature, not that nature in its entirety; consequently, the literature she can create will represent only her own feminine characteristics, and will lack the strong, masculine, vigorous, and intellectual elements which belong to the head of the race. Hence, women, unless supernaturalized as was St. Theresa or St. Catharine, can, as authors of general literature, exert only an effeminating influence.

There are strong-minded women who tell us that there is no sex in intellect. But there is certainly sex in literature. The difference between a book written by a man and a book written by a woman is as marked as the difference between the conversation of a man and that of a woman. The characteristics of the feminine mind are stamped on everything a woman writes. She cannot unsex herself, if she would. A gentleman claimed in conversation with us to be the author of a novel published in *Blackwood's Magazine*, of considerable merit; we questioned his authorship on the ground that it bore internal evidence of being written by a woman, as we have since ascertained it actually was, namely, by the now well-known Mrs. Oliphant, the authoress of the "Chronicles of Carlingford" and several other popular works. It would be difficult to mistake the conversation, on any subject, of a woman for that of a man. We do not in this deny woman's ability, her keenness of observation, her wit, or even her logic; and two works written by women are reviewed and highly commended in the REVIEW, though neither of them happens to be a novel. We set our face against all novels, especially against women's novels. They are all bad;

and since women have taken the lead in writing them, men, in writing novels, write as much like women as they are able. Whether produced by men or women, the same feminine spirit pervades nearly all our popular literature.

What disturbs us the most is, that even the guardians of public morals are themselves more or less infected, and give their *imprimatur* to popular novels, if they only mingle a due amount of piety with their sentimentalism or sensationalism, and take care to commit no flagrant offence against orthodoxy. Little or no account is taken of their silent and subtle influence on the tone and temper of the mind, or its effect in emasculating the intellect. The plea is, that, to overcome the evil of bad novels, we must provide for the Catholic reading public better ones. Such, we are told, are the vicious habits and tastes of the age, that it will read little else than novels and journals, and these of some sort it will have: all we can do is to supply good or harmless ones instead of those that tend to injure or corrupt the moral sense of the community. In accordance with this policy of compromise, even Catholics are preparing and publishing pretty little novels; for the little stories we write for our children are nothing but novels, just fitted to form these vicious mental habits and tastes in the young generation as soon as it can read: which seems to us the way to perpetuate the evil, not to overcome it. The child fed with these pretty little stories will, when grown up, crave more exciting and more highly spiced stories; such as cannot be furnished by Catholics. Happily, the Church does not stand in human wisdom or human strength; for, if she did, she would be as powerless to train men for heaven as is any of the Protestant sects. The natural tendency of Catholics is to conform to the world and its ways, and, if they do not, it is because grace restrains them.

Admitting that we must have novels, and women's novels, too, "Grapes and Thorns" is deserving no especial censure; on the contrary, it is deserving of very high commendation. Its sketches of natural scenery exhibit a poetical love of nature and rare powers of description. Its delineation of character is truthful, shows very careful observation of real life, and nice discrimination. *Lawrence Gerald* is till the last phase of his worthless life an ordinary character, but truthfully drawn; *Mr. Schöninger*, the Jew, is intended to be a heroic character, but is not well sustained, and his conversion

is due more to his love of *Honora Pembroke* than to *Fr. Chevereuse's* sermon on the Passion of our Lord, which contained little or nothing likely to affect favorably the mind of a Jew. Indeed, we think the whole of the book that relates to the Jew's conversion might have been profitably omitted. *Honora Pembroke* is very proper, very good, but not very lovable. The *Mother Ferrier* is admirable; but the really noble character of the book is her daughter *Annette*, who is worth a dozen *Honora Pembroke's*. She blunders in falling in love with *Lawrence Gerald*, but it is only the common blunder of her sex, ordinarily more attracted by scamps than by honest men.

In an artistic point of view, the story is continued long after it is ended. It properly ends with the confession and flight of *Lawrence*, under charge of his heroic wife, and the liberation of *Mr. Schöninger* falsely condemned for the murder of *Mother Chevereuse*. The conversations between the priest and the Jew are not very interesting, at least to us, for they do not touch the real merits of the question between the Jew and the Christian. We are glad to learn that *Annette* remains firm in her resolution to stand by *Lawrence*, for it is in keeping with her noble character as a Christian wife. We are glad to learn that *Lawrence* perseveres in his penance, and leads after his flight a true penitential life. But the description is not natural, and is drawn from books, not observation. The authoress, we regret, forgets to tell us what became, after the death of *Lawrence*, of *Annette*, the only character in the book in whom we take a deep interest. She loved not wisely, as few women do, but her love was redeemed, elevated, consecrated by the love of God, and the supernatural sense of duty.

Yet we have one fault, common to most women's novels, to find with "Grapes and Thorns:" it is the immense superiority it ascribes, unconsciously, no doubt, to women over men. No doubt, women novelists are sufficiently severe upon their own sex, paint them as heartless, coquettish, intriguing, artful, tyrannical, abusing power whenever they have it, or as weak, puny, whimpering, broken-hearted things; but, on the other hand, their women are almost always superior to their men, have higher moral aims, a better knowledge of life, better judgment in affairs,

and more firmness and strength of character. Our authoress sins less in this respect than most of her sister novelists, and yet,—aside from the priests she introduces, and who by their sacred profession are placed out of the account,—there is, with the exception of the Jew, who has no particular merit, except his excellence as a music-teacher, not a man in her “*Grapes and Thorns*” from beginning to end. The women lead in everything; men simply dance attendance on the women, or lean on them for support, for advice, for direction, and for extrication from perils or difficulty. Most of the little books designed for children are written by women, and present us good little girls and naughty little boys; and we have seen even in the church, at Confirmation, the girls placed before the boys. Even public lecturers to mixed assemblies no longer venture to say in their address “*Gentlemen and Ladies*,” but violate propriety, and even grammar, which holds the masculine the more dignified gender, in saying “*Ladies and Gentlemen*.” Yet who in pure English would say, in addressing a mixed audience, “*Women and Men*”? This all goes to show that modern literature, even society itself, treats woman as the stronger, not as the weaker vessel, and reverses the order of nature, which makes the man the head of the woman, and the husband the lord of the wife.

Now, we do not believe that this assumed superiority, unless in individual cases, really exists, in either an intellectual or a moral point of view. Our reasons we shall not inflict at length upon our readers. God made woman an inchoate man; and women, like children, need a master. What woman is and what she can do when acting under the direction of a husband, a father, a brother, or the priest, is no index to what she will be or what she will do when left to her own head, to her own guidance, without male counsel or direction. The most corrupt periods of history are precisely those in which women's influence is greatest; and we may say, Woe unto any age or people where the women bear rule. They can be harder-hearted, more despotic, more cruel, and less scrupulous in effecting their purposes than men. Step-mothers bear a very different reputation from that borne by step-fathers. Not a little of man's iniquity is done to please his wife, or at her dictation. “The woman thou gavest me to be my companion gave me of the tree, and I did eat.”

The man is not blameless, far from it; for he should not have listened to his wife and abdicated his headship. "Because thou hast hearkened to the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat, cursed be the earth in thy work; with labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life." (Gen., iii, 12, 17.) Under the Jewish law, which treats her with great tenderness and respect, woman is a perpetual minor, and is always subject to her father, her husband, or her male relatives. This was in accordance with the law of nature, which Christianity confirms, but does not abrogate.

The authoress of "*Grapes and Thorns*" has not the least sympathy with the Women's-Rights party: she is in this respect a true Catholic, as well as a true woman; but, perhaps, it has never occurred to her that novels, in which the men are nobodies, and all the wisdom, virtue, intelligence, and strength and energy of character are ascribed to the women, are so many powerful auxiliaries to that party, and prepare the way for its success, or at least its favorable reception by multitudes who never think for themselves, but take their premises from novels and journals. The Women's-Rights party is only a logical sequence of the immense intellectual and moral superiority feminine literature ascribes to women.

M. A. T. is not a chief sinner in this respect, and it would be difficult to name a woman novelist freer from the objectionable peculiarities of women authors of fiction. She is no mawkish sentimentalist, but has in her character a substratum of strong common-sense. Her tone of mind is sound and healthy. She is not subjective, forever dwelling on her own emotions and sentiments, and treating her readers to learned psychological analyses of her interior state. She has so few of the characteristics of feminine novelists, that we have heard her gravely charged by women as wanting in feminine refinement and delicacy,—a charge which, as far as we have been able to judge from her writings, is wholly unwarranted. She is a New-England lady, and, we presume, of Puritan ancestry, and appears to have been, prior to her conversion, more or less affected by the Transcendentalism so rife in Boston a few years since. We half suspect that it was the detection, in her earlier writings, of the phrases and turns of thought peculiar to the Transcendental school, that prejudiced us for a time against them, and made us

fancy her only half converted. We have no doubt we did her injustice, though we have no sympathy with her admiration of the Brownings and other pets of the literary society of "the Hub."

But to return to our subject. One of our grave objections to our women's novels in general, and which many regard as a merit, is their intense subjectiveness, and their habit of dissecting emotions and sentiments, passions and affections. The heroine does not know whether she loves or not, and so must go into a psychological analysis of her sentiments and affections, and argue the question *pro* and *con*. We are entertained with long and tedious accounts of the growth of love in the heart,—love, which, as a sentiment, has no growth, but is born, if at all, full-grown. Whoever loves at all—taking love as a sentiment—loves at first sight, and in this sense love has no historical development, and submits to no analysis. Nothing is more wearisome and unprofitable, to say the least, than the long-winded details of the ever-changing emotions and varying states or moods of the affections, or, rather, of the sensibility. Many women writers are fond of raising nice questions in morals, and settle in a summary way the most difficult cases of conscience. There are no casuists equal to your female casuists. St. Liguori were a fool to them.

One other objection, and this applies not to women's novels only, is that of treating love as an affection of the sensitive soul, instead of an affection of the rational soul. Nearly all popular literature represents love as a sentiment, and, therefore, independent of the will. There is, no doubt, such a love, distinguishable from mere lust or sensuality, and regarded by its possessors as pure and holy; but it is an affection of the sensibility, and not elicitable or controllable by the will. It is fatal; and it is mistaking this sort of love for that which should subsist between husband and wife, that causes so many to look upon Christian marriage, the only sure basis of the family, as intolerable tyranny, a burden too great to be borne. Hence comes the demand for the liberty of divorce, and, with the more advanced party, for Free Love, the real aim of the Women's-Rights movement, the success of which would prove the greatest of all curses to women.

Neither the individual nor the race is absolutely illogical, and the gravest and most destructive errors that ever gain

currency are in some sense logical conclusions from widely accepted premises. The horrible doctrines of the champions of divorce and Free Love are only logical conclusions from the premises supplied by the popular novels of the day. Make love a sentiment independent of reason and will, and deprive marriage of the grace of the sacrament, and it may justly be held that Christian marriage would be too oppressive to be endured. The sentiments, however pure and sweet, are little endurable, lasting rarely beyond the honeymoon, sometimes not so long. The sentiments also border on the senses; and conjugal fidelity on the part of the husband, and even of the wife, assailed through her sentiments,—what she mistakes for “true inwardness,”—becomes very difficult to maintain. Considering the sort of religion, called by some the “religion of gush,” which obtains in Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, it would be more difficult to believe in the innocence than in the guilt of its eloquent pastor. This religion of gush is a very legitimate development of the emotional side of Protestantism. Indeed, modern literature itself is the offspring of Protestantism, or the revolt against the Church, that is to say, against God; and it is only by a return to the Church and Catholic principles and influences, that we can overcome its evils.

It is only simple justice to our American women who write novels, to say that they, even when non-Catholic, avoid most of the objectionable features we have pointed out, and that their novels are pure and healthy compared with those with which English women flood our literary market. The worst and most corrupt and corrupting literary works that circulate amongst us are of English origin, not of American growth. Even the Women's-Rights movement is of English, not American origin. Mary Wolstonecroft and Frances Wright were English women. American women have their foibles, their vanities, their extravagances, but hitherto, as a rule, they have had a due appreciation of the proper duties and sphere of their sex, and deserve to be held in honor for their modesty and good sense. Long may it continue to be so.

In conclusion, we repeat that we yield to no one in our high appreciation of true womanhood. We hold, it is true, that the woman is for the man, not the man for the woman; that the man is the head of the woman; and that, while husbands should

love their wives, wives should love and obey their husbands. We hold also that the appropriate spheres of the sexes are different; but we do not consider that of woman, though different, inferior to that of man. In her proper sphere, woman is the equal of man. Though we do not believe every woman an angel, nor every man a devil, or that all the virtue of society is on the part of women, any more than all the suffering, we have no difficulty in believing that the religion and virtue of the community depend even more on the women for their maintenance than on the men. They are more susceptible to religious impressions and more persevering in their resolutions. They are different in their mental and moral characteristics from men, but in no respect inferior, and in some respects decidedly superior. They have more quickness, more tact, and, in general, greater executive ability. There is no better proof of a frivolous mind and a depraved heart than the disposition to speak disparagingly of women. The true man honors womanhood; and the worst effect of our feminine literature and our Women's-Rights movements is their tendency to destroy that chivalric respect for woman native to every man whose heart is uncorrupted.

ART. V.—*The Wonders of Lourdes.* Translated from the French of MGR. DE SÉGUR. By ANNA T. SADLIER. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1875.

THERE is to the Christian mind, or to the mind that believes in God, the Creator of heaven and earth and all things therein, no a-priori difficulty in believing any duly attested miracle, or presumption against it, for God, as Creator, must be distinct from his works, independent of, and supreme over them, their sovereign Lord and Proprietor. They, then, can interpose no obstacle to his working a miracle, if he chooses or judges it proper. To pretend, as some do, that God is tied up by the so-called laws of nature, or is bound in his free action by them, is to mistake entirely the relation of Creator and creature. God, if at all, is supercosmic, and cosmic laws are dependent on him, and subject to his will. They are, therefore, incapable of binding him, or impeding

his free action. Creation itself is a miracle, and our personal existence is a standing miracle, for we exist at any moment only by virtue of the continuous creative act of God. God, being free in all his acts *ad extra*, can perform any act he pleases, not intrinsically impossible, or that does not imply a contradiction.

The Christian order, though it supposes nature and completes it, is itself supernatural, and a manifestation of the supernatural power and action of the Creator. Miracles, which are the direct and immediate acts of the Creator, are in some sense in the Christian order. Man and the universe are perfected, or fulfil their destiny, only in the supernatural, that is, in the Christian, order. This order being supernatural and the expression of the supernatural providence of God, miracles have in them nothing anomalous, nothing illogical, or not concordant with it, and hence are as credible as any other class of facts. They serve the purpose or end of the Christian order, and therefore tend to perfect or fulfil the design of God in creation. Being supernatural as to their cause, they express the supernatural order; but being in the natural and even sensible order as to their effects, they are as provable, as facts, by ordinary testimony, as if they were natural facts as to their cause. They prove of themselves their supernatural origin and character.

Our Lord promised that miracles should always remain in the Church, and they always have remained. It is of faith that miracles continue with the faithful; and whoever has paid any attention to the subject is well aware that nothing is or can be better authenticated or more conclusively proved than the fact that miracles have never ceased in the Christian Church. Yet we are slow in crediting any particular alleged miraculous fact. Every alleged miracle stands, so to speak, on its own bottom, and is to be received or rejected according to the direct proofs in the case. If I am asked to believe the reality of this or that alleged miracle, I must have proofs which conclusively establish it, and leave no room for a reasonable doubt. We find amongst good people, whose faith is lively and strong, hundreds of things passing as miracles, which, while we by no means deny them to be miraculous, we do not accept as miracles, because we do not find them to be proved as such. The Christian temper inclines neither to incredulity nor to credulity.

The alleged appearance to the shepherds of our Lady of la Salette we have never seen proved to our satisfaction, yet it may have been a real appearance; for we know no reason why our Lady should not appear to mortals, if such is the pleasure of her divine Son. That she has so appeared at different times cannot be doubted, unless we doubt all historical testimony. We know no reason why she should not so appear, if such appearance enters the divine economy, for nothing hides her or any of the saints from us but a mimetic veil, which nothing hinders our Lord from withdrawing as he did in his own case and that of Moses and Elias, in his transfiguration on the mount in presence of Peter, James, and John.

The Blessed Virgin, the saints, and the angels are not separated from us by space, or hidden from our view by physical distance, as with our false views of space and time we are apt to imagine. The state of the blessed is changed, but not their place, for they dwell in the bosom of God, are made one with him: and he is everywhere present, dwells not in space, but in immensity, and inhabits not time, but eternity. We are apt to forget that space and time are nothing in themselves. Ideal space has been well defined to be the power of God to externize his act, or to create *ad extra*; and ideal time, his power to externize his act successively or progressively. We should never think of God as physically remote from us; or of the Blessed Virgin, the saints, and the angels, as separated from us by distance, unless it be, unhappily, by a moral distance. In all other respects, they are present with us, as is our Lord himself. If we see them not, it is not because they are distant, but because the mimetic veil is before our eyes. Yet we must remember, as Dr. Watts sings, heretic as he was, that

The saints above, and the saints below
Do but one communion make.

We all profess in the Creed to believe in "the communion of saints." They who are separated do not commune. We think of God as here, and of him and the saints and angels as ever present with us. Our God is nigh unto every one of us, if haply we seek after him. The natural order is not separated from the supernatural, but is, so to speak, immersed in it, and forming only one complete whole with it. The natural proceeds from the supernatural, lives in it, is sustained

by it, and completed only by returning to it, and becoming one with it, as the Creator and the creature become one in the Incarnate Word.

There is nothing incredible in the supposition that, from time to time, the blessed show themselves to the living in furtherance of the gracious designs of God to individuals or nations. We do not reject modern spiritism, falsely called *Spiritualism*, because we doubt that the souls of the departed are still really living, or because we hold it impossible for them to appear by divine permission to persons in the flesh; but because we have no proofs that the spirits that appear are the spirits of the dead, and not evil spirits, fallen angels, who personate them. The literal facts alleged by the spiritists, or facts of the same order, we do not dispute, though there is connected with them much fraud, and no little jugglery. The proofs of miracles are not more conclusive than are the proofs of the satanic prodigies, that is, as simple facts; and in either case they are sufficient, if we accept historical testimony at all. What we deny in regard to spiritism is, not the facts as alleged, but the induction from them, that the spirits are really the spirits of the departed.

Nothing is more certain than that Satan imitates, as far as in his power, genuine miracles, and seeks to deceive by his prodigies. We must never assume that the superhuman, or what surpasses the power of man, is supernatural and divine. Satan, though a creature, has a superhuman power, and is able to work, not miracles, but prodigies, which imitate miracles, and which the unwary may mistake for them. But Satan, being a creature, has no creative, and, therefore, no supernatural power. He can operate only within the cosmos, and can never exhibit any real supercosmic power; whereas every real miracle is a manifestation of supercosmic, and, therefore, of creative power. There are certain diseases that Satan can heal,—diseases which demand for their cure only the vitality of the diseased; but those which demand more, or a *vis* the system has lost, he cannot heal. Hence he cannot raise the dead, or restore a dead person to life, for that demands a creative power, as much as the production of an existence from nothing. In all cases where there is an exhibition of creative power, we must see the finger of God, not a satanic prodigy; a real miracle, not a lying wonder.

Many of the alleged cures related of persons visiting holy shrines do not surpass the power of Satan; and corresponding cures are recorded as having been effected in the temples of Æsculapius and other heathen shrines. They cannot, therefore, be taken as conclusive proofs, in themselves, of the divine interposition. They are such proofs only when effected under such circumstances as exclude the supposition of their being effected by satanic influence.

We reject the induction of the spiritists, that the spirits they profess communicate with them, because their communications are not truthful, and they prove themselves lying spirits. They teach what we know to be false, and hurtful to the soul. They deviate from the apostolic doctrine, and lead to separation from the apostolic communion. Everything about them indicates that they are lying spirits, are trying to pass for what they are not, and are practising a gross imposition upon their dupes. In fact, spiritism is only a revived demonism, or the renewed effort of Satan to get himself worshipped as God. Saints and angels, when they appear, come as the messengers of the living God, show themselves to be engaged in his work, in promoting his worship, and leading souls to union with him: the supernatural end for which they are created. Their mission is to enlighten, to elevate, and perfect, or to help man to fulfil his destiny. They calm, they soothe, and they give peace to the troubled soul. They exert a directly contrary influence from that exerted by the lying spirits followed by the spiritists.

Though, as we have said, we are slow to believe this or that alleged miracle, we cannot help believing this of our Lady of Lourdes. The evidence in the case seems to us absolutely conclusive that she actually appeared to the poor girl Bernadette, and that she honors the shrine consecrated to her. We cannot doubt the perfect truthfulness of M. Henri Laserre's book, or that of Mgr. de Ségur, so beautifully translated by our young friend, Anna T. Sadlier, now before us; and which we have read with a renewal of our love and devotion to our Blessed Mother, conceived without original stain, who is all fair, without spot or blemish. We cannot doubt the reality of the appearance, or the fact of the many marvellous cures related,—cures often instantaneous and complete; and which are undeniably beyond the greatest medical science or skill, and also beyond any known natural

therapeutic agent. We cannot deny them as facts, and are utterly unable to account for them without the supposition of a supernatural intervention.

Yet, as we have already intimated, not all these alleged cures are to us conclusive proofs of miraculous intervention. We had a near relative who for six months had been rendered utterly helpless by inflammatory rheumatism. She was unable to move herself in bed, or even to raise her hand. A Mormon Elder asked her husband for a night's lodging, which was refused on the ground of the illness of his wife. The Elder replied that that was no reason for refusing his request, for, if he would let him see his wife, he doubted not he could cure her. He was led to her bedside, where he kneeled down and made a short prayer; at the end of the prayer she was completely cured—as well as ever she was in her life. We do not believe that God wrought a miracle at the prayer of the Mormon Elder, nor are we willing to suppose an intervention of the Evil One. There are moral or non-physical causes whose operation we but imperfectly understand, and which produce effects on the physical system that seem to us little less than miraculous. Till we know the extent of these causes, or the moral *vis medicatrix* of nature, we cannot take these sudden and inexplicable cures as conclusive proofs of a supernatural intervention.

But there is a class of facts and cures that are to us conclusive. None but God can work a real miracle, because in every real miracle there is an exhibition of creative power, or the production of something from nothing, or where nothing was before: and God alone has creative power. Now, in the wonders related of Lourdes, we find facts which seem to us to involve the act of creation. When Moses smote the rock and the water gushed forth it was a miracle, for there was no water in the rock; and it was as purely an act of creation to cause the water to flow from the rock where previously there was none, as if there had been no water in existence. So to us, the opening, by Bernadette of the fountain which continues to flow, in the rocks of Massabielle, or Massavielle, seems a miracle of the same kind, and impresses us much more forcibly than most of the cures related. We copy Mgr. de Ségur's account of it—(pp. 66-69).

"It was the eighth day of the fortnight. Every spot in the vicinity was crowded with ardent, eager people. When little Bernadette appeared, every one, the sceptics, as well as the believers, instinctively uncovered their heads. The kind, merciful, and most admirable Virgin Mary vouchsafed, that day like the others, to keep her appointment in the grotto. In no other sanctuary, perhaps, did the Mother of God so often repeat her celestial visits.

"She began the conversation on this occasion, by confiding to her dear Bernadette her third secret: 'My daughter,' said she to her. 'I wish to confide to you, for yourself alone, a last secret; like the other, you are not to reveal it to any one in the world.'

"Bernadette heard, with joyful heart, the ineffable melody of that voice so sweet, so motherly, so tender, which of old, at Nazareth, charmed the ears and heart of the child Jesus.

"'And now,' said the Blessed Virgin to her, after a moment's silence, 'to drink and wash yourself at the spring, and eat of the grass which is there.'

"Bernadette looked round her in astonishment. There was no spring in the grotto; there had never been one. A sandy and arid pile, strewn with fragments of rock, which then obstructed the interior of the cavern, and reached to the roof, a height of about seventy-five cubic feet. Without losing sight of the Apparition, Bernadette was moving towards the Gave, when, by a glance and a gesture of the hand, the Virgin pointed out the place where she was to go.

"'Do not go there,' said she to her; 'I did not tell you to drink at the Gave; go to the fountain, it is here.' And extending her hand, she pointed out to the child that same dry corner, to which, the evening before, she had made her ascend on her knees. It was at the end of the grotto, on the left of the spectator.

"Bernadette went up, and when she was near the rock, she looked for the fountain. Not finding it, and wishing to obey, she told her embarrassment to the heavenly Lady by a glance. In obedience to another sign, the child bent down and, scraping the earth with her little hands, began to make a hollow in the ground.

"All at once the bottom of the little cavity became damp: coming from unknown depths, across the rocks and through the thick of the earth, a mysterious water appeared beneath the hand of the child of Mary, and soon filled the little hollow, which might contain about a glassful. Mingling with the earth, it was quite muddy, and poor Bernadette raised it to her lips three times, without having courage to taste it. The radiant Apparition presided over this strange scene, and followed the child with an attentive glance. The latter at length overcame her repugnance; she drank the muddy water and bathed her face with it.

"The spectators understood nothing of all this. 'Oh! see,' cried some of them, 'see how she daubs her face, poor child!' Others said: 'She is losing her mind; there is no sense in that!' At this moment, with her wet fingers, Bernadette plucked and ate some blades of grass which grew there.

"Immediately the water of the rising spring overflowed the banks of the little pond hollowed by the child, and began to flow like a fine thread, which, during the first day, only moistened the sand. The

wet mark which it traced on the soil, slowly, insensibly lengthened, in the direction of the Gave.

"With her feeble hand, Bernadette had unconsciously opened the source of cures and of miracles.

"The Blessed Virgin, rewarding her little workwoman with a smile, disappeared, all radiant, and the faithful, obedient Bernadette went home as usual.

"The astonished spectators wished to see the miraculous fountain, and to soak their handkerchiefs in it. Next day, the Blessed Virgin's fountain, visibly increasing, flowed already a finger's breadth. At the end of a few days, it gushed out of the earth, pure and limpid, about as broad as a child's arm. It then ceased to expand.

"It was subsequently measured with mathematical precision: the first week, it gave 85 quarts a minute; five thousand one hundred quarts an hour; that is to say, a hundred and twenty-two thousand four hundred quarts a day. And before that time, we say again, that that rock, those sands were dry and arid, as all the inhabitants of the country knew. The strong minds of the neighborhood said and wrote that it was something quite natural, that there was no spring; that the crazed and deluded Bernadette had simply struck a collection of water, which had *undoubtedly* oozed out of the rock!

"The miraculous water of Lourdes has been analyzed by skilful chemists; it is a pure, virgin water; a natural water devoid of all mineral properties."

Taking, as we do, the fact as related, there is here all that is necessary to constitute a real miracle, and, therefore, full proof of the actual apparition of the Blessed Virgin, the IMMACULATE CONCEPTION, as she named herself, to the poor child. The continuousness of the fountain, and its copious flow of water still, is a standing proof of the reality of the miracle, or what seems to us an unmistakable miracle, though we are forbidden, if we mistake not, to pronounce it positively a miracle till declared to be such by the judgment of the Holy See, which, so far as we are aware, has not been rendered in this case, though we are told that it has sanctioned the devotion to our Lady of Lourdes.

When our Lord raised the widow's son to life, or restored Lazarus to his weeping sisters, after he had lain four days in the grave, it was a miracle, and as much an act of creative power as the original production of life itself, for it was the production of life where there was no life. No power but that which can give life can restore the dead to life. Now, we find a case in these wonders of Lourdes that is marvelously the restoration of the dead to life—pp. 81–86.

"But the Immaculate Virgin did not wish that that memorable day should terminate without a brilliant manifestation of her goodness.

A great miracle, a *maternal* miracle, worthily marked the close of that fortnight of miracles.

"A little child of two years old was dying in a poor cottage at Lourdes. His name was Justin. His father, Jean Bouhohorts, was a day-laborer. Subject from his birth to a slow fever, the poor child had never been able to walk; he was dying of consumption, notwithstanding all the efforts of the doctor. He was in his agony; his despairing father and mother were beside his cradle to see him die. A charitable neighbor had already prepared the little shroud, and was trying to sustain the courage of the unhappy mother.

"The child's eyes had become glassy; his limbs stiff and motionless; his breathing was no longer perceptible.

"He is dead," said the father.

"If he is not dead," said the neighbor, "he is going to die, my poor friend. Go and cry somewhere else; I will wrap him up presently in this shroud."

"But the mother wept no more. A wild hope had taken possession of her. 'He is not dead,' she cries, 'and the Holy Virgin of the grotto will cure him for me.'

"She is mad with grief," said the father, sorrowfully.

"As for her, she seizes the already stiffening body of her child, she wraps it in her apron, and in spite of the efforts of her husband and her friend, she rushes out, running like a mad woman, praying aloud. 'I am going to the Virgin,' she cried, as she went out.

"It was near five o'clock, and, as we have said, some hundreds of persons were still around the grotto and the fountain. The poor mother throws herself on her knees before the grotto, and prays with all her heart; then, dragging herself on her knees to the little basin, she takes the naked body of her dead or dying child, and plunges it entirely into the miraculous water. It was very cold, and the water was frozen.

"A cry of fright and murmurs of indignation burst from those around her. 'The woman is mad,' was said on all sides; 'she will kill her child.' They seek to prevent her. She remains motionless, holding her child under the water.

"Let me alone! Let me alone!" she answered in an eager and supplicating voice, 'I want to do what I can, and the Good God and the Holy Virgin will do the rest.' Little Justin was quite livid; he neither stirred nor gave any sign of life.

"The child is already dead," said the people. 'Let her do it; it is a poor mother whom sorrow has crazed.'

"For a quarter of an hour, the supposed mad woman held the body of her son in the icy water which would have killed him in less than five minutes, even had he been in perfect health. Nothing could move her, neither cries, nor supplications, nor even threats. The body of the child was frozen, motionless. Full of faith, however, the mother drew him out of the water, wrapped him in her apron, and brought him home, praying all the time to the Blessed Virgin.

"You see he is dead," said the father.

"No," answered she; 'he is not dead. The blessed Virgin will restore him to us;' and she puts the child back into his cradle. A moment after, she bends over him: 'He breathes!' cries she. The father rushes forward; his child was indeed breathing. His eyes

were closed; but it was no longer death, it was no longer the agony: it was a sleep, a peaceful sleep. The Blessed Virgin then said from the height of heaven to that Christian mother, what Jesus said of old to the humble and faithful woman of Canaan: 'Go in peace; thy faith hath saved thee.'

"During the night, the breathing continued, strong and regular, under the tender gaze of the mother, who did not sleep. The next day little Justin awoke; his color was fresh and healthful, although he was still emaciated. His little eyes were full of life as he smiled on his happy mother. He asked for the breast, and drank freely. He who had never walked wanted to get out of his cradle; but the frightened mother, who could not believe in a resurrection so complete, so sudden, dared not put him on the ground. The day passed thus: the child drank from the breast eagerly and often; he was making up for lost time. He passed an excellent night.

"Next morning, the 6th of March, the father and mother went out early to their work. The child was sleeping quietly in his cradle. When, after some hours the mother came in, she almost fainted, at seeing her little boy, until then paralytic, dying, not to say dead, the evening before, had got up all alone, and was walking, trotting here and there, around the room, going from one piece of furniture to another, delighted, and full of vigor. She was obliged to lean against the door to keep from falling. O, what a cry of love and gratitude must then have gone up from her maternal heart to the heart of the Virgin Mother!

"Little Justin ran joyously to throw himself into the arms of his mother, who embraced him, sobbing. 'He was cured yesterday,' thought she, 'since he wanted to get up and walk; and I, unbeliever that I was, wanted faith and prevented him.' And when her husband came in, she said to him: 'You see he was not dead; the Blessed Virgin saved him.'

"The good neighbor, who, the evening before, had made little Justin's shroud, could not believe her eyes. She looked, looked again, and thought she was dreaming. 'It is he,' she cried. 'It is really himself! Poor little Justin!' They all fell on their knees. The mother joined her child's little hands, that he might also return thanks to the Mother of God.

"Justin is now a large, strong boy of thirteen; since his cure, he has never had a relapse. 'He is a good child,' said the venerable pastor of Lourdes to me in the month of April, 1870,—'he is a good child, a little giddy, but he has a good heart, and he loves the Blessed Virgin very much.'

"This miracle produced, in the town of Lourdes, and in all the surrounding country, a prodigious effect. Three skilful physicians confirmed the truth of it. In their eyes, three circumstances made the cure an actual miracle, a miracle of the first order: in the first place, the duration of the immersion of a dying child in ice-cold water; then, its immediate effect, which had no connection with the reaction caused by the ordinary application of cold water; finally, the faculty of walking, manifested as soon as the child had got out of the cradle.

"The mother,' said the report of one of the doctors, 'held her child, for more than a quarter of an hour, in the water of the fountain. She thus sought the cure of her child by proceedings absolutely con-

demned by experience and by medical reason, and she yet obtained it immediately. . . . The cure of the child took place without convalescence, in an entirely supernatural manner.'

"It was thus that the Blessed Virgin wished to crown 'her fortnight.' Henceforth the pilgrimage was founded; and the fountain of grace, coming from the heart of Mary, much more than from the side of the rock, flowed fruitful and consoling, never to be exhausted."

Supposing the facts in the case to be as narrated, this is virtually a restoration of the dead to life, and therefore a real miracle. It must not, however, be supposed because we single out this case, that we recognize no supernatural intervention in the numerous other cures related, and, no doubt, truthfully related, but that this and the opening of the fountain are to our own mind decisive. The fountain was supernaturally opened through the instrumentality of the Blessed Virgin; and as the water of the fountain possesses in itself no medicinal properties, the cures effected by its use must be ascribed to the same instrumentality, and therefore be held to be effected by supernatural intervention. They are to be considered as parts of one whole, or integral elements of one and the same supernatural manifestation or event. The fact of the reality of the apparition of our Lady to the child Bernadette, and the opening of the miraculous fountain under her auspices, removes the whole question from the order of facts adduced by the spiritists, places it in the order of divine and supernatural facts, and justifies the faith of those who use the water, or resort to it in their physical maladies. There is no superstition in resorting to it, for, springing from a supernatural cause, and, therefore, an omnipotent cause, the effects sought are from an adequate, not an inadequate, cause.

Why our Lady should seek a special shrine at Massabielle, or why she should favor one spot, or grant her favors at one spot more than at another, or why certain pictures and images of her should receive greater marks of her favor than others, we do not know, and by no means attempt to explain. Perhaps, in reality, she does not confine her favors to them, but is equally ready to show favor to her clients anywhere, wherever they invoke her patronage with equal love and devotion to her divine Son, with equal concentration of faith and fervor. These sacred shrines, perhaps, serve chiefly to fix the attention, to intensify faith, kindle fervor, inflame devotion, and prepare the heart for the reception of supernatural favors.

We must be permitted to copy here the reflections with which Mgr. de Ségur concludes his little volume (pp. 241-249):

“WHAT IS TO BE INFERRED, BY FAITH, FROM ALL THESE WONDERS ?

“Before this glorious collection of *miracles*, heaped, so to say, one on another, and the evidence of which is obvious to the most ignorant, let us rejoice that we are children of the Holy Catholic Church, which God never ceases to visit, and to which he continues to give the pre-eminently divine testimony of miracles. In the beginning, miracles were the great proof of the truth of faith; although they be now no longer necessary, miracles are none the less useful to our intelligence, and experience shows how powerfully they revive and console our faith.

“But if faith is divine and absolutely certain, let us be consistent with ourselves; let us practise it faithfully, energetically, cost what it may, without calculating. We have the truth, we possess the true light and the true life; let us be Christians, let us be fervent.

“In the second place, as we have said before, let us conclude from all these wonders, not only the legitimacy, but also the excellence, of devotion to the Blessed Virgin. We live in a time of half-rationalism, when many Christians themselves are full of prejudice in regard to piety; let us not be led away by this half-Protestantism, and, as true children of the Catholic Church, let us love, serve, and honor, with all our strength, the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God and Queen of the elect. Provided that we do not *adore* her, for adoration, every one knows, is due to God alone,—provided that we do not adore her, we are always below what we *owe* her. Tell me what Christian will love and honor the Blessed Virgin as much as her divine Son, our Lord, has loved and honored her ?

“In the third place, let us draw from the contemplation of the wonders of Lourdes a renewal of the spirit of faith, and an ardent devotion to the mystery of the Immaculate Conception. This mystery is the precious pearl of our century, and the shield of the Church in the struggles of the latter times which are approaching.

“What, in truth, is the grace of the mystery of the Immaculate Conception, if it be not the grace of the total triumph of the Blessed Virgin over Satan ? She crushes his head, and, on that account, he can do nothing against her. From Mary this grace of innocence and of victory flows to the Church, in order that the Church may also totally triumph over the old serpent, who, for six thousand years, has seduced the world. Armed with the grace of the Immaculate Conception, assisted by her Queen, the Virgin Mary, conceived without sin, the Church will crush the serpent's head and triumph over Antichrist. All of us faithful Catholics, children of Mary, living members of Jesus, let us arm ourselves with this same grace, let us walk in this light; and, following the beloved steps of the Immaculate, of the Virgin without stain, let us lead a life pure and innocent, strong in faith, faithful to the Eucharist, fervent in prayer.

“The great miracle of Lourdes, unique in its kind, is, as it were, the heavenly crowning of the dogmatic definition of December 8, 1854: it seems to be the echo, the divine reflection, thereof. The Immaculate Virgin and Pius IX, the mystery of the Immaculate Conception and that of the Papal Infallibility, should not be separated either in our minds or in our hearts.

"Consoling evidence of Catholic faith and of the excellence of the devotion to, and love of, the Blessed Virgin; fidelity to the sovereign grace of the mystery of the Immaculate Conception: such, in the eyes of faith, are the three first conclusions which shine, like rays of light, from the marvels which the mercy of God has made manifest in these last years at the grotto of Lourdes.

"WHAT THE HEAVENLY APPARITION OF THE GROTTA TEACHES OUR PIETY.

"Taken in a pious point of view, we can and should draw practical conclusions of the highest importance from the contemplation of our Lady of Lourdes.

"Every time that she appeared to little Bernadette the Immaculate Virgin was under the same form, with the same garments, and in the same light; in a word, with the same collection of mysterious details, which are so many silent lessons for us.

"In the first place, she always appeared surrounded with light; and this light was so pure, so splendid, so sweet, that the earth knew nothing like it. This is an emblem of the divine light of faith, in which we are plunged, so to say, by our baptism, which is nourished by the Holy Eucharist, and with which a true Christian should be ever penetrated and enveloped. Faith is the truth-light—'the light of life'—wherewith we ought to shine before the world. Yes, our faith should shine out in the holiness of our life, and that, I repeat, in all things and everywhere. Faith is the heavenly air of the Christian. We should never go forth from it. The light of the apparition was calm and deep; such also is the Catholic faith, in which we find rest for our souls.

"In her miraculous apparitions the Virgin of Lourdes was beautiful—so beautiful that Bernadette's eyes could never find anything to be compared with her. The Blessed Virgin, our Mother, thereby teaches us that we should labor to acquire the true beauty, in order that Heaven may regard us with pleasure. True beauty is not that which strikes the eyes of men, as true riches is not that which is shut up in strong coffers: true beauty is the beauty of the soul; it is the beauty which God sees, which charms Jesus Christ, which attracts the regard of his Mother and of his angels. To be beautiful in the eyes of men does not depend on ourselves; but it depends on us, by uniting ourselves most intimately with Jesus by grace, to participate in what he is. Now, Jesus is infinite beauty; and the beauty of the Blessed Virgin, of the angels, and of the blessed is only a reflection of his divine splendor. The more we resemble Jesus Christ, the more we shall clothe ourselves with him by holiness, the more we shall be beautiful with his beauty, the only one which passes not away. The beautiful Virgin of Lourdes is, for our eyes, the perfect model of that celestial beauty wherewith she would see the interior of all her children resplendent.

"The robe of the apparition was white, but a white so pure, so delicate, so splendid, that no precious stuff could ever approach it in brilliancy. The most pure Virgin thereby showed Bernadette and us all, in her person, with what perfect and delicate purity our baptized souls should be clad before God. Sin soils our beautiful white robe; the slightest venial sin, the least voluntary imperfection, tarnishes its lustre. Let us, then, avoid sin, and keep ourselves pure and immaculate,

to resemble our heavenly Mother. Above all, let us keep with jealous care, with scrupulous vigilance, purity in its proper sense, most beautiful and most holy chastity. Chaste in body, chaste in heart, chaste in looks, in words, thoughts, in his whole being—such should be the true servant of Jesus and of Mary.

“A long, white veil, as pure, as dazzling as the robe, entirely covered the apparition; from the head, it fell from the shoulders to the feet. Was not this the image of that which enshrouds and preserves innocence—modesty? Modesty is that array of precaution, vigilance, mortification, which, so to say, envelops and preserves purity. If we would remain chaste, let us be modest; and let ‘the modesty of Christ,’ as says St. Paul, ‘be the model and rule of our most trivial actions.’

“The white robe of the apparition of the grotto was as if fastened at the waist by a girdle of celestial blue. Bernadette said that the azure of the sky itself was neither so blue nor so heavenly; an image of what should be the heart of a Christian which desires to remain pure in the service of God. Now, it is prayer, interior recollection, and union with Jesus, which in this world render us thus all heavenly. ‘If you wish, you can be a heaven for Jesus Christ,’ said St. Ambrose long ago. And St. Paul has said, in the name of all the faithful, ‘Our life is in heaven.’ Let us live in advance, by the aspirations of our soul, where we are all called to live eternally.

“Yet more, the girdle which confines the garment, and yet leaves liberty in moving, is the emblem of what we should be as regards our eternal salvation: always ready to depart, detached from earth, mortified, temperate, free, and active in the way of the commandments of God.

“The Blessed Virgin appeared with her feet bare, and on each of them shone a luminous rose. The bare feet of Mary teach us evangelical poverty—that beautiful and sublime virtue to which the Saviour has promised the kingdom of heaven. ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit, for they shall possess the kingdom of heaven.’ And what is the spirit of poverty, if not sincere detachment from all earthly things, humility of mind and of heart, the simplicity which attaches itself to God alone, and which sacrifices to him unhesitatingly all that does not fully agree with his holy love?

“There is nothing more edifying than this humility—than this simplicity and poverty of mind; like the roses in the apparition, they shed everywhere the sweet odor of Jesus Christ, the divine perfume of the Gospel.

“Finally, the Immaculate Virgin always had her hands joined in prayer, and held, either in her sacred hands or hanging from her wrist, the beautiful white and gold rosary which we have before described from Bernadette’s account.

“By this our Lady of Lourdes would remind us ‘that we must pray always and without ceasing;’ that prayer should be to our soul what breath is to our body; and that purity, fervor, holiness, are contained in that one word, prayer.

“The apparition did not recite the Rosary; but she presents it to us, in the first place, as an excellent manner of efficacious prayer; then, because the Rosary is the prayer of the simple, of the humble, and the poor. The good Virgin thus herself recommended to us fidelity

in reciting the Rosary. Has each of us a rosary? Do we carry it always with us? Do we say it every day? Do we say it with devotion and recollection?

"Such are the silent lessons which are taught us by the *Immaculate Conception* of the grotto of Lourdes. Let us not forget them.

"Mary usually kept her admirable eyes fixed on little Bernadette. That look of the Queen of heaven is fixed on each of us; yes, Mary regards us, as Jesus regards us. . . . We must never do anything to grieve those maternal eyes.

"O sweet Virgin! guard us amid the dangers of the present time. Guard, the Pope, guard the Church, guard all thy children! And grant that we may imitate thee so faithfully on earth that we may have the happiness of living and dying in the love of thy Son, our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ!

"Glory be in heaven and on earth to the IMMACULATE CONCEPTION!"

We wish Mgr. de Ségur had judged it advisable to hint, at least, to his readers that the Blessed Virgin, however powerful as the Mother of God with her divine Son, has of herself no miracle-working power. She is, though exalted above all below the Ineffable Trinity, still a creature, and as destitute of creative power as any other creature. Not she, but our Lord, wrought the miracle of Cana of Galilee. She has power with her divine Son to obtain from him a miracle by her prayers, for she can ask nothing not in strict accordance with his will, or not inspired by him. Moreover, the relation of mother and son subsists, and ever must subsist, between them. But though she may, by her prayers, obtain favors, and even miracles, for us, it is God who works the miracles and bestows the favors. Every Catholic knows this, and Mgr. de Ségur has probably neglected to state it, because assured that it is a point on which no Catholic can fall into a mistake. But, as it is a point on which non-Catholics suppose or pretend that we do fall into a mistake, and a most grievous mistake, too, that of giving to the creature the glory that belongs to the Creator, we think the author should have expressly guarded, not against our falling into the mistake, but against others supposing it possible for us to do so.

We do not, we may remark by the way, ask the Blessed Virgin to pray for us because we cannot pray directly to God for ourselves, or because we feel that she loves us better than does her Son, and is more ready to favor us, or, as far as depends on her, to hear and grant our petitions. He is as near us as she is, and no less tender and merciful to us, since he loved us well enough to die for us on the cross. It is not

because we can more easily approach them, because they have a greater, a tenderer, sympathy with us, or are more ready to help us, that we pray to Mary and the saints, and ask them to intercede with our Lord for us, or to bear for us our petitions to the throne of grace, for our Lord is perfect man as well as perfect God, and God himself is the fountain of all love, mercy, tenderness, and compassion to which we appeal in them. The reason is, the mediatorial character of the kingdom of God, as we have so often done our best to explain. The principle of the order founded by the Incarnation of the Word is the deification of the creature, to make the creature one with the Creator, so that the creature may participate in the divine life, which is love, and in the divine blessedness, the eternal and infinite blessedness of the Holy and Ineffable Trinity, the one ever-living God. Creation itself has no other purpose or end; and the Incarnation of the Word, and the whole Christian order, are designed by the divine economy simply as the means to this end, which is indeed realized or consummated in Christ the Lord, at once perfect God and perfect man, indissolubly united in one divine person.

The design of the Christian order is, through regeneration by the Holy Ghost, to unite every individual man to Christ, and to make all believers one with one another, and one with him, as he and the Father are one. All who are thus regenerated and united are united to God, made one with him, live in his life, and participate in his infinite, eternal, and ineffable bliss or blessedness. Herein we see the superabounding goodness of the Creator. God is infinite, perfect, in all respects sufficient for himself, and therefore is and must be infinitely happy in himself. He could, therefore, have been moved to create only by his infinite goodness, in order to diffuse his own life, which is the light of men, love, and happiness, *ad extra*, as say the schoolmen. Creation is a manifestation of the love and goodness of the Creator; and as the purpose of God in creating was to give to creatures a share in his own infinite life and blessedness, he must be infinitely more loving, tender, compassionate than any creature, however exalted or glorified. It is from him that the glorified saints and angels draw whatever of love, tenderness, or compassion we appeal to in them.

But the goodness of God does not stop here. He not only

permits the glorified creature to participate in his own life, love, and happiness, or beatitude, but he also permits his creatures to be co-workers with him in his work, and to participate in the glory of its accomplishment. He makes, in some sense, the creature a medium of effecting its perfection; that is to say, he uses created agents and ministers in effecting his purpose, and in gaining the end for which he creates them, and thus enables them to gain the signal honor of sharing in the glory of the Creator's and the Redeemer's work, that is, in the glory of the kingdom of God. Hence it is that the true followers of Christ enter into glory with him, or participate in the glory of his kingdom; which they could not do, if they had done nothing towards founding and advancing it. It is not that he needs them for himself; but because, in his superabounding goodness, he would bestow on them the honor and blessedness of sharing in his work, and of being, so to speak, employed in his service, and meriting his approbation and reward. It is his love to his Blessed Mother that makes her the channel of his grace; his love to his saints, his friends, that leads him to employ them in his service, that gives them the high honor of being intercessors for us. This is not only a high honor to them, but a great joy and blessedness, for they are filled with his love, and, like him, overflow with love and goodness to all his creatures. The *Cultus Sanctorum* flows naturally, so to speak, from the principle of the Incarnation, the deification of man or the creature; and in it we not only honor the saints, but show forth our faith in the superabounding love and goodness of God, which permits them to work with him for the fulfilment of his design in creation, and to participate in its glory.

The fact, that God does employ the saints and angels as agents and ministers in carrying on his mediatorial work, is indisputable. If anything is clear and certain from the Holy Scriptures, it is this. It is implied in the very fact of the Incarnation, which makes the creature one with the Creator. It is only the universal extension of the sacerdotal principle which underlies all religion, and cannot be denied without denying the very principle of the Christian order. Most Protestants would seem to reject it; but most Protestants, whatever they may intend, really reject the Incarnation, and cannot be held to be believers in Christ the Mediator of

God and men. Yet Protestants, when they send, as most of them do, a note to their minister asking him to pray, and the congregation to pray, for a sick or dying friend, or for a family, or an individual in great affliction, recognize, whether they know it or not, the sacerdotal principle,—the very principle on which rests the invocation of saints. When a Protestant, writing to a friend, concludes with the request, pray for me, he does the same.

Indeed, the whole system of creation is a system of means to ends, and, in fact, could not be otherwise, since its prototype is in the ever-blessed Trinity, which it copies, or faintly expresses *ad extra*, as the three Divine Persons express the divine essence *ad intra*. In the Holy Trinity, the Holy Triad, we have principle, medium, and end. The Father is principle, the Son is medium, and the Holy Ghost is end—the consummator. As the *idea exemplaris*, or type of creation, is in the eternal essence of God, it must, through the free act of the Creator, express in a faint degree, *ad extra*, the Triad which expresses that eternal essence *ad intra*, or which, if we may so speak, constitutes that essence. Then everything in creation must express, in some degree, principle, medium, and end; and the end is unattainable without the medium or means, as we see all through even the natural world. We are promised seed-time and harvest, but we must cultivate the soil, and sow the seed, or no crop will be obtained. In no case is the end gained but by the proper use of the divinely-appointed means.

Now, in the Christian world, founded by the Incarnation, the appointed means to the end is prayer. God grants his favors only to those who ask for them, perhaps because only those who ask have the internal disposition to profit by them. We can, of course, ask him directly for whatever we think we have need of; but when we ask also the saints to ask him for us, we act in accordance with his love for them, and unite with him in honoring them, by engaging them in working out his designs. We also give them the opportunity of serving him in us, and showing forth their love both for him and us. We honor God in honoring with our love and confidence those whom he delights to love and honor; and, in invoking their prayers, we use the appointed means of gaining the blessings we crave, and we enlist, in aid of our own prayers, the prayers of those whose sanctity renders them dear to our Lord and God.

If we have made ourselves understood, we have shown why it is we, in the old sense of the word, worship Mary and the saints, and why it is that God himself, in fulfilling his design in creation, especially the "new creation," or teleological order, uses the ministry of saints and angels, and chiefly, as their Queen, his Blessed Mother, from whose chaste womb he took his human nature. The pretence of Protestants, that, in honoring Mary or the saints, we are robbing God of the honor that is his due, and putting the creature in the place of the Creator, shows, if not absolute want of faith in Christ, an absolute ignorance of the Christian system, or the theological principles revealed in the Holy Scriptures. It overlooks the mediatorial character of the Gospel, and the fact that all in the Gospel grows out of the Incarnation of the Word, who was with God in the beginning, and is God. The Protestant objection denies that creation has its prototype in the divine essence, and expresses it *ad extra*. It denies that the divine economy of creation, so to speak, was, by a free creation, to communicate, *ad extra*, his own life and blessedness, as they are realized *ad intra* in the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Ghost. It denies that the end or fulfilment of creation, in the supernatural order, is the deification of man, or the union in one of the creature and the Creator. It denies that God, to honor and bless the creature, admits him to a share in the fulfilment of his design, and, therefore, to a participation in his own divine life and blessedness. The Protestant either knows nothing, or believes nothing, of the Christian system. He fails to perceive that it is in accordance with the divine intention, that of diffusing his own divine life and blessedness, to employ the agency or ministry of saints and angels, who are honored and blessed in being so employed. In invoking that ministry in the Cultus Sanctorum, we only love and honor those whom he loves and honors, and give them, as it were, the opportunity to work with God, and participate in the glory of his kingdom.

The Blessed Virgin is the Queen of saints and angels, and, as the Mother of God, is exalted above every other creature, and is only below the Ineffable Trinity. Whom, then, should God more delight to honor, or more delight to have honored by us? She is the Spouse of the Holy Ghost, she is his Mother; and nothing seems more in accordance with his love

and goodness, and the very design, the very idea, if we may use the term, of his mediatorial kingdom, as revealed in the Gospel, than that he should do her the honor of making her his chief agent in his work of love and mercy,—the medium through which he dispenses his favors to mortals. There is joy in heaven among the angels of God, we are told, over one sinner that repenteth. The saints and angels, filled with the spirit of God, and in perfect concord with the divine purpose in creation, and with the Word in becoming incarnate, are full of love to all the creatures of God, and join with him into whose glory they have entered, in seeking the blessedness of those he has redeemed by his own precious blood. They take an interest in the salvation of souls, the repentance of sinners, and the growth and perfection of the regenerated, and consequently love their mission, and perform their task with their own good-will, and with joy and alacrity. This love, this interest, this good-will, must be greatest in their Queen, the ever-blessed Virgin. As she is exalted above every other creature, only God himself can surpass her in his love for his creatures.

We understand, then, why Mary holds so distinguished a place in Christian worship, and performs so important a mission in furtherance of the mediatorial work of her divine Son. Her love is greater, for she is full of grace, greater than that of any other creature. She is more intimately connected with the Holy Trinity, and holds a relation to God which is held and can be held by no other creature. In some sense, as the Mother of the Incarnate Word, she is the medium through which is effected the deification of man,—the end of the supernatural order. She cannot be separated from that end. We can easily understand, then, why God should assign her a part assigned to no other creature. Her love is only less than his, and her heart is always in perfect unison with the Sacred Heart of her Son, and Mother and Son are strictly united and inseparable. Equally easy is it now to understand why the Christian heart overflows with love and gratitude to Mary; why Christians recur to her with so much confidence in the efficacy of her prayers, the success of her intercession; and why Catholics offer her the highest worship below the supreme worship offered in the Holy Sacrifice, but never offered except to God alone.

We have not given, or attempted to give, a complete dis-

cussion of the great subject we have opened, or rather which the appearance of our Lady of Lourdes has opened. We have only aimed to throw out a few thoughts and suggestions, which, if followed up, will show that such appearances, that miracles, that the love and veneration of the blessed Mary, and the *Cultus Sanctorum*, as practised by Catholics, are not anomalous, but grow out of the very principles of the supernatural or Christian order, the mediatorial kingdom of God's dear Son; and are in strict accordance with the design or purpose of the ever-blessed Trinity, and tend to further and realize it as appropriate means to an end. The doubts or difficulties of non-Catholics on this subject originate in their rejection or ignorance of the Incarnation, and their never having considered the Christian system as a whole. The heathen retained the primitive revelation, but only in a broken and piecemeal state. Protestants do the same with the Christian revelation as preserved and taught by the Church. They have lost the perception of the relation of the several parts to the whole, and fail to recognize their interdependence and strict logical consistency one with another, and with the whole, of which they are integral parts. They,—in fact, the best of them,—understand nothing of Christian theology. Even Catholics, while their faith and worship is right, do not always grasp the profound and eternal principles which underlie the dogmas they hold, and the worship in which they join.

We repeat, all in Christianity proceeds from, depends on, and clusters around, the Incarnation, in which the design of God in creation, the deification of the creature, is consummated. The devotion to Mary, the veneration of the saints, grow out of the Incarnation, as does the Church herself, and tend to keep alive faith in that crowning act of the Creator. We need, then, place no restraint on our love to Mary, or our love and veneration for the glorified saints of God. In loving, venerating, and invoking them, we are acting in accordance with the design of the Holy Trinity.

ART. VI.—*The Possible, or Mundus Logisticus.*

IN a previous article we endeavored to show that the question, Are possible things finite or infinite in number, cannot be admitted as a fair and valid question requiring a positive and definite answer; because, whether we affirm that they are finite or infinite, in either case we find ourselves entangled in inextricable difficulties. If we affirm possible things to be infinite in number, we affirm what is contradictory, namely, an infinite number: as has been shown in a foregoing number of the REVIEW. The truth that an infinite number or series involves a contradiction, is a main point upon which many philosophers found their proof, that the world must have been created. We may pass over, for the present, the ultimate principles upon which the validity of the argument rests, or the entire contents of the premises with which the intellect must be connected, for this point has been sufficiently explained in the essay in refutation of Atheism in this series of the REVIEW. In the universe, we find everywhere changes and successions; we find that nothing happens without a cause, that there is and can be in reality no such thing as what is properly called "mere chance." Though we may not be able to assign the particular cause to this or that phenomenon, still we are most certain that the principle is, and always must be, verified in every particular instance. There are, indeed, many cases in which we cannot assert what the cause is, but in every case we can, with absolute certainty, affirm that there must be, or has been, some cause. The truth, then, that there are in this world changes and successions of causes and effects, and that these changes and successions cannot be eternal, for, if eternal, they would imply an infinite number,—this truth, I say, serves greatly to prove that the world is not eternal, that it must have a first cause, having no cause for itself, but existing *a se*, that is, having the sufficient reason of its existence in itself: which is God. This whole proof of the creation of the world and the existence of God rests for its validity upon the impossibility or contradiction of an infinite series or number. Now, if they admit possible things infinite in number, they, by such admission, lose the essential point, the very nerve of their syllogistic reasoning regarding the

creation of the world and the existence of God as first cause thereof. This will sufficiently show that they cannot affirm possibles as being infinite in number. We have already explained, in a previous article, that possibles are neither finite nor infinite in number; that no number is applicable to them, because the possible is nothing in itself.

The confounding of the operations of the intellect with those of the imagination, and mistaking sensible species or phantasms for ideas, seems to us the source of many of these errors regarding possibles. It is true, we are not pure intellect, as St. Thomas teaches, and the intellect must be assisted by the imagination; but we must be very careful not to allow the imagination to go ahead of the intellect, or to suppose that the intellect has no other data and premises than those furnished by the imagination. When, for example, we wish to reason on God's eternity and immensity, the imagination is immediately ready to give us a picture, as it were, of both. Eternity is represented as time without beginning and end, time, so to say, hammered out "*ad infinitum*"—to infinity, both as to past and future. Afterwards God's immensity becomes the subject of our reflection, and immediately it will be represented to us by the imagination as an infinite extension, or a space without limits; and yet, reason will very clearly prove to us that neither an unlimited time nor an unlimited space or extension will constitute eternity or immensity in the proper sense of the words, since we may say that entire eternity coexists with every moment of time, and that the whole of immensity is in every point of space. God, a most perfect Being, cannot change. In him there are no successions, consequently no time, no past nor future. "*Ego sum qui sum*,"—I am who am,—is what he said of himself. Philosophers who assume sensible species for the objective reality, will invariably find themselves falling into errors.

Those who take for their ultimate data the phantasms of the imagination and take eternity to be an unlimited time, must assert a prevision in God of the affairs of this world, or a "*præscientia Dei*," as Father Rothenflue calls it,—a term we do not wish to accept, for things do not take place either before or after the knowledge of God, though in time they succeed one another; still God knows them by one pure intuitive act, for what is past and future to us is present to him: and hence the particle "*præ*" is applicable, not to his

knowledge, but only to the things or changes succeeding one another. Hence, when the difficulty of reconciling the free-will of man with what they call the foresight of God arises, and when they are pushed to the extreme point, they can refute the objections brought forward, only by saying that what they called a foreknowledge or prevision in God is not, properly speaking, prevision or foreknowledge, but only knowledge or simple vision. This is the only way of escaping the difficulty. But why, then, do they call in the heading of their proposition this knowledge of God "Præscientia," when they mean only "Scientia," or simple intuition? Philosophers will assert God as a most perfect being, and that he knows what will take place in the future, and that, therefore, in him is the knowledge of the future, which they call prevision. But we have shown already that to him nothing is future, and that this idea arises from a supposition which is not true, namely, that eternity is time unlimited,—an error which is very similar to, and superinduced by, the one of supposing the possible in itself, prescinded from the ability of the real, an object of knowledge. Of this, perhaps, more hereafter. We cannot, however, refrain from quoting the beautiful words of the learned Boethius so very appropriate to the subject. Boethius says: "Nam quid postulas, ut necessaria fiant, quæ divino lumine illustrantur, cum nec homines quidem necessaria faciant esse, quæ vident? Num, quæ præsentia cernis, aliquam eis necessitatem tuus addit intuitus? Sicuti vos, cum pariter ambulare videtis hominem in terra, et solem oriri in cœlo, quanquam utrumque sit simul conspectum, tamen decernitis, et unum voluntarium et aliud necessarium judicatis; ita etiam cuncta conspiciens divinus intuitus qualitatem rerum minime perturbat."¹

Which substantially means: Why do you ask whether those things which are seen by the divine vision happen necessarily, since neither men make those things necessary which they see? For, does your knowledge or sight make necessary what happens in the present? As when you see a man walking upon the earth, and the sun rising in the heavens, although you see both at the same time, you can judge very well that the one is voluntary, the other necessary: thus the divine vision or knowledge does not by any means

¹ De Cons. Phil. Lib. v, Pros. 6.

disturb the quality, that is, the freedom or necessity, of what happens.—What I have said on this point is not intended to be a full explanation of this subject, but merely an illustration of the errors we shall be likely to fall into if we mistake the phantasms of the imagination for the reality. Neither will space nor time allow me in this article to reconcile the proposition of St. Thomas with the foregoing system. His proposition is: “*Utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum,—*” Whether the knowledge of God be the cause of things,—which he answers in the affirmative, and which apparently contradicts, but in reality supports, what has been maintained in this article. The explanation of this we will, *Deo volente*, resume at some future time. For the present, we will confine ourself to the possible, and first state the opinion of the learned Father Suarez, a Jesuit, as to the knowledge which God has of possible things, and then explain the doctrine of St. Thomas, which is more in accordance with what we maintain regarding possibles.

Suarez, in treating of the knowledge which God has of possible things, states the proposition as follows: “*De scientia quam Deus habet de creaturis ut possibilibus.*” (Tom. i, lib. iii, caput ii.) “*In hoc puncto non est difficultas, quin Deus hæc omnia cognoscat, nam evidentibus rationibus illud probatur, ut in dicta Disp. 30 Metaphys. sect. 15 ostendi num. 22. Et in Scripturis est notissima. Dicitur enim ad Hebræos, iv: ‘Non est ulla creatura invisibilis in conspectu ejus;’ et ad Coloss., ii: ‘In quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiæ et scientiæ.’ Et Roman., iv, de Deo dicitur: ‘Vocat ea quæ non sunt, tanquam ea quæ sunt.’ Ubi vocandi verbum, aut significat cognitionem aut supponit, quia non posset Deus vocare, quæ non sunt, id est, jubere, seu facere, ut sint, nisi ea præcognosceret. Unde etiam certissimum est habere Deum scientiam de omnibus rebus, quæ fieri possunt secundum proprias rationes earum, propriasque differentias, quibus inter se distinguuntur, alioquin non posset illas producere, quia nisi cognosceret eas secundum esse proprium possibile, sed solum secundum esse quod habent in Deo, hoc non esset creaturas cognoscere, sed se tantum, ut latius in citato loco Metaphysicæ prosecuti sumus.*”

“*Deus scientia sua creaturas omnes posibles agnoscit, non solum, ut in seipso eminenter contentas, sed formaliter, et in seipsis.*” (Ibid. 2, per tot.)

Suarez maintains that God, by his knowledge, knows all possible creatures, not only in so far as they are contained eminently in himself, but he knows them also *formaliter*, that is, as they are in themselves. That God knows possibles in so far as they are eminently contained in himself, he proves, as does also St. Thomas from several texts of Scripture. First, from the Epistle of St. Paul to the Hebrews, chap. iv: "Neither is there any creature invisible in his sight, but all things are naked and open to his eyes;" and from the Epistle of St. Paul to the Colossians, chap. ii: "In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." To the Romans, chap. iv, v. 17: "Who calleth those things that are not, as those that are."

Here, as Suarez well reasons, the term *calleth* presupposes and signifies knowledge, otherwise he (God) could not create them or call them forth from non-existence into existence without acting blindly. St. Thomas uses the same text from the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, namely: "Who calleth those things that are not, as those that are," in order to prove that God must know possibles as eminently contained in himself, that is, in his exemplary idea and ability to create them.

Thus far we agree with Suarez; but when he tells us that God knows them not only inasmuch as they are eminently contained in himself, but that he knows them also *formaliter*, that is, as they are in themselves, we cannot agree with him. For in themselves they are not, because the possible in itself is nothing; and nothing cannot be an object either of divine or human knowledge. We can imagine a possible thing with such or such determinations, but such pictures of the imagination are borrowed from the real, or are at least only new combinations from the real. Such phantasms of the imagination imply an imperfection in human knowledge; but God's knowledge is most perfect, it is one pure act, for in him are no phantasms of imagination; and what we imagine by phantasms, he knows by a simple act of knowledge. We must never forget the difference between knowing that something is possible by knowing the ability of the real to produce it,—whether that ability be the power in God to create, or the power in man to modify and combine what is created,—and imagining what this or that particular thing would be were

it created by Omnipotence, or modified and combined by the ability of man. God knows all that we know, whether we understand it or only imagine it, but he knows it by a pure act. We can neither know, nor can we even imagine, the possible in itself without the real, or without pictures and forms borrowed from the real; but, as has been said, such imaginations imply an imperfection in human knowledge, and must not be supposed to be in God. Suarez says that God knows all possibles as to their own nature and differences by which they are distinguished from each other, otherwise he would not be able to produce them; for, were he to know them only in so far as they are contained in himself, but not according to their own possible nature or being—"secundum esse proprium possibile"—this would be, not to know creatures, but only to know himself. This evidently shows that Suarez thinks that possibles have a proper nature of their own, and also differences by which they are distinguished from each other. But possibles are nothing; and hence they have neither a nature of their own, nor differences that distinguish them one from the other. The nature and differences or proper determinations, not of possibles, but of real existences, arise from the ability of the real, by which creatures are made different by the creative act. Suarez says, in maintaining that God knows possibles according to their possible nature: "*Nisi Deus cognosceret eas secundum esse proprium possibile, sed solum secundum esse, quod habent in seipso, hoc non esset creaturas cognoscere sed se tantum.*" Which means: If God were not to know them according to their own possible being or nature, but only inasmuch as they are eminently contained in himself, this would not be to know creatures, but only to know himself. Now, God is the adequate object of all his knowledge. Whatever he knows, he knows by knowing himself. Hence there can be no necessity for his knowledge of the "*esse proprium possibile*," or possible nature, for there is and can be no *esse proprium possibile*. Suarez says: If God were not to know them according to their own possible nature, but only as they are eminently (and he should have added, virtually) contained in himself, this would be a knowledge, not of creatures, but only of himself. This supposes that possible things are creatures. How can he suppose that possible things are creatures? If creatures, they are not mere possibles, but actual existences:

hence Suarez treats of possibles as if they were actual existences. Actual existences God knows by knowing himself; so also knows he what is possible. The error of Suarez seems to us to have its source in confounding phantasms of the imagination with acts of the intellect. What we know by the senses and imagination combined with the intellect, God knows by a pure act of intelligence. He is *actus purus*, in him is and can be no imagination; for imagination, as was shown before, implies imperfection. If God were necessitated to imagine, he would be imperfect and no God at all, because imagination, as to the material order, is founded on experience derived from the external senses: but God has no external senses; therefore in him can be no imagination as it is in us; therefore we cannot know and see things as God sees and knows them. Some may object, saying that imagination has for its object not only the material, but also the immaterial; and that, although God has no senses from which to derive imagination as to matter, he may have them as to the immaterial. This, however, cannot be, for imagination supposes an image presented to the mind: which cannot be maintained in reference to God, especially since it holds up before the mind images and phantasms different from the reality, as exemplified in our ideas of God's immensity and eternity in which imagination represents them, that is, immensity and eternity as infinite extension, and infinite time without beginning or end,—representations, which the intellect must correct, and not use as sole data or premises for reasoning. The existence of God, as proved by St. Anselm, was objected to by Leibnitz, who said that the proof would be valid if it were first shown that God, or a most perfect being, were possible. This objection supposes that the possible must precede the real in knowledge: which cannot be admitted, inasmuch as the possible is nothing in itself, and can be known only by knowing the ability of the real. When we prove that a most perfect being is possible, and that it involves no contradiction, some think that we reason on mere logical relations. This, however, is not true; for, after having proved that a most perfect being is possible, and that it would not even be possible were it not real, we can prove that the possibility of a most perfect being is its reality, and that, consequently, our conclusion is not

from the mere possible to the real—which would suppose more in the conclusion than is contained in the premises—but only that, by our reasoning, we discover and perceive more clearly the contents of our premises. The proof of the existence of God from the idea of God, as made use of by St. Anselm, supposes that the infinite is contained in the *idea* which serves as premises, for, if it were not, the conclusion would be invalid and against a very primary principle of logic. Neither can we know the being of God without knowing at the same time our existence as creatures. But my existence as creature I cannot know without having in my premises the creative act, by means of which I am a creature—for I am no less dependent in my knowledge, than in my existence, on God's infinite Being who creates me—unless we were to maintain the absurdity, that an effect can be greater than its cause, or the *rationatum* greater than its *ratio sufficiens*, or sufficient reason.

J. H. KOOP.

ART. VII.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

- 1.—*The Life of Father Bernard*, Missionary Priest of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. The Apostolate of a Redemptorist. By P. CLAESSENS, Canon of the Metropolitan Church of Mechlin. Translated from the French. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1875. 12mo, pp. 323.

As a Life of Father Bernard, we do not prize this volume very highly. It is very edifying spiritual reading, but the pious author seems to have been more intent on glorifying the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, than on delineating the life and labors of the missionary. Undoubtedly, the congregation is more than any individual member; but when an author professes to give us the Life or Biography of a person or personage, we wish him to do it, and to present us the facts and characteristics of the individual. We have seldom found the members of religious orders or congregations excelling as biographers. They appear to count external facts as of little importance, and to hold as important only the interior life. They give us, it may be, the religious, but rarely the man. We want in a biography, even of a religious, to see the natural man, with his natural acts and surroundings, a man with a body, not a disembodied spirit. For the most part, religious

biographers are too detached from the world, too spiritual, too far removed from all sympathies with men still living in the world, to write lives that can be read with interest out of the cloister, or by literary men, not specially devout. In general, the Lives of the Saints suppress what is natural in the saint, and give us very few of the external facts of his life. The saint is made a ghost, and the life of one as given is substantially the life of all.

Now we do not say that this, considering the end aimed at by the biographer, is a fault, for that end is edification, or progress in the spiritual life. We only say that it is a fault if the biographies are to be regarded as literary works designed for the public at large, and to attract the attention and interest of well-disposed persons not in religion. We know that the internal life, the operations of grace on the soul, is of far more importance than the external life, or the operations of nature; and to edify is a far nobler aim than to interest or instruct. But we confess that we prefer, for our reading, biographies which do not raise their subject so far above us that we are unable to feel that there are any human relations between us. In every sentence of the Confessions, or Autobiography, of St. Augustine, we see the saint, but we see also the man, and recognize in him a brother.

These remarks do not all apply to this Life of Father Bernard, but it merges the missionary, to a great extent, in the congregation, and gives us only a dim and shadowy view of Father Bernard's individuality. It tells us, indeed, where he was born, where educated, when he entered the congregation, where he preached his first mission, and what was the extraordinary success of his eloquence; but he afterward hardly appears as an individual. His services to the congregation are grudgingly acknowledged, and nothing could be more meagre than the account of his missionary labors in this country, where he may be said to have established the congregation, and prepared its subsequent success. The Redemptorists had hardly made a lodgment in this country, and were little known before he came, and it was he who assured their success by getting them attached to the Province of Belgium, whence the American missions could be, and, to a certain extent were, supplied. It was under his rule as Provincial, that the Redemptorists became generally known, and the success of their missions secured.

We knew personally Father Bernard, and we loved and venerated him as one of the noblest men we have ever known. He had a large mind, remarkably free from national and every other prejudice, open and candid. He had studied the American character, and, *me judice*, understood it better than any foreigner or native-born American it has ever been our happiness to meet and converse with. He had great respect for, and confidence in, the American people. He understood the wants of the country, and had his plans, which he was only waiting for time to mature. The greatest blunder which his superiors, all small, narrow-minded men, in comparison with

him, could commit, was to remove him from the American missions, and send him to Ireland where he was comparatively lost. But the German element gained the predominance in the congregation here; and, ignorant of the country and its wants, his freedom from national prejudice, and his apparent preference of the American fathers for missions to Americans, were held by their narrow German prejudice to be an offence, and hence he was incontinently removed from the sphere of his greatest usefulness. It was a sad blunder, and lost to the congregation the noble band of American fathers, who had given so much *éclat* and success to its missions. If Father Bernard had been retained as Provincial of the American Province, and had formed, as he said to us was his intention after a little while, an American house, for the purpose of giving missions, principally to non-Catholic Americans, these American fathers would have been retained in the congregation, where their labors could hardly have failed to be far more effective in converting the country than they have been or could be, formed into a separate community. They would also have attracted to the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer large numbers of Americans having a vocation to a community life as well as to the priesthood.

It was a sad blunder of the narrow-minded Germans, who, it would seem, wished to keep the congregation predominantly German, and were afraid that the American element would become too influential, if Father Bernard was retained as Provincial, or even in the country, for the conversion of which a large portion of our foreign born and reared Catholics care very little. We do not mean to imply that the services of the American Redemptorists who left the congregation, and subsequently formed the Congregation of St. Paul the Apostle, have been lost either to the Church or the country. Such is far from being the fact. But we must believe that their services have been less effective to either than they would have been if forming an American House and remaining in the Congregation, backed by its powerful influence. We have a strong attachment to the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, founded by that great saint who is now declared to be a Doctor of the Universal Church, and a profound esteem and veneration for such individual Redemptorists as we have the honor of being acquainted with, but we cannot but believe that the controlling influences of the congregation either here or in Belgium, by sending away Father Bernard, who seemed to us raised up to be the Apostle of America, threw away the opportunity of making an impression on our countrymen and rendering their congregation the most influential body of missionaries in the country, which may never occur again, or, if it should, not for centuries. No doubt, the Redemptorists are doing their best to recover the ground they have lost, and are prosecuting their missions with no little success; but the country does not know them, or looks upon them as missionaries almost exclusively to

our German population. They have lost the prestige which they a few years ago had acquired with Americans.

It must not be inferred, from anything we have said, that we have any national prejudice against the Germans; indeed, as far as we know ourselves, we have no national prejudices, not even in favor of our own countrymen. We aim to do our duty to our country, but we are incapable of any intense nationalism, or even of sympathizing with intense nationalists, whatever their nationality. We belong to a nation which is made up of emigrants from almost every country on the globe, and it would be impossible for us to say from what race springs the blood that flows in our veins; and we consider that no matter of regret, "for God has made," if we believe the Holy Scriptures, "of *one blood*, all the nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth." It is a matter of indifference to us whether a man is English or Irish, Kelt or Teuton. No better Catholics are found to-day than you find in England and Holland. The Catholic Germans, clergy and laity, in their heroic resistance to the infamous acts of the Empire against their Church, and their patient endurance of the bitter persecution to which they are subjected by the Kaiser Wilhelm and his chancellor, present a spectacle worthy of universal admiration, and which even angels must applaud. The German Catholics, as little notice as is taken of them in our Irish Catholic journals, constitute a large and solid portion of our Catholic population, in no respect inferior, in proportion to their numbers, to our English-speaking Catholics, nor more disposed to abandon their faith. Yet they are not precisely a missionary people, and, perhaps, do not feel very strongly the obligation to labor for the conversion of the heretics among whom they dwell, and from whom they are more or less separated by differences of language and manners and customs. Our own pastor is a German, and it is in a German church that our family worship.

The author of the volume before us makes little account of the American labors of Father Bernard, and seems to know very little of them. He is also very meagre in his account of his labors in England. He seems to have understood that Father Bernard was a pious, zealous, eloquent, and devoted missionary, but it never seems to have entered his head that he was a great man, a man of extraordinary insight, solid judgment, and rare abilities. The author's account of the last sickness and the death of Father Bernard is beautifully written, and full of interest and edification. Father Bernard died as a saint.

Excepting in not doing justice, as we think, to the greatness and nobility, the large-mindedness, of Father Bernard, and the importance of his American Mission, the work before us, from the point of a religious, deserves high commendation. We are not a monk, and, though we love and reverence the religious orders, and can, to a certain extent at least, appreciate the perfection of the religious

state, and the life of sacrifice, of crucifixion, they who enter it find their joy in living, we are afraid we have a good deal of the world about us, and that our tastes are more secular than ascetic. We do not relish as we should purely ascetic literature. We are constantly receiving from the publishers, especially English publishers, numerous ascetic works of rare excellence, and which we ought to read with avidity and delight, yet we do not; our taste does not incline us to them. The spiritual reading we best relish, and which most moves, enlightens, and edifies us, is the Holy Scriptures, in which not man, but the Holy Ghost, speaks to us. This *Life of Father Bernard* is too ascetic for our taste: which is a sad confession, and a reproach to us, not to the author. Were we as spiritually-minded as we ought to be, we should relish it, and all works like it, especially if as well written.

But, if we do not relish, for our own reading, the ascetic works of contemporary religious, we trust we are not deficient in our appreciation of monastic institutions, and religious orders and congregations, whether of men or women. If our country is ever to become Catholic, it will be through their influence, their prayers. They are, to the Catholic hierarchy, what the prophets and the schools of the prophets were to the priesthood under the Old Law. We need more vocations to the priesthood, and especially more vocations, of both men and women, to the religious life. When and where these vocations are numerous, there is life, there is hope. All Christians, it seems to us, should pray our Lord that these vocations may be multiplied. In no way can we labor more effectually for the diffusion of our faith, and the conversion of our country.

2.—*The Syllabus for the People.* A Review of the Propositions condemned by His Holiness Pius IX. With the Text of the Condemned List. By a Monk of St. Augustine, Ramsgate, Author of "The Vatican Decrees and Civil Allegiance." New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1875. 12mo, pp. 51.

THE Catholic Publication Society has done well in republishing this pamphlet by a Monk of St. Augustine, along with the late Bishop Fessler's tract on "The True and the False Infallibility of the Pope," and the several masterly replies which have appeared in England to Mr. Gladstone's ill-advised "Expostulation," in which he contends that the Vatican decrees are incompatible with the civil allegiance of Catholics. Everybody knows the outcry of the enemies of the Church occasioned by the publication, Dec. 8, 1864, of the *Syllabus*, or List of Condemned Propositions, and the

Encyclical which accompanied it. Even some Catholics were startled by it; and one Catholic journal, edited by a woman, saw in it, with great apparent delight, a condemnation of our REVIEW, which had ceased to be published, and which had never one of the propositions censured. It was contended that Pius the Ninth had, by this publication, broken with the modern world, and placed the Church in direct hostility to modern civilization and all modern thought. Mr. Gladstone cites it to prove that every man, in becoming a Catholic, becomes a moral and mental slave, and that the claims of the Church are hostile to the civil power, and incompatible with the civil allegiance of the subject.

Dr. Newman, in his reply to Mr. Gladstone, denies, as Bishop Fessler had previously done in his refutation of Dr. Schulte, the dogmatic authority of the Syllabus, and maintains that nothing indicates that it was drawn up and published by the infallible authority of the pope. Its author is nameless; and who is responsible for it, nobody knows. This is all very true, if understood of the compilation and publication of the List, and not of the propositions themselves. These are all taken from, or supposed to be taken from, papal documents, which are cited, and therefore have the papal authority. The censure of any proposition contained in the list has the authority of the document from which it is extracted, which we understand neither Bishop Fessler nor Dr. Newman to deny. A proposition formally censured in a papal encyclical, allocution, or brief, we take it, is censured by papal authority; and if it pertains to faith, or impugns the truth or any point of the law of God, natural and revealed, is censured by infallible authority, and no Catholic can maintain it in the sense censured. The Syllabus, as such, has no dogmatic authority, but the condemnation of the several propositions has all the authority, and no more, of the original document from which the proposition is extracted.

There are here two questions: 1. Is the proposition copied correctly? 2. In what sense is it condemned? We cannot answer these questions, for we have not access to the original papal documents, or at least to only a few of them; but, if we may credit the statements made in some Catholic publications, the Syllabus sometimes gives, as a universal proposition, what in the papal document is only a particular proposition with a particular application. We read in the Syllabus, as a condemned proposition, "The church ought to be separated from the state, and the state from the church." This professes to be taken from the allocution, *Acerbissimum*, Sept. 27th, 1852. This allocution, which we have not within our reach, we have seen it stated, had reference to the state of affairs at the time, and simply censured the movement of the Liberals to abolish the union of church and state in that country where it long had and still existed. The abolition of that union, where it exists and enters into the traditions and habits of the

people, may be censurable, and yet the Catholic not be bound to maintain always and everywhere the union of church and state, which almost inevitably results practically in subjecting the administration of ecclesiastical affairs to the civil power. We condemn the separation of church and state in the sense of the revolutionists, who mean by it, as we see in the Bismarckian policy in Germany, the supremacy of the state and the subjection of the church to the civil power; but the separation of church and state, in the true American sense, that is, in the acknowledgment of the state of its incompetency in spirituals, we are free, the Syllabus notwithstanding, to approve and defend, as we do, and always have done. Taking the modern world as it is, we believe the best condition of the Church is that of independence of the state, and freedom to administer her own affairs, and to exercise her own discipline on her own subjects, without let or hindrance from the civil power. We are aware of no infallible decision of the pope against this, and we think there can be none, for Catholics are permitted to hold office under our government, and to take the prescribed oath to support and defend the constitution. Hence, against our private interest, and in opposition to our personal and political friends, and not a few Catholics, we supported the Union in the late civil war, and did it frankly, without any reserve, or compromise with our loyalty, although we had no sympathy with the abolitionists, and no predilection for the Republican party, which was led by the most bitter enemies of our religion.

But it is necessary to determine in what sense these several propositions are condemned. Propositions are condemned not only as heretical or *contra fidem*, but for various other reasons. Some are censured as simply false, some as erroneous, as schismatic, as scandalous, as against discipline, as *male sonans*, as offensive to pious ears, etc. The rule is, when a proposition is condemned as heretical, to take its exact contradictory as *de fide*; but this rule holds only with regard to those propositions expressly or formally condemned as heretical. Thus the 55th proposition of Baius, "God could not, from the beginning, have created man such as he is now born," is a condemned proposition; and hence many theologians have maintained and maintain that the contradictory, that is, that he could have so created him, is *de fide*: whence comes the theory of *natura pura*, and its necessary pendant, natural beatitude. But St. Pius V, in his condemnation of the Baian proposition, does not expressly condemn it as heretical, except in the sense in which it was held by Baius; and says expressly that it is not asserted that the several Baian propositions condemned are not in some sense (*aliquo pacto*), even true. It is only the exact contradictory of the sense in which Baius meant the proposition, that is *de fide*. Indeed, the exact contradictory of the proposition as it stands, we know, cannot be *de fide*, for God could not have created man with original sin and under the penalty of eternal

death, subject to which he is now born. The most we can say is, that God could have created man from the beginning such as he is now born, *seclusa ratione peccati et pœnæ*; but this does not follow from the condemnation of Baius, as both Berti and Belleli, Augustinians, amply show, unless we are greatly mistaken. The error of Baius on the point here involved was, if we mistake not, that of the Reformers: that the original justice which man lost by the fall, belonged in the state of innocence to his nature, and that God could not have created man originally without giving him a nature adequate to the end for which he designed him. As man's nature is now evidently not adequate to that end, therefore God could not have created man from the beginning such as he is now born. It is this error St. Pius V condemns, for, in fact, man's powers were never, even before his fall, adequate to the end for which he was created; and the original justice in which he was established (*constitutus*), and which placed him on the plane of that end, was supernatural.

We should err greatly if we took the contradictory of each of the several condemned propositions included in the Syllabus. Some of them are heresies, and some of them are not. Here comes to our aid the commentary of the Monk of St. Augustine, Ramsgate, which, however, is rather superficial, and less thorough and satisfactory than we could wish; yet it throws considerable light on the nature of the errors condemned, and enables readers of only ordinary information to see the justice of most of the papal censures. But, like all writings designed for the people, it stops short the moment it approaches the gist of the question. We hate all writings intended for the popular understanding. Let every writer master his subject, present it in a clear and forcible manner, and as thoroughly and as profoundly as he can. We would have every writer study to avoid obscurity and unnecessary technicalities, but we recognize the obligation of no writer to find brains for his readers, or to spare them the labor of thought. We have no confidence in thought made easy. In attempting to make it easy, we emasculate it. Since authors have begun writing for the multitude, literature has lost its dignity, become wordy, flashy, and shallow. Thought has wellnigh disappeared from it, because little or no appeal is made to it—no opportunity for its exercise is given. Never, perhaps, were writers more superficial, or readers more deficient in understanding.

The Monk of St. Augustine, after all, does not appear to have consulted the original documents, and tells us nothing more of the sense of the condemned propositions, than can be gathered from the condemned propositions themselves. Of that information, which we who have not access to the original papal documents from which the propositions are extracted, most desire and would be most thankful for, he gives us nothing; and we know no more with what

note of censure the several propositions are branded, after reading his commentary than we did before, or might know without it. Some of the propositions are undoubtedly against faith, and are heretical; some of them are errors against morals, and open the door to moral license; some of them are errors against the natural law, and some, errors against the revealed law; some are errors against discipline, and some against natural society and civil government; some are errors against the rights and authority of the spiritual society, and others are simply schismatical, scandalous, and false. Now these cannot be all branded with the same note of censure; and what we wanted the Monk of St. Augustine to tell us was, by a reference to the original papal documents, the particular note of censure with which each proposition in the list is branded. It was only by so doing that he could tell us what, in the several propositions, is condemned, and wherefore, or for what reason. But this he has not done.

The Syllabus itself has no dogmatic authority, and all the dogmatic authority for the condemnation of the several propositions that can be alleged is in the original papal documents in which they are censured; and this authority is infallible only in regard to those propositions which relate to faith or morals, in which alone the Council of the Vatican defines the pope to be exempt, through the divine assistance, from error. That the condemnation reaches many things on which modern thought prides itself, and that the papal censures, if heeded, would arrest not a few of the cherished tendencies of what is called modern civilization, we do not doubt; but that the censure of the several propositions in question tends to the detriment of real civilization, to hinder social progress, and to prevent the advancement of science, we deny. The pope, in censuring, is doing all in his power to save modern civilization from its aberrations, to aid social progress, and to promote science. Let the principles censured become dominant, and society would inevitably lapse into barbarism. As for the pretence of Mr. Gladstone and others that the Syllabus is hostile to the civil power, we pay little heed to it. The civil power is bound to obey the law of God, and forfeits its authority in going contrary to it. We shall not suffer those who refuse to believe the infallibility of the pope, to assert the infallibility of Cæsar or the state.

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- 3.—*The Internal Mission of the Holy Ghost.* By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1875. 12mo, pp. 494.

THE MESSRS. Sadlier & Co. have published a very fair American edition of this work, but the edition before us by the Catholic Publication Society, the American publishers of Archbishop Manning's

works, is printed from duplicate plates cast in England, and is an exact fac-simile of the English edition; and though some American books are better printed than some English, in general the American printers do not equal the English, and persons of taste prefer, when to be had, English editions to American reprints. The American publisher also studies cheapness, and American paper and ink are far inferior to the English. It is not easy to distinguish the volume before us from the English printed volume. We may add here, without making any invidious comparisons, that the Catholic Publication Society has had a happy influence in inducing our Catholic publishers to bring out their publications in a far better style than was usual a few years ago. This is a matter of some importance, for which Father Hecker deserves the thanks of the Catholic reading public.

The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster is one of the most prodigious workers in the Catholic hierarchy of England, and, so far as we know, in that of any other country. He was noted for his activity and his great working capacity as an Anglican arch-deacon, as well as for his solid judgment and practical efficiency. Since his conversion, and especially since his elevation to the archiepiscopal dignity, and the virtual, if not the nominal, primacy of England, his labors seem to us almost superhuman. He is here and there wherever there is an occasion to officiate, to preach, or to lecture, or to make a public address in favor of some good work or some moral reform, and yet finds time to write and publish works of rare value, almost as frequently as if he did nothing else than sit in his library and write books for the instruction and edification of the public.

Yet his Eminence can be no favorite with reviewers. His writings are too perfect every way to give them any opportunity to pick flaws in them, or to criticize them: they cannot be summarized and their substance given in a briefer compass, for they are already condensed as far as they can be, and no sentence or word can be omitted without damage, and nothing needs to be added to explain or strengthen the argument, or to the full development of the subject; and to do nothing but use the language of commendation and eulogy is monotonous and tiresome, and on the part of a layman, like ourselves, not seldom impertinent. The cardinal, whatever the subject he treats, always says the very thing we would say ourselves if we could, and in the very words which we feel are the simplest and best. No one can be more thoroughly Catholic; and no one seems to us to understand better the special wants of our age, and particularly of our English-speaking world. His influence with his own country is deservedly great; hardly, if at all, less than was that of his brilliant, learned, and accomplished predecessor, the late Cardinal Wiseman, to whom the revival of Catholicity in England is so deeply indebted. To his zeal, his activity, and judicious

labors, as to those of his predecessor, is to be attributed, in no slight measure, the present healthy and prosperous condition of the Catholic cause in our mother country, once known as "Our Lady's Dowry," and renowned as "the Island of Saints." When we note the learning, zeal, courage, and activity of our English brethren, we cannot despair of England's reconversion, or doubt that she may yet become as efficient a promoter of the Catholic cause, as she has hitherto been of Protestantism, of which she has been for three centuries the chief bulwark. Both England and Scotland were tricked, cheated, out of their Catholic faith, of which they became the violent persecutors; but they are beginning to discover the satanic deception: and we trust that it is in the gracious designs of our Lord that they shall yet return to the faith which rescued them from barbarism, and for ages made their glory.

The author published, some years since, a work on the "External Mission of the Holy Ghost," or his office in the "mystical body of Christ, that is, his Church, which office began on the day of Pentecost, and will continue to the second advent of the Son of God." In the volume now before us, his Eminence does not treat of this "corporate office" of the Holy Ghost, through which the Church is rendered living, fecund, indefectible, and infallible in all that pertains to faith and morals, but traces "in outline the work of the Holy Ghost in the souls of men, one by one. The ever-blessed Trinity, whether in creation or in redemption, or in sanctification, works in all things with a unity of will and power. There is one God, and all the acts of omnipotence are the acts of that one God; nevertheless, there are special offices which have been assumed and are exercised by the three Persons distinctly. God the Father is the Creator, God the Son is the Redeemer, God the Holy Ghost is the Sanctifier; and yet not so that the Son and the Holy Ghost are excluded from creation, or the Father and the Holy Ghost from redemption, or the Father and the Son from sanctification. But each of these three Persons has assumed to himself, by an economy of his own supreme wisdom, the special discharge of one of these three offices." The design of the author in this volume is to present us this special work of the Holy Ghost as Sanctifier, or his special operations in the souls of men.

We do not see very clearly why his Eminence calls this special office the *Internal Mission* of the Holy Ghost, for it seems to us to be the performance by the Holy Ghost of his own proper work, or the discharge of the office he is said to have assumed to himself; and a *mission* is a work which one is *sent* to perform. We are in the habit of regarding the three Persons of the ever-blessed Trinity, who express relations *ad intra*, not *ad extra*, as principle, medium, and end. The Father is principle, the Son is medium, and the Holy Ghost is end, and the three Persons, all equally eternal, perfect, so to speak, the Divine Being, and constitute him inherently, eternally, in

himself, an active and living God, not a dead and unproductive unity, which he would be without the three eternal and indestructible relations; for nothing is actual, complete, and living, that has not at once principle, medium, and end, in itself. Hence, to deny the Trinity, or the Sacred Triados, as does Unitarianism, is really to deny God and to assert atheism. If God exists at all, he must necessarily exist as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

Now in every divine act *ad extra*, the Divine Being expresses itself; and hence, in every outward act in creation, the three Persons equally concur, though in diverse respects,—the Father as principle, the Son or Word as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end, that is, consummator. The prototype of creation is in the Eternal Being of God, which it expresses externally; and hence as the Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father as principle, and from the Son as medium, completes or perfects the Divine Being, so the Holy Ghost is the end, perfecter, sanctifier of creation, of which the Father is principle, and the Son the medium. His office, in the souls of men, is simply the expression, *ad extra*, of his office or relation in the Godhead, and therefore would seem to be his own appropriate office, not a special office assumed, nor a mission he is *sent* to perform. While, therefore, his Eminence sets forth correctly, with truth, force, and beauty, the internal office or work of the Holy Ghost, it would seem not improper to ask, if it is verbally correct to call that office or work a *mission*.

The special office or work of the Holy Ghost is always teleological; and if we assume that the perfection, consummation, or sanctification of creation of man is in the natural order, it manifestly is not a mission. In the Christian order, founded by the Incarnation of the Word, which is teleological and supernatural in its principle, medium, and end, we know from our Lord that the office or work of the Holy Ghost is a mission, for he is *sent* by the Father and the Son. His work as the Paraclete is rightly termed his mission. Are we to consider his universal operations or interior operations in the souls of all men, in all ages and nations, as *ad Incarnationem*; and that the grace he infused into them before as since the Incarnation became a fact in time, as *gratia Christi*, not simply *gratia Dei*? If so, we can properly call these universal operations the internal *mission* of the Holy Ghost. But this supposes that the Christian order is included in the original decree of God to create, and the Incarnation was always necessary to the realization of the divine purpose in creation. We know that the divine purpose in the Incarnation is the deification of man, or his elevation to perfect union with God; and if this is included in the original decree, the end or completion of creation requires the Incarnation, and was never possible without it. It would therefore follow that God would have become incarnate even if man had not sinned; that the Christian order, which is supernatural, is necessary to complete or perfect

the divine creative act; and that the natural and the supernatural are simply two parts of one dialectic or harmonious whole.

In this view of the question, the internal or universal work of the Holy Ghost, or his operations in the souls of all men, moving them to strive to gain the end for which they are created, may as properly be termed "the Internal Mission of the Holy Ghost," as his operations in the mystic body of Christ, his "External Mission." Yet this view, which supposes that Christ, the Incarnate Word, is always the medium of the light and life of the soul, assumes that the grace of Christ, which flows through the Incarnation, precedes, as well as follows, the Incarnation as a fact; that it was the grace of Christ that constituted Adam in that original justice which placed him on the plane of his supernatural destiny from which he fell, and by which the patriarchs and the just, under the Old Law, were made just, and even those who lived only under the natural law, like Job, Melchisedech, and others among the Gentiles, although they could not be made perfect and enter heaven before the Word actually became incarnate in time, and completed the creative act in the deification of man by the union of the human and the divine in the one Divine Person.

This view of the efficacy of the Incarnation when it was effected only in the divine purpose or decree, seems to us to be favored by the dogmatic definition of Pius the Ninth, still gloriously reigning, that Mary was conceived without original sin, or that she was exempt from sin in the first instant of her conception: which, as she is of the race of Adam, could have been only by the merits of her Son, which merits were not yet acquired *ad extra*, since her Son, Jesus Christ, was not yet born or conceived. We are, therefore, disposed to accept the term mission as applied to the universal operations of the Holy Ghost, though it requires us to reject the theory, favored by many, of natural beatitude, and to maintain that the deification of man, through the Incarnation, is the very end of the divine creative act, the original intendment and purpose of creation, the expression, *ad extra*, by the Creator, of his own eternal idea or essence.

But be all this as it may, the cardinal deserves the gratitude of all Catholics for his works, which cannot fail to encourage and deepen devotion to the Holy Ghost. We say not a word in disparagement of any special devotion approved by the Church; but we can conceive of none more profitable to the soul, or better fitted to nourish a robust faith and a strong and masculine piety, than the special devotion to the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of the Lord that filleth the whole world, and, as containing all things, hath knowledge of all things. He it is that communicates to us the things of the Son, and kindles in our hearts holy aspirations, illumines our understandings, and conducts us to our final cause,—beatitude in union with God.

- 4.—*Memoirs of General William T. Sherman written by Himself.*
New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1875. 2 vols. 8vo, pp. 405 & 409.

WE received these two handsome and important volumes at too late a day to be able to do more, in our present number, than to give them a brief notice. General Sherman held an important position in the army from the first battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861, till the surrender of General Joseph E. Johnston in North Carolina, April 26, 1865, and is now its general and commander-in-chief. In these *Memoirs* he does not profess to give the history of his entire life, nor of the civil war in which he performed so prominent a part, but his personal recollections of his California experience, and of his own command and the events which fell under his own observation, with which he was personally connected in the fearful struggle to suppress the rebellion and maintain the integrity of the Union. The *Memoirs* show that no man in the Union surpassed him in devotion to his country, in loyalty to the constitution, or in his understanding of the nature and magnitude of the struggle in which the nation was engaged, or of the means of terminating it successfully and with honor. No one can read them understandingly without recognizing in General Sherman a true soldier, a great captain, and also a great man, a profound thinker, and an accomplished writer. We are struck with his eminent ability as a man, his rare intelligence, and the depth and justness of his views and observations on other than military questions. He has the capacity to be as great a statesman as he has shown himself to be a great soldier.

We do not like to make comparisons which may be counted invidious, and we would not say one word in depreciation of the high military reputation of General Grant, whose capture of Vicksburg, and his reparation at Chattanooga of the effects of Rosecrans's unnecessary defeat at Chickamauga, evinced a military genius of a high order; but we think the real soldier of the Federal army was Wm. T. Sherman, and that to him, more than to any other of our generals, history will ultimately award the credit of the final success of the Federal arms. This is no new conviction of ours, but was forced upon us by our observations during the progress of the war, and it will not be easy to beat it out of us. No man took a deeper interest in the struggle, or watched more closely its varying phases, than we did, and we found no man who committed so few blunders, and so uniformly was up to the level of his command and position as W. T. Sherman: and he proved what was in him when he obtained, after Grant's elevation to be Lieutenant-General, an independent command and he was made commander of the department of the Mississippi. His march from Chattanooga to Atlanta stands out in brilliant contrast with Grant's from the Rapi-

dan to City Point, for he had to march through a country far more difficult, and had in his front a Confederate general in no sense inferior to General Lee. General Johnston's forces were not more inferior to General Sherman's, than General Lee's were to General Grant's. Yet General Grant lost three times the number of men in reaching City Point, that Sherman did in reaching and capturing Atlanta, and in marching to the sea and in getting possession of Savannah: which proved his superiority as both a tactician and a strategist. Sherman, by his capture of Atlanta and Savannah, and breaking the railroad connections between the eastern and western sections of the Confederacy, insured the fall of Richmond, the capture of Lee and his army, and the end of the war; for, once at Savannah with his base on the sea-coast, and free to turn his army north and march through and devastate South Carolina and North Carolina as he marched through and devastated Georgia, General Sherman cut off the army of Virginia from its resources, which, brave as it was, must necessarily fall before the army, equally brave and determined, of General Grant.

The simple march from Atlanta to the sea-coast General Sherman does not regard as any extraordinary feat, but as a change of one base for another, for he encountered little opposition, and had very little to apprehend: its merit lay in severing the eastern section of the confederacy from its western supplies, and placing a splendid and victorious army, with its base on the sea-coast, in the rear of General Lee, while Grant held him in front. Richmond was substantially conquered at Savannah. The credit of this bold and successful strategy, though claimed for General Grant, commander-in-chief of the army, by his friends, belongs undeniably to General Sherman. The Memoirs settle that point. General Grant, though he finally assented, was at first opposed to it; and when Sherman's army had reached the sea-coast, he gave orders for the general commanding to transport it by water to the James, and leave Savannah in the possession of the rebels. Happily, before transport could be collected in sufficient numbers to transfer the army of sixty-five thousand men from Ossabaw Sound to the James, General Sherman had got possession of the city of Savannah, its forts and stores. Then General Grant modified his orders, and left General Sherman free to move according to his own judgment. It is pretty evident that General Grant never fully appreciated General Sherman's march to the sea till he saw its effects. It is hardly too much to say that General Sherman's strategy and his wonderful executive ability caused the collapse of the Confederacy.

These Memoirs correct numerous errors originated and circulated by that "first-class nuisance," the army correspondents, as General Sherman justly characterizes them. They show, contrary to the general impression at the time, and Montgomery Blair's recent bitter

and vindictive criticism, that General Sherman was not taken by surprise at the battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, and that his men were not bayoneted in their tents, and while eating their breakfast. But this was a cruel falsehood. General Sherman was on the alert, knew where the enemy were, expected Beauregard's attack, and disposed his command to meet and repulse it. But his division, composed of new regiments just organized, and never before under fire, in great part, on the attack of the enemy, were frightened, officers and men fell back and scattered, and rushed to the rear, and could not be rallied, nor, during the day, be brought again into action. This created some confusion, and enabled the enemy to gain, for a time, considerable advantage, and take some prisoners. But he was soon checked, and before the close of the first day's fight, and before Buell or Nelson engaged in it, was compelled to commence a retrograde movement.

Nor is it true that General Grant, as alleged, was drunk and not on the field till late in the afternoon. He was on the field before, 10 o'clock A. M., and he personally commanded the last charge on Sunday, which, aided by Webster's battery, compelled the enemy to fall back to some distance, and ended the fight for that day. General Grant, we presume, is not a teetotaler, but nobody ever found him the worse for liquor when he had any duty to perform, and his intemperance has been and is greatly exaggerated. Grant has high qualities as a soldier, is a man of far more ability than he gets credit for, and every patriot should cherish his fame as a general, as part of the inheritance of the country: and even his errors as president,—and some of them are very grave, especially with regard to the States that seceded,—he has been led into by wily and rascally civilians. He is, we believe, honest and patriotic, and we admire his independence.

General Sherman was at the time roundly abused, and even accused of having betrayed the cause for which he had been fighting for four years; and, most cruel of all, of having been bribed by Jeff Davis's gold to do so, in consequence of the liberal terms on which he agreed to accept the surrender of Joe Johnston with all the confederate forces still under arms. Those terms were in strict accordance with the policy resolved on by President Lincoln, and were virtually, almost formally, authorized by him in conversation with General Sherman on the *River Queen* lying off City Point. We thought them at the time wise and politic; and had the agreement been approved by the government, it would have secured the hearts of the South, converted the enemies of the Union into its staunchest friends, restored order and civil authority in the States that had taken part in secession, and saved a world of trouble and civilian rascality and corruption from which those States have suffered more than from the civil war itself. But the assassination of Mr. Lincoln had frightened Mr. Stanton and aroused all his

vindictive passions, and for the moment he was the government, for Andrew Johnson was hardly sooner seated in the presidential chair, than he followed the advice of the great secretary of war.

We defended General Sherman's agreement at the time, and we regretted and still regret that it was not approved by the government; but as it was expressly made subject to that approval, Mr. Secretary Stanton might easily, in the name of the president, have disapproved it or suggested some modifications of it without abusing or insulting General Sherman, and doing his best to turn popular opinion against him. But he was jealous of Sherman, and wished, we presume, to crush him, or get him out of the way; in which he was aided by the leaders of his party, who hoped, by giving the elective franchise to the freedmen, coupled with the disfranchisement of the leading white people, to gain and keep the political ascendancy in all the Southern States, and make them mere subjects of the Northern States. Stanton won over to his side General Halleck, imposed on President Johnson for a few weeks, and apparently had some influence even on General Grant, between whom and General Sherman there had been, and probably still is, high mutual esteem and sincere friendship. But all in vain. President Johnson soon escaped from his control, adopted a policy the reverse of his, and, if he had not committed the blunder of offending Grant, would have thoroughly crushed him and secured his own election to the presidency in 1868. As it was, Stanton with all his efforts failed to crush Sherman, or for more than a moment to dim, with the American people, the glory he had so justly won; and, finally, he went down himself. His conduct towards General Sherman is indefensible, and a foul blot on his memory, which his friends, if he has any left, can never wipe out.

We have read with profound contempt the outrageous attack on the personal and military character of General Sherman by Montgomery Blair, professedly in vindication of his brother, whose character he falsely charges Sherman with having aspersed. To say that Sherman is of an envious disposition, and that he speaks well of no one, is an inexcusable perversion of facts, for his *Memoirs* prove him of a generous nature, and liberally praise Halleck, Grant, Thomas, McPherson, Slocum, Howard, Schofield, and nearly all the general officers who served under him in his Atlanta campaign, his march to the sea, and through South and North Carolina. He commends the bravery and military ability of Logan and Blair, and all he says that can be construed into a disparagement of either, when assigning his reasons for not choosing either to succeed the lamented McPherson, killed at Atlanta, is, that he "regarded Generals Logan and Blair as 'volunteers' that looked to personal fame and glory as auxiliary and secondary to their political ambition, and not as professional soldiers;" that is, as we understand it, as generals who sought military honors not as professional soldiers, but in furtherance of their

political ambition. Here is no reflection on their patriotism or disinterestedness, for they might be as patriotic and as disinterested in political as in military ambition: it only assumes that they were professional politicians, which they were; not professional soldiers, which they were not. That is all.

He is falsely charged with speaking disparagingly of General Thomas, for he only said that "Thomas is slow but sure:" which was notoriously the fact. He relied greatly on his military judgment, and evidently had for him a high esteem as an officer and as a man. General Grant was far less patient with General Thomas. General Grant termed his slowness inexcusable, sent him a peremptory order to attack Hood, who was investing him in Nashville, without delay, and actually sent General Logan with orders to supersede him. Happily for his reputation, General Thomas, before Logan arrived, engaged Hood, beat him, and dispersed his army. General Sherman's judgment of Joe Hooker, so called "fighting Joe," differs from what was for a time the judgment of the outside public, but probably not from that of military men, and is amply sustained by the discreditable failure at Chancellorsville. It is singular that New England has never, in any of our wars, furnished a great general, though she has given our armies excellent common soldiers. We attribute the fact to her town and congregational organization, which prevents the development of individuality or the assumption of individual responsibility. Even in civil life New-Englanders have shown a sad lack of executive ability. Mr. Blair charges General Sherman with constitutional timidity, which is simply absurd. He is constitutionally brave, but he is prudent, is unwilling to sacrifice his men unnecessarily, and is satisfied when the substantial end of a movement is gained. That is all.

The general belief that General Sherman protested against the move of General Grant which resulted in the capture of Vicksburg, and the opening of the Mississippi through its entire length, is unfounded. He simply gave his opinion as to the best method of taking that stronghold, which, for other than military reasons, General Grant did not see proper to adopt; but it was no protest against General Grant's plan, for that plan, if conceived, had not as yet been communicated to General Sherman, nor any other of his corps-commanders. The Memoirs give the entire credit of the plan adopted, its conception and execution, to General Grant himself.

The Memoirs are well written, show a highly cultivated mind, great literary ability, and are extremely interesting and full of instructive lessons for both the military man and the statesman, as well as a most valuable contribution to the history of our late civil war. They are frank, bold, manly, and independent, partaking of the personal character of their author. They will be, nay, already

have been, severely criticized, but they have not been, and cannot be, in any important particular, successfully impeached. No one who watched the varying phases of the terrific struggle for the preservation of the Union can read these Memoirs carefully and candidly without feeling that William T. Sherman, though never holding till since the peace the supreme rank in the army, is, upon the whole, the greatest figure on the Union side in the war, and deservedly has his place in the front rank of the greatest military men the nation has produced, and, in our judgment, at their very head.

There are many points in these volumes, suggestions made, and lessons drawn, of high import to the civil as well as the military glory of the United States, on which we should like to comment. We regret we have no room to do it now, but hope to be able to resume the subject on a future occasion. We need not say that we have a profound admiration, and even a strong personal affection, for their distinguished author, though we have never seen him, nor, as far as we recollect, even a picture of him. He is no political aspirant, detests politics, but he has just and noble views of statesmanship; and on all great national questions he is perfectly competent to instruct the ablest of our civilians. We should regret to see him a candidate for the presidency, but we should be glad to see him the real as well as the nominal commander-in-chief of the army, which office appears to be filled at present by the secretary of war, a civilian official. We want no civilians at the head of military affairs, and for civil matters we have more confidence in General Grant than in Congress.

5.—*Criterion; or, How to detect Error and arrive at Truth.* By REV. J. BALMES. Translated by a CATHOLIC PRIEST. New York: P. O'Shea. 1875. 12mo, pp. 321.

THIS work appears to be faithfully and elegantly translated, and may be read with as much pleasure as if originally written in English by a master of our mother tongue. The work itself has very considerable merit, and is well fitted to be practically useful. The system of philosophy adopted and defended by the excellent author, one of the recent glories of the Spanish clergy, is not ours, and, in our judgment, falls short of the truth on many points, but is the least objectionable of any of the philosophies set forth by those who profess to follow St. Thomas without, in our judgment, understanding him. He is never precisely a routinist, but on several points seems to have applied his own independent thought to their investigation. He comes generally as near to the truth as one can and miss it. He failed to grasp the first principle of rational science, which, according to the learned and profound professor, the first

theologian of our time, is, in his language, *l'Ente crea l'esistenza*, and which the routinists combat in vain, so long as the first verse of *Genesis* stands true, or reason is not held to be a false light even in its own appropriate sphere.

Yet Balmes in this work is practical rather than speculative, and his practical observations are, in general, sound and just. We have read the volume with great pleasure, and found comparatively little to dissent from, while we have found much to approve. Men, unless misled by the false systems of the philosophers, for the most part think truly enough, but confusedly, and without proper discrimination. Their errors originate, not in the fact that they do not think truth, but in the fact that they do not think clearly, distinctly, with precision, and that they include, in their thought, heterogeneous elements, which they do not distinguish, or apprehend as belonging to different categories. Any rules or instructions which enable people to discriminate and properly classify the various elements confusedly embraced in their thought, must be of great utility. This is what is aimed at in the "Criterion." But, after all, we do not think works of the sort effect much. It needs, for their profitable use, all that their profitable use can give. We cannot, for instance, make men reason logically by teaching them the rules of logic. If the mind is not logical by its inherent constitution, a perfect knowledge of the laws and construction of the syllogism will not make him a correct reasoner. We believe we reasoned as correctly and as logically before we had ever seen a work on logic, or knew anything of the rules laid down by logicians, as we do or can now. There are no artificial means of making men able and correct logicians. Men whose minds are not naturally logical cannot be made logicians by any possible amount of instruction. The only thing that can do any good is, to labor to make people think,—think, not merely remember what others have thought, and contemplate the principles of science, which are inherent in the reason which is common to all men and entire in each individual. What men most need to recognize are first principles, and these are given to every man in the reason; and the true education of the understanding is that which turns the mind to them. He who grasps them cannot fail to reason logically, and, as perfectly as is given to us, to distinguish truth from error. These principles, generally disregarded by contemporary philosophers,—who, for the most part, are a nuisance,—and never fully grasped by Balmes, are the only possible criterion of that which enables the human mind, in the natural order, to "detect error and arrive at truth."

There is a sad lack of philosophy in our schools, Catholic as well as non-Catholic. The philosophy current has no basis, is not founded on real principles, the principles of things, and leads to error rather than truth. Philosophy needs to be recast, and made to conform to the truth of things. The principles of science, we

never fail to insist, and the principles of things are identical, for what is not real cannot be an object either of science or thought. We must get our minds out of their grooves, and turn them to the study of things as they are.

6.—*Bits of Blarney*. By R. SHELTON MACKENZIE. New York and Montreal: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1875. 12mo, pp. 426.

MR. MACKENZIE is a man of considerable literary ability and reputation, and, though a Protestant, we believe a genuine Irishman. Perhaps we ought not to say *though a Protestant*, for our poetical friend of the *Boston Pilot*,—a high authority in such matters,—assured the public, not long since, that the truest and best Irishmen going are Protestants. Why, then, complain of “Protestant ascendancy,” and denounce the Irish Parliament of 1800, that sold the Irish nationality for British gold, every member of which was a Protestant? Grattan, Flood, Plunkett, Curran, and a few others, were, no doubt, able and eloquent, and regarded Ireland as their country, but they were powerless against the mass of their Protestant countrymen; and we have never seen, and never expect to see, any good come to Catholic Ireland from following Protestant and infidel leaders. We have much more confidence in the Catholic bishops and clergy than in Protestant and infidel “Head-Centres.” We have no confidence in those Catholics even who sink the religious in the national question, for no nation can be really free and independent that is not Catholic.

Protestant Irishmen are for us neither more nor less than the Protestants of any other nationality; and Catholic Ireland has suffered far more from Protestant Irishmen than from Englishmen. We are simply disgusted when we find the *Boston Pilot* prating about “our element,” and telling us, when it hears of a man somewhat noted, that, if his great-great-grandfather came from Ireland, though he was a bitter Protestant without a drop of Milesian blood in his veins, he belongs to “our element.” Our interest is in Catholic Ireland; and Irish politics, save so far as they affect the Church, are no more to us than the politics of any other foreign nation. We have very little respect for those Irish patriots who think they can serve their country by leaving their religion in abeyance and acting under the lead of its enemies. If the *Boston Pilot* insists on glorying in “our element,” let it visit our prisons, penitentiaries, almshouses, etc.; above all, let it look into the reports of our police courts and mark the frequency with which “our element” is brought up for drunkenness, and husbands of the same element for brutally beating and kicking their wives, not seldom even to death. It may also count the “street Arabs,” belonging to the same “element” that swarm

in our cities and live only by begging and stealing—chiefly by stealing. There it can find “our element,” as also in the emigrants from remote Irish districts, who have never been instructed in the first principles of religion and morality, and hardly know how to bless themselves.

These certainly do not include the whole or even the larger portion of “our element,” but they are enough to render the claims so confidently made by the *Boston Pilot*, and kindred journals, simply ridiculous. There are Irishmen and Irishmen. We want no better citizens or better Catholics than the great majority of our population of Irish birth or descent; but here, as in Ireland itself, there is a large class, that, to say the least, do no credit either to their religion or to their race,—a class large enough and vicious enough to moderate the tone, not a little impudent, of such journalists as our poet of the *Boston Pilot*. We say not that even this class are worse than a much larger class of native-born Americans, and we should never single them out or refer to them as belonging to “our element” but for the impudence of the Irish-American journals, which are, what General Sherman calls army correspondents, “a first-class nuisance,”—a nuisance which, we have no doubt, our venerable bishops and clergy, if they had leisure to attend to it, would soon abate if they could. The worst enemies of the Irish people settled here are their journals and professional patriots, who only trade on their natural and laudable affection for the land of their birth. “Our element” is rich, it must be admitted, in demagogues, and demagogues of the first water. These demagogues go far to neutralize the influence of the Church in redeeming the country and giving it a sound, healthy moral and political tone, for they have been mostly baptized in her communion. Yet they are an evil that must be borne.

No one can deny that to the emigrants from Ireland and their children born here we are indebted for a large, industrious, enterprising, and thriving portion of our population. They constitute probably two-thirds of the Catholic congregations, and more than that proportion of the clergy and religious of the Union; and all honor is due to their zeal and liberality. Nothing can be more admirable or praiseworthy than the love and reverence of these congregations for their clergy, or their liberality in contributing of their often scanty means to the erection of churches, the founding of colleges, asylums, hospitals, and other charitable institutions. Yet they are too apt to forget that they are not the only Catholics in the country, that they are not still in old Ireland, and that Irish politics are out of place here. As much as they profess to hate England, to be loyal to the United States, seven thousand of them, in a single city, who had abjured the British crown, sworn allegiance to the Union, and voted at our elections, in order to escape the draft in the late civil war, denied their American citizenship, and claimed British

protection as British subjects. But enough of this, too much, perhaps, and far more than we would have said, if such journals as the *Boston Pilot* and the *Irish World* had less impudence, and showed some interest in Catholicity separate from Irish politics. What have Americans to do with Fenianism, Home Rule, and other like questions?

To return to "Bits of Blarney." Some of Mr. Mackenzie's pieces are amusing, witty, and funny, but, like most popular Irish literature, low in their moral and religious tone. The biographical sketches of Henry Grattan and Daniel O'Connell are interesting and instructive. O'Connell was, say what you will of him, a great man, a true Irishman, and an enlightened and fervent Catholic,—a complete refutation of our poetic friend's assertion that the truest and best Irishmen are Protestants. He is a proof, too, that it is only under Catholic leaders that good can come to Catholic Ireland.

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- 7.—*Adhemar de Bercezel ; or, Be not Hasty to Judge.* Translated from the French. By P. S. A., a Graduate of St. Joseph's, Emmetsburg. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1875. 18mo, pp. 314.

IN this translation, and in several others that have fallen under our notice by graduates from our conventual schools for young ladies, we detect a deficiency in the mastery of our mother tongue. No translation by any one of these graduates that we have seen is the French rendered into pure English. In addresses to the Almighty the French use the plural pronoun *you*; the English use always the singular *thou*. P. S. A. uses the plural in this translation. The greatest mistakes in translations from the French by these charming graduates are made with regard to proper names. The French generally Gallicize nearly all proper names, especially geographical names from foreign languages, and make them conform to the laws of their own language. In English we follow a different rule. In all cases where there is an authorized name differing from the foreign name, the foreign name must be rendered into it: thus Gascogne must be translated *Gascony*, Bourgogne, *Burgundy*. In all other cases the translator must give the name in the form and orthography of the language to which it belongs. Thus we should write, in English, Strasburg, as the Germans do, not Strasbourg after the French fashion; Mechlin, not Malines. Our young lady translators from the French generally give geographical names in their French form, not in their English form, or in that of the language to which they pertain. The consequence is, that the reader who happens not to know French is often at a loss to know what city, town, or country is meant.

But, leaving these criticisms which reflect on the translators not so much as on their teachers, who, with their French tastes, do not attach sufficient importance to making their pupils accomplished in the use of the English language, we turn to the simple, but highly instructive and charming story of Adhemar de Bercastel itself. The story is French, French in conception and treatment, and consequently contains many high-wrought scenes, an abundance of tears, frequent chokings, and utter inability of the heroine to speak, when to speak, if but a word, is all-important; and a vast amount of sentimental suffering, which a timely word of explanation, that both parties were dying to give, would have prevented. We do not like the author's marrying cousins-german without a hint of the necessity of a dispensation, but otherwise the story is singularly pure and elevated in its moral tone, orthodox in its theology, and cheerful and gentle in its piety and devotion. To a certain extent, it is ascetic, but its asceticism, like all Catholic asceticism, is bright, joyful, attractive even. It appears to have been written to refute the false impression produced by the Protestant and Jansenistic heresies, that religion is a gloomy affair, and that one cannot regulate one's life by its precepts, and be faithful to all its injunctions without foregoing all natural cheerfulness, and becoming sour and morose in temper and disagreeable in society. Nothing is more untrue. The lightest-hearted and most joyous people we have ever met, we have met in convents, monasteries and nunneries. The heartiest laughs we have ever heard, we have heard from devout Sisters consecrated to religion and leading lives of continual labor and sacrifice. The only people we envy are the religious, devoted to prayer and contemplation, and to the active service of suffering humanity. In them religion seems to be a well-spring of joy. Blessed are they who left all, houses and land, father and mother, brothers and sisters, to follow our Lord Jesus Christ in the way of the cross. Yet we cannot deny that the most unhappy and disagreeable people we have ever known are your would-be pious Puritans, who know nothing of the sweetness and cheerfulness of the Gospel. We remember one of them, a minister, who came with unutterable groanings to visit us, when we were given over by our physicians, and thought to be dying. Not a word of the love and mercy of God had he to say, but talked to us of hell-fire and brimstone, till we could bear it no longer, and were forced to bid him "begone, and suffer us to die in peace." We were not a Catholic then.

The story, we suspect, was written before the recent revival of religion in France, when it required no little moral courage in a Frenchman moving in society to avow his faith as a Christian, and to attempt to live according to the teaching and precepts of the Church. He was obliged to brave that which a Frenchman can least bear,—ridicule; and we may add here that nothing seems to us more admirable in the genius of Louis Veuillot, than his successful use of

this terrible weapon, ridicule, against the enemies of religion. From all we hear, Frenchmen may now go openly to mass, practise their religion, go to confession and receive Holy Communion, without fear of being laughed, at or being made the sport of the profane wit of freethinkers, the weakest, the most ignorant, the most conceited, and the most ridiculous people to be met with. We know them, and were once of their number, till it pleased God, by his grace, to enlighten us and show us our folly and absurdity, as well as our sinfulness.

Though written in France and for French society, the story is not without a value for us in this country. It is, as far as we can judge, theologically sound: which is more than we can say of all French publications intended to be Catholic, written by a layman. It breathes always the purest and noblest sentiments, inculcates, in a pleasing way, the highest morality, subordinates all in life to the great end for which man is created, teaches the necessity of grace, the assistance of the Holy Ghost to enable him to keep the commandments, and to attain to eternal life, and a perfect reliance on the divine love and protection, and withal is full of interest and charm. We can recall no story in which the piety and the romance are so happily blended; in which the one strengthens, instead of interfering with, the other. We have read it with interest, from beginning to end, and cordially commend it to our youthful readers, and even to those who are no longer youthful. It is a book we should like to see widely circulated and read. It cannot fail to do good. We cannot have too many such books, and we are delighted to find it translated and published for our English-speaking public.

8.—*The Life of Our Lord Jesus Christ.* By LOUIS VECILLOT. Translated into English. By the REV. ANTHONY FARLEY, from the seventh French Edition. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1875. 12mo, pp. 509.

WE can hardly accept the assertion of the title-page, that this work is translated into *English*. It is, as used to be said, “done out of French,” but the language into which it is done, is not pure English. The translations made by the graduates of St. Joseph’s, Emmitsburg, and other of our female academies, criticized in the foregoing notice, are faultless in comparison with this exceedingly un-English translation. The translator, we feel sure, frequently mistakes and misrepresents the sense of his author, and he uniformly follows the French idiom in his addresses to the Almighty, and uses the plural *you* instead of the singular *thou*, which is un-English and irreverent, and is allowable only in familiar discourse addressed to equals or inferiors. Its use in solemn prayers addressed to God is very offensive to the English ear, and is repugnant to the English idiom, and can be tolerated only by those who are not accustomed

to say their prayers in our mother tongue. We find also, in reading the work, sentences which can bear only a contrary sense to that obviously intended by the author. The translator may know French perfectly, but has not yet learned to render it into pure, graceful, and idiomatic English. Yet we are bound to say, in excuse of the translator, that we have found few French writers so difficult to render into our language as the Catholic journalist, Louis Veuillot.

Louis Veuillot is an able man, in many respects a learned man; but he is not a theologian nor a philosopher: he is a journalist, a Catholic journalist, indeed, with strong faith, and ardent zeal. He is a great favorite at Rome, for he has long been a staunch defender of the papacy, sometimes even to a forgetfulness of the rights of the episcopacy; he has long had, and still has, an immense influence with the bishops and clergy of France, and controls almost absolutely the public opinion of Catholics throughout the world, which holds his utterances hardly less open to criticism than the dogmatic decrees of the sovereign pontiff himself. He is certainly an able journalist, a brilliant and powerful writer, but, if we may take the volume before us as a fair specimen, wanting in theological accuracy in his expressions; and he not unfrequently, in the rich flow of his rhetoric and the ardor of his feelings, contradicts himself, and, if taken *au pied de la lettre*, utters undeniable heresies, at least as represented in Mr. Farley's translation, which is about the worst that we have ever met with.

Take, for instance, the opening sentences of the Introduction, "There are in the Gospel *two* personages,—God and man. The place that man holds therein is scarcely lower than that of God." If by *man* here be meant our Lord in his human nature, then the assertion that there are *two* personages is false; for our Lord has no human personality and is no human personage. If by *man* be meant the human race our Lord came to redeem, which we suppose is the author's meaning, then it is not true to say that the place man holds in the Gospel is scarcely lower than that of God: for in the Gospel the place of mankind is infinitely below that of the Creator, and must be so till united to him in the Incarnation, and the creature becomes one with the Creator. We are criticizing, not the meaning of the author, but his language.

The author, as represented by Mr. Farley, says in his Introduction that Jesus Christ has no history, for he had no beginning. The Word is eternal, has no beginning nor end; but by Jesus Christ is to be understood the Word incarnate, and the Incarnation as a fact is not eternal, but has a beginning in time as has man himself. The Incarnation could not be a fact without the creation of man, and the creation of man was not, could not be, eternal. Jesus Christ, that is, the Incarnate Word, or God in his human nature, had therefore a beginning as much as Adam had, and, consequently, a history:

else why this *Life of Christ* or the Gospel narratives? Nay, the author seems to hold that man himself had no beginning, because he existed eternally in the divine idea or essence: which would imply pure pantheism, and deny the creative act of God. The prototype of creation is, no doubt, eternal in the divine idea, or essence, but the idea is not man; it is the type, *idea exemplaris*, after which God creates man. Man has his beginning, and his beginning in God who has no beginning, for, as St. Thomas says, *Idea in Deo nihil est quam essentia Dei*. We do not suppose the eloquent author means anything more than this, or contrary to it, though he or his translator adopts expressions not reconcilable with it. We pass over numerous other inaccuracies of language which we have noted in the Introduction, the only portion of the volume that we have read, for we prefer reading the life of our Lord in the Gospels to reading it in any uninspired work, however eloquent, or conformed to modern literary taste. Indeed, the author or translator so modernizes most of the Scriptural quotations, that we frequently find it difficult to recognize them; and also paraphrases or renders so freely the quotations from the Fathers and ancient classics,—authors with whom we had supposed ourselves well acquainted,—that they seem strangers to us. They bear no marks of their origin.

But regarding this work as a work against Freethinkers, the pretensions of modern infidel science or materialism, and designed, indirectly at least, to refute the weak and infamous “*Life of Jesus*” by Strauss, and the weaker and more infamous “*Vie de Jésus*” by that vain pretender, Ernest Renan, it deserves high commendation for its boldness, vigor, and resistless eloquence. As a theological work, we cannot praise it; as a *Life of Christ*, we do not prize it, for we are contented with the Four Gospels; but as a controversial work, as a work by the most vigorous, energetic, and uncompromising journalist of our times, when journalism has become a power, and is in the acme of its glory, we esteem it very highly, and consider it worthy of the high reputation of its distinguished author. That its rhetoric is sometimes superior to its logic, and its declamation more forcible than its arguments, is only saying that its author is a journalist, and writes for the French public with whom the phrase is the principal thing.

The purpose for which Louis Venillot wrote this work is worthy of all praise; but, judging from the Introduction, which contains the principles and arguments of his book, while he has shown the ignorance, bad faith, and absurdity of the Freethinkers, and made them ridiculous, which, in such a country as France, is a great deal, and perhaps the most effective answer to their insane attacks on our holy religion that could be given, we do not find that he has set forth any original principles, or any new arguments against them. In substance, he only reproduces the principles and arguments of the tract, *De Vera Religione*, which makes a portion of every modern

systematic course of theology. His great merit is his downright earnestness, the intensity of his faith, and the boldness and terrible strength of his expressions, which remind us of the Letters of St. Hilary of Poitiers to the Arian emperor, Constantius. His soul, if we may say so, seems to us greater than his intellect, and his fervor more effective than his reasoning.

Our readers know that we have never been among the eulogists of the editor of the *Univers*. We have often differed from him in his politics, doubted the wisdom of his policy, and regretted his fierce and denunciatory spirit, but we hold him to be an eminent journalist, an extraordinary man, a firm Catholic, pious and devout, who, in spite of all the mistakes which, in our judgment, he has made from time to time, has, upon the whole, rendered invaluable service to the Catholic cause. We wish we had amongst ourselves a Catholic journalist with a tithe of his learning, ability, and wisdom. When we read the *Univers* or the *London Tablet*, we are mortified to mark the feebleness and inefficiency, in comparison, of Catholic journalism in our own country. Catholic journalism, properly so called, hardly exists here, and we doubt if there is yet with us a public to sustain such journalism; and, yet, we are told that we have a Catholic population of six million souls, if not more.

- 9.—*The Child*. By MGR. DUPANLOUP, Bishop of Orléans. Translated from the French, by the Author's permission. By KATE ANDERSON. Boston: Donahoe. 1875. 12mo, pp. 294.

MGR. DUPANLOUP, Bishop of Orléans, is one of the best known and most distinguished prelates of the Church in France. He is also one of the most active, enterprising, and laborious, and is justly counted as one of the most fearless, independent, and eloquent writers and preachers at the present day in the Gallican Church. He was never an Imperialist nor a Legitimist in his politics, but in the National Assembly of 1848, without being a decided Democrat, he supported the Republic. He is an ardent friend of political liberty, but liberty with order, and is probably what may be called a Parliamentarian. He has always, in the active part he has taken in the politics of his country, opposed Cæsarism, and defended the decentralization of power. He was an Inopportunist at the Council of the Vatican, but accepted the dogma of Papal Infallibility, when the council had defined it. His eloquent voice has been heard, from the first, in defence of the temporal sovereignty of the pope, and in denunciation of the Italian sacrilegious spoliators.

But the good bishop, ever since he was ordained a simple priest, would seem to have devoted no little time and his best thoughts to

the education of childhood and youth; and the schools which he has succeeded in establishing in his own diocese have, we believe, been eminently successful, and are doing great good. He evidently, like all noble and generous souls, like all truly good men, loves children. He loves and respects the child, and has diligently studied his nature, knows perfectly his good and his bad, his qualities and defects, and understands the art of developing the one and correcting the other, and training him up to wisdom and virtue, for the great end for which he has been created. His estimate of the child is very high, his confidence in the child is very great, and his belief in the power of education would seem to be unlimited. Perhaps he believes too much in the power of education, and exacts from it more than it can give, which is one of the tendencies of our times. Education, with all submission to the eminent author, has its limits, and cannot accomplish everything. It has no creative power, and can only exercise, guide, and direct what is born in the child. It has no sacramental power, and cannot, without the sacraments, the operations of the Holy Ghost, raise the child to the practice of those supernatural virtues without which the natural virtues avail nothing towards gaining the true end of man.

The bishop's views of what education is and should be are very high and very just, but the education he proposes requires either a Dupanloup or a Fénelon to superintend it. For the immense majority of parents and pedagogues it seems to us wholly impracticable. To carry it out would require the whole attention and labor of society, and nothing could be attended to by anybody but the education of children and youth. Yet the volume is full of valuable hints and suggestions to parents and teachers, which, if heeded, cannot fail to render education much more effective than it usually is. The author is right in presenting "authority and respect" as the fundamental principles to be observed in educating. The educator must respect the child, and exercise authority over him; but the great difficulty with most parents and teachers is, that they lack authority and fail to respect the child. If they govern at all, it is by force, or the rod generally used without discretion, by caprice, or in ill-temper, and without the respect due to the nature and dignity of the child. The honor of the child should always be consulted and preserved. Few things shock us more than to see a boy arraigned before his schoolmates and shamed, and his schoolmates encouraged to laugh at or ridicule him. It either breaks his spirit and renders him mean and servile, or sours his temper, hardens his heart, and extinguishes every noble and manly sentiment, and renders him indifferent to his conduct and insensible to honor.

The difficulty with parents in governing their children is that they do not or cannot govern themselves. Especially is this the case with our American mothers. The mass of those employed in teaching whether public or private schools, have no natural aptitude for their calling, and little or no heart in it.

The best-conducted schools we are personally acquainted with, after those conducted by the religious, whose vocation is the training of the young, are the public schools of New England and New York, to which is ascribed, we are sorry to see in our so-called Catholic press, the growing immorality of the country. This is unjust and untrue. The public schools do not themselves cause the deplorable immorality becoming so general with our countrymen. It is not they that breed the swarms of "street Arabs" that infest our cities. The most we can say of these schools is that they are powerless to prevent it, since, destitute of all religion, or, having only a sectarian religion, they are impotent to check the evil which springs from the depravity of human nature. Yet, so far as our experience goes, the boys who attend the public schools are rather more moral, exteriorly at least, than those that frequent our parochial schools. The reason of this is, that we have not competent and trained teachers, and cannot procure them. Our bishops, for the most part, disapprove the public schools, because our religion is excluded from them: and we are bound by their authority, and, of course, hold with them that an education that is not based on religion is not sufficient for the morality of any people; yet we do not believe that Catholic children, if they have any Catholic home-training, are in much danger of losing their faith by attending the public schools.

But, be this as it may, to give the training insisted on by the Bishop of Orléans is possible only to the rich. It is utterly beyond the reach of the great body of the people, of the poor and untrained. No matter how competent and excellent are the educators employed, they can effect little if the children receive a bad or no home-education; and few parents can give their children such a home-education as the excellent bishop requires. The mass of them, obliged to labor constantly to obtain the means of subsistence for themselves and little ones, have neither the time nor the qualifications necessary. Yet, although we regard it as impossible to carry out the bishop's views to any great extent in practice, we thank him for presenting them to the public. They give us a noble ideal, and tell us what is the true end of education, and what should be the aim of all Christian educators. His book deserves to be studied by all parents and all persons intrusted with the charge of childhood and youth; and though few can carry out his theory, the endeavor to do it will render education more Christian and more effective.

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- 10.—*Alice Brand. A Romance of the Capital.* By A. RIDDLE, Author of "Bart Ridgely," "The Portrait," etc. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1875. 12mo, pp. 384.

WE did succeed in reading through Mr. Riddle's "Bart Ridgely," and even the greater part of "The Portrait," but "Alice

Brand " proved too much for us, and we broke down before we had got through the first hundred pages, though we summoned up courage enough to look over portions of the rest. Mr. Riddle has ability, and writes with facility, but he has little capacity to construct a plot, or to manage the necessary machinery of a story. He does not seem to us to have much skill or delicacy in love-making. His masculines are quite too bashful, and his feminines have to do all the courting; and when they have succeeded in getting the youth to avow his love, they are quite too gushing, or, to use a Beecherism, too "paroxysmal." The story, no doubt, exposes no little of the corruption of high official life in Washington, and of the rascality of men high in the confidence of the Government; but that is better done and daily by the *New York Sun*.

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The Journal of Speculative Philosophy. St. Louis: Wm. T. Harris's Quarterly. April, 1875. 8vo, pp. 112.

The Month. *A Catholic Review.* London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co. December, 1874, and January, 1875. Monthly, 8vo.

A Pilgrimage to the Land of the Cid. Translated from the French of FREDERIC OZANAM. By P. S., a Graduate of St. Joseph's, Emmitsburg. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1875. 18mo, pp. 194.

Mary Star of the Sea. A Garland of living Flowers culled from the Divine Scriptures, and woven to the honor of the Mother of God. A Story of Catholic Devotion. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1875. 16mo, pp. 340.

The Young Doctor. By HENDRIK CONSCIENCE. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1875. 12mo, pp. 192.

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